

# Central African Emergency

CLYDE SANGER

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## Foreword

I have only once had the opportunity of a talk with the editor of *The Times*. I was about to go back to Rhodesia for a second time, and my mind was full of the likely repercussions which would follow Dr. Banda's return, then imminent. Sir William was at his most charming, and we sat comfortably on his office sofa. He spoke concernedly about the weather, according to the rules of Printing House Square etiquette. It was some time before I could put the question that worried me. "Are you optimistic about the future of the Federation?" I was able to ask him at last.

"Oh yes, I think so," replied Sir William Haley. "Every extra day it's there, more people are likely to come to accept its existence." Then he changed the subject.

I doubt whether he would dismiss the question so lightly now, after the Nyasaland disturbances and the Devlin Report. Yet I wonder. *The Times'* epitaph on the Devlin Commission struck a curious note of complacency.\* This note was echoed by many others in Britain (mostly, it must be said, Conservatives) as well intentioned as Sir William. In Rhodesia many whites, momentarily shocked by the declaration of the Emergencies, also lapsed back into complacency. They told themselves that the trouble had been caused by

power-hungry agitators and that "the ordinary villager" would soon be quite happy again, as long as the agitators were kept out of the way in prison or in restricted areas. They were as remote from reality as the kindly Conservatives.

This book is an attempt to show how dangerous is this complacency, and how unreal and superficial is this explanation. Of course, some Congress detainees *are* small-time power-seekers. It would be extraordinary if some weren't. But the grievances they voiced are genuine and persisting.

There is only a single chapter in this book concerned with the Nyasaland disturbances themselves; this is not only because the Devlin Report has described these events as well as anyone could, but also because the March 1959 disturbances were only a single episode (though certainly the most spectacular one) in a series of clashes between rulers and ruled. Unhappily the series looks like being extended into the future, although there is still hope that the Devlin Report will prove the turning-point in the Federation's unhappy history.

I shall be criticised for being unfair to the white governments. This book is not meant to be a wholly objective history of the Federation, but rather an attempt at showing the full reasons for the growing opposition of Africans, an explanation of why they, just as much as the Nyasaland Government, had to "act or abdicate". If it is thought presumptuous for a white man to write such a book, the need for it to be written must stand as my excuse. Until more white Rhodesians—and Conservatives in Britain—try to see the situation from a black man's viewpoint, there will be continuing turmoil.

Central Africa is an exciting and often a lovely place in which to live. Many scenes, both important and trivial, rush to the mind to illustrate that remark. Standing in the Zambezi river-bed at midnight on a Saturday, watching the floodlit workers of Kariba rushing to beat time and the

floods. . . . Chancing on a ballet of myriads of butterflies migrating through the baobabs of the Zambezi valley. . . . Cresting a hill on the road to Gatooma to see a Mephistophelian sunset storm of red and black. . . . Pacing with a tobacco farmer, red-eyed from weeks of sleep-broken nights, round his barns to gaze on the triumph of his crop. . . . Touring a mission kindergarten in Harare township and seeing the well-fed children curled asleep on mats. . . . Enjoying the gay Sundays, with cheerful bands of Africans strolling along the roadsides, a guitarist among them. . . . Losing oneself from the world in the Chambe plateau of Mlanje Mountain, which seems to float like an island of woods and moorland three thousand feet above the cares of the country. . . . Savouring the strength of a friendship which colour *apartheid* could not warp. . . .

Rhodesia and Nyasaland are exciting, too, in an agonising sense: the excitement of racial conflict. Born of selfishness and fear, it is an unnecessary agony and a futile conflict. At the height of the Emergency, Garfield Todd underlined this tragedy: Central Africa, he declared, had such potential wealth that there was nothing to stop everyone enjoying a full and good life—nothing, that is, once the present suspicions and hatreds had been wiped away. If this book helps to show how these suspicions and hatreds have arisen, writing it will have been well worth while.

PART I

HISTORY

## CHAPTER ONE

# The Differences

The history of the Central African Federation is both a commercial success-story and a political tragedy. In 1953 the experiment seemed to be giving hope to the rest of the world of a new form of society in Africa, hope of a possible solution to the racial problems then being acknowledged everywhere in the world. But this hopeful exterior image has been contradicted inside Central Africa, among its seven million black inhabitants, by a pattern of sullenness and disillusion, which, since 1958, has in many parts hardened into hatred.

The trust which Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had for sixty years put in the British Government as their protector survived many disappointments and even a few years of Federation. The Emergencies almost destroyed it. To illustrate this, I only need to contrast the scene at Chileka Airport on 6th July 1958 when Dr. Hastings Banda returned to Nyasaland to lead his naïvely cheerful people towards "freedom" (a state undefined except as secession from the Rhodesias), with the scene, exactly a year later, in St. Pancras Town Hall in London when the exiled nationalist leaders made fierce, bitter speeches against the British Government.

Of Banda's home-coming my chief memories are these: a sweet-faced choir singing anti-Federation hymns; a small boy tooting on a kudu horn and grinning under a hat which bore the sombre slogan "Slavery is Worse than Death"; a raffia-skirted choirmaster explaining to me the symbolism

behind the Nyasaland Congress flag (he had a short and genial argument with a friend over whether the red in it stood for the white man or "the blood we are going to spill"); and Banda himself saying how close he had been to tears when he came out of the plane to the cheers of thousands. Banda's neat city suit was covered by the skin of a civet-cat and brightened with Christmas crackers—the present of the widow of Chief Gomani, a prominent opponent of Federation. Banda pointed to his doctor's bag and told the press:

"Everyone expects that I have come with self-government in my hand-bag, but we will have to struggle for it. I do not hate the white man—how could I? I have lived most of my life in their countries, and individually they are very nice—but I hate Federation." Yet the mood was not of hatred that day, but of naïve cheerfulness. The Christmas crackers seemed more symbolic than the wild civet-cat.

A year later, fifty Africans had been shot dead in Nyasaland and nearly two thousand others, including Dr. Banda, had been imprisoned in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. At St. Pancras Town Hall, Kanyama Chiume, a Nyasaland Congress leader who had escaped arrest by being away in Kenya, thanked those friends in London who had helped him plead the Nyasas' cause and offered them the bitter invitation "to go with me to the day when we can say goodbye to the Union Jack".

When a white youth in the audience called, "Give credit to the white man for the good he has done!" Joshua Nkomo replied: "None of us fails to appreciate the good that the white men have brought, but we have come to the point where we are forced to believe that the bad now far outweighs the good." Nkomo, the President of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress, who escaped being arrested in the round-up because he was at a conference in Cairo, warned the British part of his audience: "If, this time when we fight for our freedom, this freedom doesn't mean the same to you as it

did in 1914 and 1939, let me assure you that it means exactly the same to us."

In Nyasaland the same mood of sad fierceness filled leading Africans. There was less acceptance than ever of the Colonial Secretary's declaration that "Federation is here to stay". Rhodesian papers suggested otherwise, and quoted Chief M'Mbelwa II, who in 1953 had journeyed to London to protest against Federation, as appealing to his people to stop violence and support the Government. Chief M'Mbelwa was quick to deny the report and wrote to Chiume:

"The fact that I asked my subordinate chiefs to stop violence is true, but with great different aims with the Government. My people of Mzimba, at home, whether staying outside Nyasaland or in prison, are all behind me in opposing Federation, which is the cause of all the trouble in Nyasaland. I am Paramount Chief of 190,000 people, and how foolish would I be to support the Government and be pleased to see my people being terrorised with guns and shot! Can I be Paramount Chief of dead bodies?"

Hatred of Federation was not an emotion confined to uneducated people unaware of its meaning. Sir Roy Welensky, who was fond of shrugging off anti-Federation feeling in these terms, and Sir Gilbert Rennie, the Federation's High Commissioner in London, who attributed it to "misconceived fears . . . and the conservative mind of the African" in his pamphlet *Why Not Be Fair?*, were sadly wrong. In April 1959 I had a four-hour talk in an inn near Zomba with three young Nyasas who were Government employees. They were neither conservative nor extremist; they were all well educated. They took a sophisticated view of Dr. Banda, offering him no hero-worship but seeing him as the incarnation of their own opposition. None of them had any doubt that, in the end, Nyasaland would leave the Federation.

"Nyasaland opinion," they said, "is now like a river without an outlet. Either another leader will come and dig us an

outlet, or we will wait for Doctor." But the course of the river was clear to them.

Given this mood of hatred and determination, what hope is there of success for the 1960 Conference to review the Federal Constitution and to plan a programme that will lead the territories of Central Africa to full independence? Is there a hope that the British Government will firmly show Welensky that it means to honour its role of trustee of the Africans, and by so doing change the mood of the Nyasas and refashion the Federation on surer foundations? Is there a chance of a truly multi-racial (or—happier phrase—non-racial) party gaining political power in Central Africa, and making partnership a reality rather than a term greeted with mockery by Africans? If not that, can the races agree to differ and form some looser, primarily economic, association which would not raise oppressive political fears? Or are the differences among the three territories so irreconcilable, and the Nyasa hatred of "the Southern Rhodesian system" so intense, that a break-up of the Federation has become inevitable, whatever the economic consequences?

These are complicated questions. This book is a search for the answers. It is necessary to start the search by summarising briefly the history of the three territories during the century since white men first came to Central Africa. Only in this way can it be appreciated how the three territories developed, from the first, at different speeds and in different directions, and how great therefore were the inherent difficulties facing the Governments when in 1953 they began trying to build a close-knit Federation.

Missionaries came first to all the territories, although the weight of their impact varied. The Moffats established a mission near Bulawayo in 1859, while the French Protestants by 1885 had become advisers to Lewanika, the Barotse king, who was politically the most important figure in what is now

Northern Rhodesia. In Nyasaland the Church of Scotland, following in David Livingstone's footsteps, founded their Blantyre Mission in 1875.

The missionaries at Bulawayo, tolerated by Lobengula as court advisers, opposed the scheme of bringing up the Pioneer Column, as they foresaw inevitable clashes with the Matabele; as a result, they never had much influence thereafter on the politics of Southern Rhodesia. This power passed to Rhodes' Pioneers who, having founded Salisbury in 1890, had attracted three thousand settlers within three years into Southern Rhodesia. Most of them scoured the land prospecting for the rich gold veins they had been promised; some became traders, and a few turned early to farming. Rhodes' British South Africa Company appointed the Administrator for Mashonaland, who was responsible to a High Commissioner in South Africa. This High Commissioner asked the British Government to proclaim a protectorate over Southern Rhodesia, but the Government was unwilling to make a move that might increase British taxes, and so left Southern Rhodesia to Company Rule (at no dividend profit to its shareholders) for thirty-three years. The mining small-worker and the farmer were soon dominant in numbers, and by 1908 had a majority over the Company officials (who represented the administration) on Legislative Council. In 1923 the settlers took over 'responsible government' as a natural consequence.

The story is very different in the two northern territories, although undoubtedly Rhodes hoped that the same pattern of advance would follow there. Set on linking up with Lugard in Uganda, he sent lieutenants to get mineral concessions from Lewanika, and they were aided in this by the missionaries. A few years later, he bought other concessions covering north-eastern Rhodesia and much of Nyasaland. But his Company's finances were already dangerously stretched, and the Jameson Raid into the Transvaal in 1895

made the British Government think twice about giving the BSA Company the same administrative powers north of the Zambezi as they had taken south of it. In Nyasaland Britain had proclaimed a protectorate as early as 1891.

In 1900 the distinction between the Rhodesias was made more absolute, when a High Court was created in Northern Rhodesia to administer English law, instead of the Roman-Dutch law in force in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The BSA Company opposed this move, but Lord Milner, who wished to see Northern Rhodesia develop as "a tropical dependency on Nyasaland lines", carried the day.

Although Southern Rhodesia was opened up for white settlement to a great extent by the mining small-workers, they never came in large numbers to Northern Rhodesia, which could only offer base minerals. Copper and lead were being worked in large enough quantities to be Northern Rhodesia's biggest export by 1906, it is true; yet there were only 1500 whites in Northern Rhodesia in 1911, compared with 23,506 in Southern Rhodesia. In that year the British Government appointed a Resident Commissioner as "a watchdog" to balance the power given to the BSA Company: for the Company, who from the beginning had had circumscribed powers to appoint Administrators for the divided regions of North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia, were given fuller administrative powers when the regions were joined in 1912.

But Company Rule for Northern Rhodesia was only an interim arrangement which could not survive either the impatience of shareholders for dividends or the awakening of a sense of responsibility in the British Government. There was no real choice for the British Government as to what sort of administration should follow Company Rule. In 1923, when the Company handed over power to the Southern Rhodesian settlers, there were less than 4000 whites in Northern Rhodesia. Farmers were sprinkled along the railroad which the Com-

pany had brought as far as the Congo by 1909, yet settlers only succeeded in gaining political representation—on an Advisory Council—in 1919. It was therefore natural that the British Government should itself assume responsibility in Northern Rhodesia in 1924.

In Nyasaland, the story of white settlement is less complicated. David Livingstone persuaded some Glaswegians to go there as the first traders, in the hopes that the legitimate business they would promote would be a positive way of destroying the slave-trade. In the event, they were unable to manage it peacefully. The African Lakes Company was nearly broken financially by the private war they had to wage with the slavers, and Sir Harry Johnston, the Administrator, took five years to “pacify” the Protectorate. The missionaries had had, since the 1890s, far more power in all of Nyasaland’s three provinces than in the Rhodesias. Africans in the Northern Province (where most Nyasa politicians are bred) have always looked for guidance to the Livingstonia Mission of the United Free Church of Scotland; in the Central Province the Dutch Reformed Church now runs seven hundred schools; and the Church of Scotland’s Blantyre Mission in the Southern Province has educated nearly all the African civil servants for the capital at Zomba.

Although Nyasaland had a Legislative Council by 1907 on which the settlers were represented, its composition was very unlike the Council in Southern Rhodesia. There were no miners in the settler group, the farmers consisted of a few tobacco planters and it was the traders—the African Lakes Company representatives and others—who formed the strongest interest group. And their future obviously depended on dealing fairly with their African customers. Even by 1939 there were no more than 4000 whites in Nyasaland, although the tea and tobacco farmers had begun to assume a more important role.

None of this would be relevant to the present political

system in the Federation if these groups had similar attitudes towards the political and racial problems in Central Africa. But differences in attitude are considerable and the relative importance of any group has determined the prevailing white attitude in each territory.

The Administrators and the white missionaries look on themselves in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as trustees of the Africans' welfare, both secular and spiritual. But while the Administration is impressed by the need to make step-by-step progress in African advancement and to base its policies on smooth evolution and continuity, some missionaries feel they should have a far freer hand, and believe that the territories must now take more adventurous strides. It is inevitable, as a result, that the administrators are accused of continuing anachronistic paternalism and some of the missionaries of irresponsibly backing revolutionary policies. Their reply—that they are only being realistic in a revolutionary situation—does not make them any more acceptable to the settlers.

The settlers—whether they are miners, farmers or traders—are businessmen rather than trustees, guided in their attitudes primarily by self-interest, more enlightened in some cases than in others. While the trader knows that he must use persuasion to make his profits, that he cannot command African customers to buy, the farmers and the miners are on a master-servant basis with their Africans. The large mining companies, whose African labour is unionised, cannot afford the high-handed approach which small-workers may feel free to adopt. Farmers, paying lower wages and employing less skilled Africans than the mines, tend to take the unprogressive view in race relations.

Of course, there are obvious and important exceptions to these generalisations. For instance, some traders such as hotel proprietors, cinema-owners and café-owners place more value on the trade they have already established with

European customers than on the potential rewards to be got out of dealing with Africans. Again, the large Copperbelt mining companies go far beyond the minimum that enlightened self-interest suggests in providing good conditions for their African employees and in giving money for research on, and expansion of, the country's economy. There are also farmers whose welfare schemes have a more imaginative origin than mere benevolent paternalism.

A sixth group of white immigrants cannot be ignored. The artisan took little part in the early history of the Rhodesias, still less in that of Nyasaland; but, with the spreading of the railways, the bursting of activity on the Copperbelt since the 1930s, and the building boom since Federation, there has been a growing demand for his skills. In Southern Rhodesia artisans comprise forty per cent of the white male working population; in Northern Rhodesia, headed by 8000 miners, the proportion is as high. Only in Nyasaland do Government servants and traders make up a larger total than the artisans.

But, despite their numbers and despite the fact that they have produced a Prime Minister (for Welensky would describe himself as an artisan-turned-politician), their effect on the territories' politics has been a dangerous drag. Unable to block legislation for African advancement outright, the copper miners and railwaymen nevertheless seem able to surpass the House of Lords in their suspensory powers: it took seven years for the mining companies to push through an African advancement scheme on the Copperbelt, while the white union leaders on Rhodesia Railways were still resisting the advancement of any African to the (scarcely skilled) job of fireman, even after six years of Federal Government ownership.

These groups, and the attitudes they adopt, help to explain some present curiosities in the territorial politics of the Federation. In Nyasaland the Scottish missionaries have

considered themselves the main link between the races, matching the pace of African opinion and prodding the Government towards speedier constitutional advance. When Dr. Banda and his Congress colleagues were arrested, it was a short step for the Church of Scotland (which, outside Africa, is often considered a conservative body) to come forward as the champion of African rights and aspirations. Dr. George Macleod, the former Moderator, told the 1959 General Assembly: "Somebody has to speak for the Africans." It was his church's historic role in Nyasaland to do so.

The churches in Central Africa have taken no united stand on race relations, however. The degree to which they consider themselves embattled varies among the different churches, and among the different territorial groups inside the same church. For instance, there is disagreement within the Methodist Church: in 1958 its Northern Rhodesian Synod announced that it feared "that the racial policy of the Federal Government, especially in regard to its franchise proposals and its attitude towards Dominion status, is endangering this country's liberal spirit and inflaming African opinion". The same year the Southern Rhodesian Methodist Synod called the franchise law "a great electoral advance"; and, two years later, one Salisbury Methodist congregation sacked its minister, the Rev. Whitfield Foy, on the grounds that he had taken too active a part in politics by helping to edit the broadsheet *Dissent*.

The Anglican Church in Rhodesia has shown none of the appetite for controversy which Archbishop Joost de Blank has evinced in South Africa. The Archbishop of Mashonaland did make a protest at the introduction of "security" legislation in Southern Rhodesia in March 1959, and the Dean of Salisbury declared that the blame for the Emergency "must be laid firmly at the feet of the Europeans"; but the tradition of being the Established Church has inhibited its ministers from making anything but an occasional public protest

against political conditions. The Roman Catholic Church, as in the Southern states of America, has adopted an attitude steadily more critical of Government policy, culminating in the pastoral letter of the Bishop of Umtali in August 1959, in which he supported African land and school grievances and condemned the Southern Rhodesia school system with the words: "A more thoroughly unjust state of affairs it would be hard to imagine".

Nevertheless neither the Roman Catholics, the Methodist nor the Anglican Church have been as forthright as the Church of Scotland in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This variation of views among religious groups is due not only to the different traditions of each church, but also to the fact that each reflects the prevailing spirit in the territory in which it is most strongly established.

The different development of the three territories would alone have made the task of welding them into a viable federation a daunting proposition for statesmen. Two-thirds of the whites now live in Southern Rhodesia where the black : white ratio is 12 : 1; in Northern Rhodesia it is 30 : 1, there being only 80,000 whites; while there are fewer whites in Nyasaland than there are Yugoslavs in Britain and the black : white ratio is 330 : 1. The imbalance of population has inevitably given rise to friction and suspicion between black and white. White Rhodesians are reluctant that Nyasaland should share largely in the wealth they have won from the land. Nyasas and Northern Rhodesian Africans see Federation as a plan to tilt the balance of the population against them.

The various traditional characteristics of the African tribes made the task of federation much more difficult. Furthermore, contact with the different white groups has affected the tribes in different ways. At this stage it is difficult to decide what is cause and what is effect; but the result at any rate is plain: three territories of widely differing social character.

In Nyasaland the strength of the Scots missionary influence has confirmed, if it did not actually create, what are today very recognisable Nyasa characteristics. Like the Scots the Nyasas possess sturdy independence coupled with quick, shrewd brains. Poverty of land makes them as willing as Scotsmen to leave home and seek a small fortune in another country. But, deep down, they are nobody's servants.

In Northern Rhodesia the hand of the European immigrant has altered the earlier pattern of tribal characteristics more capriciously. The Lozi, already half-trained to bureaucracy in the well-organised Barotse kingdom, were swept on by the European into positions as clerks in the district *boma* or later on the Copperbelt. The Bemba, who had spilled over from the Congo into the Northern Province, have become the backbone of the underground mineworkers. But the Valley Tonga, planting maize and millet in the silt-gardens deposited by the yearly Zambezi flood, who had remained so primitive that they had never learnt to fish in the river they lived beside, were left undisturbed until the building of the Kariba dam and the filling of the lake forced their removal.

It is a claim commonly made by the Southern Rhodesian whites that the arrival of the Pioneers saved the Mashona from being annihilated by the Zulu-descended Matabele. This is a statement which can no more be proved than disproved. On the whole, it is unlikely, because the Matabele used to raid the Mashona for women as well as cattle, and this breeding of a mixed tribe was already reducing antagonisms. It is a more certifiable claim that no one has been killed in riots in Southern Rhodesia for sixty-four years, a proud Government boast which is occasionally twisted by whites into a sneer at the dispirited character of the Southern Rhodesian black. "You see, they are a conquered people and they know it", is a phrase soon offered to an immigrant who might otherwise find himself admiring the adaptability of the Mashona to the new Western-style city life. The Mashona,

who have partially absorbed their former conquerors, the Matabele, certainly strike the newcomer as easy-going; but whether he considers that to be due to wise adaptability or a broken spirit depends on how militant-minded the observer himself is. When they rebelled in 1896, they showed great courage, and the action of Sir Edgar Whitehead in arresting three hundred Southern Rhodesian Congressmen before they had organised any disturbances in February 1959 showed that, however questionable his decision was in other respects, he at least did not underestimate what the fighting spirit of the Mashona might accomplish when sufficiently roused.

The Europeans, then, have accentuated the original territorial differences by the various forms in which their impact has been applied, particularly in the realm of legislation. The Land Apportionment Act, defining where Southern Rhodesian Africans may live and trade and farm, is only the most obvious example of this; for there is no such *apartheid* law in the northern territories. It might be expected that the immigration of Nyasas and Northern Rhodesian Africans to work in Southern Rhodesia would help to reduce these differences, but in fact the reverse happens, for the immigrants experience the distasteful conditions of Southern Rhodesia and become determined that their territories shall not be altered to the southern pattern.

It is against these differences that the champions of Federation have had to contend. Closer political union could only have been successful if the differences between the territories were reduced. Yet understandably no African from Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia wanted conditions in his territory to approximate to those in Southern Rhodesia. The Matabele-Mashona, on the other hand, hoped that the northern territories would act as a liberal influence upon their Southern Rhodesia, and so make Federation acceptable in African

eyes. But suspicion that this happy result would not speedily, if ever, be achieved was based upon sixty years' mistrust of settler promises and dislike of settler legislation. We now need to study these in greater detail in order to see how great the odds were against a successful start to Federation.

## Suspicious over Land

Suspicion of European motives was first stirred by misunderstandings over land. It has been an abiding mistrust which Federation has intensified. A British Parliamentary delegation reported, after their 1957 visit:

“The nature of the objections to Federation among the Africans varies in the three territories, but broadly they can be summarised as follows: first, there is a fear that land will be taken away from them. . . .”

Patrick Wall, a Conservative member of that delegation, recalled those words in a debate two years later, and went on to suggest that the Federal Government had proved those fears groundless; for, as he said, in Southern Rhodesia just under fifty per cent of the land is occupied by Europeans. In Northern Rhodesia, European ownership is only nine per cent and in Nyasaland three per cent.

Nevertheless, during those two years the Federal Government had not quietened African fears about land, but rather had aggravated them. Anyone aware of the tension growing in Nyasaland during that time would have been justified in guessing that real trouble was going to be sparked off over the complicated subject of the federalising of non-African agriculture. In fact, the situation was saved by the delaying tactics of the Governor, who refused to react to a vague but provocative threat from the Federal Minister of Agriculture, and the explosion came instead over constitutional matters. But at least over the land question Sir Robert Armitage showed full appreciation of the African suspicions.

The word "misunderstanding" may be too gentle a one to describe the first differences of opinion between settlers and chiefs over land tenure in Southern Rhodesia. The story of how Lobengula sold his rights in Matabeleland is too well known to recapitulate fully here. Having made the Rudd Concession with Rhodes, giving Rhodes a monopoly of the minerals in his kingdom, Lobengula was seized by a fear that this would prove, in the words of Nyasa chiefs seventy years after, "the thin end of the wedge". He repudiated the Concession, but of course this was not accepted. Lobengula then tried another strategy, granting to a man he thought was Rhodes' rival a concession to lease or grant land for a 100-year period. But the concessionaire, Edouard Lippert, was, in fact, a cousin of Rhodes' colleague, Alfred Beit, and sold his concession to Rhodes. Nevertheless, the Lippert concession gave Rhodes and his company no right to the ownership of the land, and such an agreement was never made by the Matabele. To all subsequent agreements—between the British Government, the BSA Company and the settlers—no African was party, and similar situations elsewhere provide the basis for the repudiation by African nationalist leaders in all three territories today of the idea that any land was ever sold freehold.

In Nyasaland, for instance, the 1957 Select Committee investigating reactions to the possible federalising of non-African agriculture came up against this view time and again (indeed the two African committee members, Messrs. Kwenje and Chinyama, held it themselves). As Mr. Wellington Chirwa told them:

"The whole question of land in Nyasaland history has been a very thorny question between the plantation farmers and the Africans of this territory. The Africans have from time to time stated that the land, on which the European farmers are practising agriculture today, does not in fact belong to them. They argue that although the

Consul-General, Sir Harry Johnston, had given the European farmers certificates of claim, these cannot be said to be valid because . . . according to African law and custom the land could not be sold to anyone. As far as I am aware, no documental evidence has been given by the European farmers in this area, to prove that they bought the land from the Africans."

Chirwa is almost certainly wrong in his last point. Although the Select Committee may not have seen "documental evidence", it is clear that Harry Johnston checked on some sort of agreement between chiefs and settlers or traders before issuing his certificates of claim (and one made with the African Lakes Company suggests it was a written agreement). But this only means that misunderstandings existed when the chiefs made the original agreements. Chirwa believes that they had only given the first settlers use of the land, and would never have given them title to it, because that was something which "could not be sold to anyone".

It was a thorny question indeed, which the Federal Government tried to tackle when they decided to federalise the use of non-African-occupied land, while leaving the title to the land in the hands of the territorial governments. The motive was a reasonable one—to improve research and marketing facilities by putting them under a central organisation; for by the division of territorial and federal responsibilities, non-African agriculture in the Rhodesias was already a federal concern. But land titles and the use of land had got hopelessly confused in the minds of Africans, and African fears in turn stimulated European fears, as this sad little exchange between Chief Mwase and Mr. Michael Blackwood, a white settler member of the Select Committee, shows:

Chief Mwase: "If you will permit, I would like to remind you that when we were talking about Federation the Nyasaland people opposed Federation and the Government

and the Colonial Secretary said that they would do nothing with the land. So now we are very much surprised to see that you are coming to talk about the same thing which you said you would not touch."

Mr. Blackwood: "I myself do not consider that this Select Committee is going to find that land has got anything to do with it, and I don't think that there is going to be any evidence to show that the tenure of land is going to be affected at all by federalising non-African agriculture. But what I am trying to get at is the workings of your mind and your fears. It seems to me that your fear may equally give rise to the reverse fear on the part of the non-African. Because if I understand what you are saying correctly, and I hope I don't, I understand that you deny that there is freehold land and that you are going to take away that freehold land if and when you get a chance to do it. Is that so?"

Chief Mwase: "That is correct."

Mr. Blackwood: "Well then, I am not at all surprised that non-Africans are unhappy. Frankly, if that is what you want then I am not at all surprised that they want to do anything they can to get more federation."

Fear of dispossession of land, in fact, was driving European farmers to seek an entirely false form of federal protection—false because the land titles could not have been transferred. The only real protection for European farmers in Nyasaland lay in racial good-will, and that was being dissolved by such misunderstandings. The Federal Government had been singularly heavy-footed: it had viewed the matter simply as an economic question, and underestimated the political repercussions. But when it had inescapably become a political matter, the Federal Government refused to shift ground. Instead of dropping what was never an urgent plan, it accepted all too easily the role of champion of European interests in a political squabble inside Nyasaland. The Governor fortunately postponed the conflict by pleading that the plan could not be considered for a year because of "financial stringency"; but the incident added greatly to the

tension in the Protectorate and was a hidden factor in the outbreak of disturbances.

It would perhaps not be worth dwelling for so long on this single cause of racial clash if it did not illustrate two points. First, that misunderstandings between the races easily occur without either side being deceitful; if the Europeans, however, cannot straighten out the misunderstanding and still persist in their plan, the question immediately assumes quite different—and far more dangerous—proportions. Secondly, that what the Europeans (and in this case the Federal Government) look on as a purely economic measure, Africans may consider to have deep political significance. And if one side considers a matter to be significant in a political sense, then immediately it becomes so, no matter what the other side's conception of it may be. This happens time and again to federal planners, to their despair; but if these deserve sympathy, they should also recognise the reason why Africans today see a political motive behind any economic scheme.

As Patrick Wall pointed out, the Nyasaland acreage held by Europeans is tiny. It is also highly productive, tea and tobacco being intensively farmed on four hundred estates; and the Nyasaland Government has for years been busy on an admirable scheme for halving that white-held acreage by buying back the land for African occupation, so ending the feudalistic *tangata* system, by which the African tenants held plots in return for service to white landowners. It is in the Rhodesias, and particularly Southern Rhodesia, that the land question has generated bitterness, and will undoubtedly generate more.

In Northern Rhodesia, white settlers come on to the land in small enough numbers not to cause the friction and resentment which there has always been in Southern Rhodesia. The same system was, however, applied in both Rhodesias. The British South Africa Company was obliged

to assign sufficient land and water to the Africans, but the Administrator (who was a Company appointee) had power to remove Africans from the land, providing they were paid compensation. The British Government, though opposed to widespread white settlement, was far away and made only faint protests about protecting Northern Rhodesia as "a tropical dependency"; the Company, to pay for the railway, needed quick settlement and the Colonial Office conceded the point. It is a pattern of settler pressure and British Government concession which has been repeated often in the half-century since. It can be argued, as both South Africans and Kenyans have argued in similar circumstances, that there was nothing morally wrong in settling on vacant land in days when there was no black population pressure on the land. Just as the Kikuyu had left the present White Highlands empty, so there were large uncultivated areas north of the Zambezi. But what was unarguably reprehensible was that, when it had been decided that there should be widespread white immigration and that the Africans should therefore be offered the protection of some reserved areas, the Africans should then have been confined to those reserves, as happened in the fertile Fort Jameson area on the Nyasaland border.

Viewed from 1960, there is a pleasant "help yourself" politeness about the exchanges between chiefs and white Administrators in the early days; indeed it is exactly that attitude of off-hand hospitality which caused misunderstandings. A chief could give a man—black or white—land on which to grow crops for a season or more, but he was not in his own view thereby alienating the land. The white settler, on the other hand, had no intention of switching to the African system of shifting cultivation: he was what his name suggests, a settler.

Although the influx of white farmers into Northern Rhodesia has never been heavy enough to make land distribution a major issue—there were, for instance, only

eighteen new farms opened up in 1957—yet the leaders of the Zambia African National Congress saw as unfair the whole scheme of post-war immigration from abroad. Simon Kapwepwe, Zambia's treasurer, who fought with the British forces in East Africa against the Italians, was once witheringly sarcastic to me about the sequel:

"We went to war to fight your enemies the Italians, and we defeated them. What do you do? Within a few years you are inviting the Italians to come and share our land. Can you not understand why we cannot trust a white man's government?"

It seemed as though the two European nations, having decided to bury the hatchet, had chosen to bury it in the back of the African.

In Southern Rhodesia this same resentment was dramatically illustrated immediately after the war. When the Royal African Rifles returned to Salisbury from war-time service, they were cheered through the streets and ended up in a township being addressed by Chief Nyandoro, of Chiota Reserve. In place of loyal platitudes, Chief Nyandoro put the embarrassing question to the whites:

"You have taken our sons to be killed. What do we get in exchange?"

The answer has been: not very much. Since the war about one thousand white applicants have been given land in Southern Rhodesia by the Land Settlement Board and European-held areas have been increased to 48 million acres, of which only three per cent are under crops in any year. For every white farmer in the Colony, there is an average of 3800 acres allotted. In the meantime, the Native Land Husbandry Act has been passed which gives the African farmer an average of six acres and will, when fully implemented, make legally landless a million Africans who consider that they hold communal rights in land although they have not necessarily been farming it.

Six months after asking his question, Nyandoro was deposed from his Chiota chieftaincy by the Southern Rhodesian Government. The unhappy incident made its impact on the chief's nephew, George Nyandoro, who belongs to a family that has never been deterred from opposition by punishment, for George's grandfather was killed while helping to lead the Mashona Rebellion of 1896. Having learned from his uncle's career that the Government was extremely touchy over the land question, George, when he became secretary-general of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress, concentrated on enrolling farmers. He often said: "The Land Husbandry Act is the best recruiter Congress ever had". Yet the Act has been presented to visitors as a revolutionary scheme for land improvement, one of the measures in which the Government takes most pride. Is this self-deception or hypocrisy? Government officials, echoing Sir Gilbert Rennie's words about Federation, say that the conservative mind of the African does not appreciate what is good because it is suspicious of what is new. Once the system is familiar, and once the development officers have taught improved methods of farming, everyone will be happy, they assure themselves. But will a solution be found so easily to what is, after all, the fundamental problem in any African country with a considerable white settler group? Closer examination of facts suggests that the answer is no.

From the first days of Pioneer settlement in Southern Rhodesia, the policy of rigid racial division of land has been followed. After all, the Pioneers and their five-hundred-strong police escort were promised 3000 acres each as inducement to labour up from Bechuanaland. As early as 1894 a Lands Commission had begun designating native areas, and by 1913 there were sixty reserves in which nearly half the African population lived, though the acreage was less than a quarter of Southern Rhodesia. In that year, individual white farmers and the big companies owned about 12 million acres

each, there were 20 million acres in native reserves, and 48 million acres were still "unalienated" Crown land.

Two further sets of figures will serve to show how land distribution since then has only widened the gap between the average European and African holding. A Reserves Commission appointed in 1914 produced proposals which cut native reserves down by a million acres, despite the fact that by 1923, when the proposals were implemented, the population had increased by about 15 per cent. Nevertheless, for every one of the 425,000 then living in the reserves there was about forty acres of land. With only 33,000 whites in the Colony, there was still plenty of room for all.

The quality of land must be considered together with the distribution of it. A Southern Rhodesian African today often compares the rich red soil on European farms with the thin sandy veld soil in African areas, and reckons that the first white settlers grabbed the best land for themselves and drove the Africans on to the poorer soils. This is not a fair statement of fact. The vast majority of Africans was already on the sand veld when the Pioneers arrived, because they preferred an easy living scratching a light soil to the hard work needed to cultivate a heavy one. When the first African reserves were designated, they naturally included the areas where Africans were most populous—and these were the sand veld districts.

Very few Africans were moved off the red soil lands when the reserves were first drawn, say white Rhodesians. Africans deny this, and can quote cases of large numbers being moved. For instance, Chief Chivero's people were moved from land around Norton into Chivero Reserve in Hartley district; Chief Mashayamombe's people once occupied the red soil area around Hartley, and now live in Mhondoro Reserve; Chief Mpaosi occupied Rimuka, which is now the European farming area of Gatooma. Other African farmers were moved from Salisbury itself (then called Harare), from land near Old Umtali and from good soil in the Mount Darwin district.

The Land Apportionment map backs up this assertion. The European areas enclose nearly all the good soil, and in some cases jut into reserves in order to secure patches of red earth. Another African claim is that Africans who are moved away from Crown land are never resettled on virgin red soils, but on dry, poor soil, where the Government has to sink bore-holes for men and animals.

The problem of squatters is yet a further cause of racial antagonism. Africans who had stayed for years as squatters on the large estates of the big companies, giving labour in return for squatter's rights, were moved into reserves when the companies divided up their estates to sell to individual farmers. What a squatter saw as wrongful dispossession, the new white owner saw as implementation of *his* rights. The same clash is likely to occur in the Native Purchase Areas, where three-quarters of the 6 million acres still remain unsurveyed and in the "possession" of African squatters. When this is surveyed and African farmers are put in possession, many more squatters will be "dispossessed". The clash between those who believe that everyone has a communal right in the land and those who wish to clarify individual rights has recently become intensified; but it has been apparent for a long time.

It was in the 1930s that serious friction over land was first generated. There were two reasons for its appearance then: first, the European farmers had begun to fill in their general areas and wanted to take over "pockets" of good tobacco-growing soil from the Africans still remaining there; secondly, because white small traders in the towns faced competition from Africans during the depression years, the Land Apportionment Act was passed in 1930 dividing the country into European and African areas. This is the Act which is so rigid that it has to be amended each time a black man tries to step into the white world, as when Herbert Chitepo, the first African barrister in Southern Rhodesia, wanted to set up

chambers with the other lawyers in Salisbury. Another amendment had to be introduced when the university college was set up, and African students were to be lodged in halls of residence in a white area.

Each of these concessions has been reluctantly given by the legislators, who have guarded the sacrosanctity of the Act and of the white areas it designates with great zeal. The most striking instance of the jealousy with which many Southern Rhodesian whites guard this Act occurred in February 1959, when Sir Edgar Whitehead wished to pass a mild amendment allowing black men to stay in hotels in towns, if the proprietors were prepared to register their hotels as "multi-racial". Sir Edgar had been careful to explain that the amendment was intended to avoid causing embarrassment to distinguished visitors such as American negroes, or scientific delegates from French Africa, or the Sultan of Zanzibar (who had to bypass the law when he visited the Rhodes Centenary Exhibition). Thereupon the main Dominion Party Opposition speaker, Dr. Ahrn Palley, rose to declare that the amendment "attacks one of the essential and basic pieces of legislation, an Act on which the whole racial structure of this country has been built and which by and large has given satisfaction and met with approval of all sections of the people". Another speaker added that he regarded the Land Apportionment Act "as the cornerstone of our society"; while Mr. Jack Cary, who can always be relied on to put matters plainly, said: "We older Europeans in Rhodesia have always regarded the Act as the Magna Carta of the European". The strength of the opposition was such that, although the amendment was passed, for more than a year not a single hotel-proprietor applied to be registered as "multi-racial", knowing that, in a town like Salisbury well endowed with accommodation, he would lose too many clients.

Although the provisions of the Land Apportionment Act restricting African urban life will have to be progressively

amended, no white politician in the Government party has yet hinted at recognition of the necessity to modify the division of agricultural land. By the latest adjustment (1955), almost exactly half (48 million acres) of Southern Rhodesia was allocated as European; and even if all the unassigned land is eventually given to African farmers, they will still not have half of it, since three million acres are designated as "forest areas".

A select committee, set up by Garfield Todd to investigate the Development of Unimproved Land, reported that there were 8500 white farmers cultivating only 1,100,000 acres in Southern Rhodesia. They gave it as their opinion that not more than a quarter of the European-held land was in any event arable, but added that "it is clear that the present percentage of European-held land under crops, that is to say approximately from three to four per cent, is deplorably low".

Still, the very setting up of such a committee showed that some white Rhodesians had a bad conscience about holding the lion's share of the land. There were two ways of easing their misgivings: to hand over to African farmers land which was not being used by Europeans, or, alternatively, to subdivide holdings and bring in fresh European farmers to cultivate the land more intensively.

The first solution has not been considered by any legislators; the second has run into difficulties, for, although the average tobacco farmer in Mashonaland never plants more than ninety acres, he needs many more for the wood for his tobacco barns and for growing maize for his workers. An area, therefore, of less than 1000 acres would be considered only fit for "peasant farming". There have been attempts to introduce groups of European "peasant farmers" into Southern Rhodesia, but without success. Winston Field, who was a successful tobacco farmer long before he became federal leader of the Dominion Party, settled some Italian immigrants on land near his farm,

but they disliked the slur which they found attached to the status of "peasant farming", and, discovering that they could merge themselves best with other Europeans if they moved into towns, left the land.

Later, in August 1957, Dr. H. G. Weizmann suggested that fifty families from the continent of Europe should be settled on 100-acre holdings in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The idea was rejected in Southern Rhodesia on the ground that there was not land available near enough to a rail-head or free from tsetse fly—a difficulty which would hardly have deterred the Pioneers. It was rather that white Rhodesians were (reasonably enough in the political circumstances) loath to introduce a group who might be dubbed "poor whites". In any case, at that time the Federal Government was much taken with a scheme to attract on to farms ex-British officers, then being axed in large numbers—the ideal sort of immigrants in the view of a government which had strictly limited non-British immigration to a 12 per cent quota (as compared with Canada and Australia, where respectively 73 and 56 per cent of the immigrants are non-British). However, there was opposition to the scheme and in fact the two-year-apprenticeship condition discouraged many of the candidates.

The question of whether established farms should be subdivided was brought up again in April 1959, after the Emergency had helped to shake complacency. Another Dominion Party farmer M.P., Peter Gray, proposed that the Government should buy back and subdivide large areas of privately held land and offer "every inducement, particularly to young Rhodesians, to acquire land". He also urged "the necessity for encouraging the immigration of suitable farmers", and his party leader, Mr. Aitken-Cade, made clearer the motive when he said that, by subdividing,

"we would restore that flow of immigration that is the final answer in this country to all the problems by which we

are bedevilled. If we had a vastly increased European population, the reservations and fears of the European population would be dispelled."

Such talk is the swiftest way of increasing African suspicions of immigration, for an African can only conclude that each new immigrant is being brought in primarily as a racial reinforcement in a near-military sense, rather than as an extra contributor to the future prosperity of the whole country.

These various moves to people the European farm areas with more white farmers, whether successful or not, have made it clear to the Africans that they cannot expect any alteration in the terms of land distribution between the races in Southern Rhodesia. Their view is that they cannot make do with their present quota of less than half the Colony's acreage; they dislike the Native Land Husbandry Act for a wide range of reasons, particularly because it seeks rigidly to perpetuate the divisions of the Land Apportionment Act; the policy of immigration they interpret as a sinister long-term plan. A pervading atmosphere of suspicion therefore hangs over the single question of who tills how much land. It is not hard to understand why Nyasas were suspicious to a man of letting any part of their land be transferred to the control of a Federal Government, whose Minister of Agriculture was a Rhodesian farmer. It was no good telling a Nyasa that land titles were not—could not—be transferred, and that federalisation of non-African agriculture would bring greater efficiency, greater prosperity for all. He had seen such arguments used before to justify actions with an underlying racial motive.

PART II

FEDERATION

## Paraphrasing Partnership

Undoubtedly the chief cause of suspicion among Africans about Federation was the way in which it was brought in. If it had to be imposed against their obvious opposition, they argued, how could it ever have been intended for their especial benefit? No amount of talk about "the misconceived fears of the African" has succeeded in altering that view.

Federation is a compromise between amalgamation of the territories into a unitary state (a plan mooted as early as 1915) and a loose form of economic union. It is not, as Sir Godfrey Huggins hastened to point out in 1952, "an inferior form of government . . . it is the form of government which has been adopted by many of the most powerful and prosperous countries in the world as, for example, the United States, Switzerland and Canada". For the previous twenty years he had believed that "a clear and clean-cut amalgamation would be the best solution, as it would have the virtues of simplicity and efficiency". He had hoped for the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias, on the basis of the Southern Rhodesian constitution, Nyasaland not being an essential component. His original motive was to secure Rhodesian independence from South Africa, not to lay hands on the Northern Rhodesian copper money, for that was not then the substantial attraction it became after the war. Later he told Northern Rhodesians gaily: "I was in favour of a united Rhodesia when you hadn't a bean. Now that you're rich, I like you just as well!" But other Southern Rhodesians only became interested in being linked with the north when copper had begun to

yield profits of £40 million a year, from which the Northern Rhodesian Government was drawing high tax revenues.

The white Elected Members in Northern Rhodesia's Legislative Council had also favoured amalgamation for years; it would, they hoped, free them from the rule of the Colonial Office and save their territory from being turned into a "black state". In 1939 the Bledisloe Commission had rejected immediate amalgamation on the grounds that the legislators of Southern Rhodesia were too inexperienced and their native policy too unreliable. But as late as August 1945 Welensky introduced a motion for amalgamation in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council, which the Government official members and the unofficials sitting for African interests defeated.

By 1946 Welensky had been converted to the idea of Federation. The conversion came, it is said, after a talk with Oliver Stanley, who assured him that the Conservatives would no more entertain the idea of amalgamation, if they were returned, than would the Socialists then in office. Welensky persuaded Huggins to his view, and the pair spent the next five years battling to promote the scheme. But it was a late conversion for them both, and Africans have not yet been convinced that their acceptance of the idea was not purely tactical, and that they were not aiming to achieve amalgamation—a white-run, unitary state—by roundabout means.

Every time that the Federal Government has increased its power since Federation—especially in the agricultural sphere—Africans have suspected that this meant that amalgamation was still not a dead policy. As Minister of Defence, Welensky was in command of the Federal troops flown to Nyasaland during the disturbances, and when he went on to say that "the most cogent lesson" of the disturbances was the need to establish a Federal police force in

addition to the territorial police, the bogey of amalgamation rose up again. In the 1957 London Agreement it was thought necessary to disallow afresh the idea of amalgamation; nevertheless, the bogey had not faded two years later, and Sir John Moffat took his stand for the Central Africa Party in the Northern Rhodesian elections on the platform that no more territorial powers should be allowed to drift into the hands of the Federal Government.

The alternative to amalgamation was an economic union. In October 1944 the Central African Council had been set up with the approval of the British coalition Government, and it excited the suspicion of Welensky and Huggins, who thought they were being "fobbed off with something to stop amalgamation". The Council did good work, even if it precipitated the 1948 general election in Southern Rhodesia, in that it discussed (for it had only consultative powers) the unifying of such services as customs, posts and telegraphs and European education, and helped to negotiate a migrant labour agreement.

At the height of the 1959 crisis, non-party men remembered the Central African Council a little wistfully. Sir Robert Tredgold, the Federal Chief Justice, said: "They were in too much of a hurry to start the Federation. They should have persevered with the Central African Council." East Africa has learnt its lesson from this: in 1952, to support his own policies, Huggins was claiming that "Sir Philip Mitchell recently forecast that the countries of East Africa would ultimately end in a federation". Now it seems most unlikely that East Africa will join in the kind of political union the former Governor of Kenya envisaged. The economic union established through the East African Commission is obviously the best mode of connection at this moment of the territories' political evolution. Many people in Central Africa wish that their territories, too, were only linked in the same way as those of East Africa. But the path back from political union

to a looser economic union is one which would be difficult to retrace.

In the recriminations over the first failures of Federation, it was natural that Rhodesians should have tried to make scapegoats of the Labour Ministers who had influence over Central Africa policies from 1945 to 1951. Those who were, as Sir Robert Tredgold has suggested, in too much of a hurry must consider that those who were more cautious destroyed the chance of getting essential early confidence in the scheme. Jim Griffiths, the Colonial Secretary in the 1950-1 Labour Government, has been attacked fiercely on two counts: that he did not publicly approve the principle of Federation as soon as the conference of officials produced the first draft; and, more positively, that he instructed the governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to refrain from giving their Africans guidance concerning the merits of Federation. Writing about the suppression of the Zambia Congress in 1959, the *Central African Examiner* commented:

"Government action this year in Northern Rhodesia saved bloodshed as surely as inaction by the Nyasaland Government six and seven years ago laid the foundation for it. And it was, of course, on the instructions of a Labour Government that members of the Nyasaland Administration were forbidden to advise their people on the desirability or otherwise of Federation—so that village headmen and chiefs met a blank refusal to discuss the matter at all. Suspicion swept the country—a bush-fire the Government has never managed to overtake."

There is enough truth in the story to make some mud stick, but it is important to get to the real facts—not in order to apportion blame so much as to learn the lesson of how suspicion is generated. In February 1949 Welensky and Huggins held a secret conference of private European citizens at the Victoria Falls. They approved the idea of federation, but made the irretrievable blunder of having no

Africans present, although there were then two Africans in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council. The omission was understandable, for they produced a scheme which cut out African representation. African distrust of Federation dates directly from that time.

The 1951 London Conference of officials, which produced a draft plan, was not initiated by Griffiths, who always considered it as merely exploratory. Later in the year when he visited Nyasaland, he told Ralph Chinyama, then the Congress President, that Federation would not be imposed against African wishes. His talks at Victoria Falls with Huggins and Welensky, to which he persuaded some Africans to come, broke down. Huggins described the scene as "degenerating into a native benefit society, led by the Secretary of State".

Griffiths' predecessor at the Colonial Office, Arthur Creech-Jones, first and foremost a Fabian, had hoped to see the Central African Council evolve into a form of closer association and was dismayed by the manner in which Welensky and Huggins seemed determined to "torpedo" it. He was not against a federation for mutual economic benefit—his sponsoring of the Montego Bay Conference, which led to the Federation of the West Indies, shows that—but he was firm in his belief that "the essential condition for the effective working of any federal constitution is its acceptability to public opinion". Just as he had been careful to see that West Indians were the prime movers in their federal scheme, so he was opposed to any federation in Central Africa of whose political as well as economic benefits the majority (or the representatives of the majority) could not be convinced. The Conservatives agreed with this broad view; where they differed was in believing that the African nationalists were not proved to be representative of the majority opinion, and that the majority of Africans would, in time, come to be convinced of the all-round benefits of federation.

The Labour Government of 1950-1, in which Creech-Jones

was no longer an M.P., declared eventually that there was an urgent need for some closer association among the territories, and that this "would best be achieved by federation", but without specifying what form of federation they favoured. In Griffiths' own words (to the Commons in July 1959), "The Conference in 1951 adjourned, having agreed to consider federation further and having agreed, also, to embody as basic principles the principles which are now generally referred to in this house as the Preamble"—the declaration that the three territories "would foster partnership and co-operation between their inhabitants". But the Labour Party could not help but be perturbed by many features of what was to become, under a Conservative Government, the proposed Federal constitution, and they opposed the plan consistently during long months of argument until it was imposed by Order-in-Council.

Conservatives are naturally disposed to put the best interpretation on the motives of a governing party, providing that it has not risen to government by revolution. Although the Conservatives recognised that the writing into the Federal constitution of safeguards for African interests was psychologically important, from the first they saw the constitution in terms of a gentlemen's agreement between two governing parties, it being tacitly understood that both governments would act for the good of all their subjects. And although in 1952 the conference to draft the final federal scheme was postponed in order to give time for the Minister of State for the Colonies to visit Nyasaland, it was obvious that Mr. Hopkinson's mission was to tell Nyasas why Federation was considered good for them, rather than to consult them to any practical purpose. The Conservatives' attitude to the Federal constitution has made Africans mistrust their motives as much as those of Huggins and Welensky.

The kindest interpretation of the contrast between Conservative and Labour attitudes was given by the Archbishop of

Canterbury to the Lords during the Devlin Report debate: He divided them thus: "On the one side, those who in general pride themselves on being the supporters of reason and authority, wise judgment and economic welfare and all the other good things; and, on the other, those who in general pride themselves on being the supporters of rights, of justice, of freedom and of divine discontent". And he warned the two parties that "the worst thing we have contributed from this country to Central Africa is to have allowed their dilemma to be seen by us over here in terms of political struggle. . . . Where we ought to be able to speak with one voice of wisdom to Central Africa, we find ourselves in the lamentable situation of speaking with two."

The history of how Federation was brought about shows that it began under the most ill-omened stars. The Labour Government had given Africans the promise that their views would be fully consulted; the Conservative Government decided that their views would be over-ruled. If a Labour Government had never been concerned with the Central African situation, it is possible that in 1953 Africans might not have felt that they were being so badly let down, since expectations of fair treatment would never have been raised. But that is not at all to say that the later troubles would have been avoided. The racial iniquities in the Central African territories were bound to create fierce friction in the setting of a continent being awakened by nationalism, and the form of the Federal constitution did not suggest to Africans that the Conservative Government meant to remove these as quickly as possible. The Conservatives believed that they and the white Rhodesian politicians were speaking the same language when they talked about "racial partnership". They find it politic today to believe it still. This may help to smooth Conservative dealings with the Federal Government, but it makes Nyasas accuse the British Government of the same

hypocrisy which they reckon they have detected in the Federal Government's use—or abuse—of the phrase.

Nor did the Labour Party emerge, in African eyes, from the events leading up to Federation with its reputation for fair dealing and regard for African rights untarnished. The firmness of Creech-Jones was followed by the unexplained hesitancy of Griffiths in office. Finally, when the Conservatives had brought Federation into being, Mr. Aulce expressed the view that Labour should make the best of the situation, reconcile themselves to a *fait accompli* and trust that their earlier misgivings would not be fulfilled. Africans looked on this as a surrender of principles to the white settler strength. The Labour Party's decision not to join the Monckton Commission was surely hardened by unwillingness to repeat in 1960 the vacillation which their leaders had shown in 1953.

What hopes did those who promoted Federation have in it, and how far were they fulfilled?

To Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, then Colonial Secretary, Federation was primarily a large-scale experiment in multi-racial co-operation, a vital experiment in a continent where Mau Mau terrorism and Malan's *apartheid* were the disastrous extremes towards which any country might drift. Afrikaner immigration into Rhodesia had increased and had raised fears of a "wooden horse" plan to annex Southern Rhodesia to South Africa. In the Federation debate in March 1953, Mr. Lyttelton described the federal scheme as "a turning point in the history of Africa", and went on to say: "If we follow this scheme, I believe that it will solve the question of partnership between the races".

Sir Godfrey Huggins put the priorities of Federation in a very different order. In the June 1952 debate on the White Paper which was produced after the Conference of Officials, he bundled together all his hopes in one sentence:

"We are trying to enlarge and fortify a unit of the Empire which is at present small, thinly populated, industrially of small importance and of relatively insignificant importance in the world, into a country which is well populated, highly developed and with its immense natural resources employed to the benefit of mankind in general."

Nowhere in his long speech did he mention 'partnership.' He quoted Chief Awolowo, later premier of Western Nigeria where there is universal adult suffrage, as saying: "The articulate minority is destined to rule the country now and for all time. It is their heritage"; and he added that "the only supremacy there should be in Rhodesia is the supremacy of civilised people", comforting the apprehensive with the assurance that there was as yet no evidence that more than a few of the backward peoples would be able to acquire the civilised qualities of technical skill, education and cultural values.

The benefits of Federation to Africans he explained blandly: "Among other things the Federal proposals are intended to do is to increase the real wealth of the three territories, and if we succeed in that, who will benefit most? Why, of course, the greatest number." Vaguely he added: "There are many problems concerning the African Native we cannot deal with without greater wealth, and Federation is the road to the solution of these problems."

Perhaps it would have been too much to have expected him to pledge his support of partnership while commending the federal scheme to the all-white Southern Rhodesian Assembly, for some of its members saw Federation as a surrender of the Colony's powers to a government over which Britain or the blacks might win control. He had to ridicule fears and stress the economic benefits and "the importance of creating a strong British bloc in this part of Africa". The size of his task can be measured by the 14,929 votes which were cast against Federation in the Referendum nine months later.

More than one white in three resisted his arguments and voted against Federation.

Nevertheless, Huggins put economic progress as the paramount argument for Federation; the promise of racial partnership, written into the constitution's Preamble, was, he implied, the unpleasant part of the bargain with the British Government. For he told the Federal Assembly in July 1954:

"Let us for the sake of Federation, which was for economic advancement, not for the Preamble, which was forced on us, have patience. . . ."

Garfield Todd, speaking in the June 1952 debate, was far more forthright than Huggins. He hardly mentioned economics in his speech, which he ended with the words:

"If we federate these three countries, we are committing Central Africa to a liberal policy. We are committing it to a policy of racial co-operation, which I believe we are not so fully committed to under our present State Government. I believe that it would be easier to swing back from such a policy at the present moment than it would be when we are on a Federal basis. If this is a disadvantage of Federation, then people must consider it and vote accordingly."

But the prospects of economic benefits and independence from South Africa were uppermost in the minds of the 25,580 who voted for Federation at the Referendum.

Before considering in detail the economic advantages it was hoped Federation would bring, it is worth following the career of that vexed word 'partnership'. It is the keyword to the concept of Federation; if it is meaningless, the idea of Federation is likewise void.

The idea of partnership was suspect from the very first among Africans, for a simple reason which few Europeans appreciate. In 1930 Lord Passfield, as Colonial Secretary, laid down the principle that, whenever there was a conflict of interests in territories such as Northern Rhodesia and

Nyasaland, African interests should be considered paramount. But in 1948 the policy of African paramountcy was officially dropped in Northern Rhodesia in favour of one of racial partnership. This was the first official occasion on which the phrase had been used. When, five years later, it also became the official slogan of the Federal Government, it inherited the earlier odium it had gathered in the north. Whereas in Southern Rhodesia it hinted at a (still only theoretical) departure from the policy of white supremacy, in the north it had already been experienced as the substitute for the old policy of African paramountcy. Africans, in fact, thought that partnership would take—had even taken—more from them than they could ever hope to gain from it.

After the Devlin Commission had reported in July 1959, Mr. Gaitskell rather uncharitably described partnership as "a fine word, but becoming a little fly-blown". He then ventured his own definition: "If it is to mean anything, partnership must be based on equal rights and equal status, and it must not be regarded or treated as a device to justify *de facto* white supremacy." He added that partnership meant the eventual granting of universal adult suffrage.

Sir Godfrey Huggins has defined it differently. For public, or British, consumption he once said:

"Partnership is based on the total rejection of any policy of racial domination and suppression, and a sincere acceptance of the fact that black and white are indispensable to each other and that each must by his conduct and actions earn the confidence or goodwill of the other."

But for private, or Rhodesian, consumption he added the now famous aside that he looked on partnership of black and white as the same sort of relationship as exists between a horse and its rider.

Even this early disclaimer was not enough to set some white Rhodesians' minds at rest. When the Southern Rhodesian Assembly was debating in April 1959 the Unlawful Organisa-

tions Bill, which proscribed the Federation's four African Congresses, Mr. William Harper, a former wing-commander turned tobacco farmer who heads the Dominion Party group which would like to see Southern Rhodesia secede from the Federation to re-establish white supremacy, spoke of partnership thus:

"Originally we were led to believe that its inclusion in our Federal constitution was of no importance, but as time has gone on this particular unfortunate word has assumed greater and greater importance. To start with, in my opinion it is nebulous phraseology; and further, it is the very use of words of this sort which gives grounds for people to embark upon the very enterprises that this Bill is supposed to stop. If there has been any loss of life as a result of this Emergency, I certainly attribute a considerable portion of it to the use of meaningless phrases in trying to convince the Africans of what we intend to do in the future."

In reply to Mr. Harper there was quoted the definition of partnership arrived at by the committee which Huggins' Federal Party appointed for the purpose. It is worth giving in full as an example of the remarkable talent Rhodesian politicians have for hedged statements which, because they deal with matters of degree or timing, can sound as progressive or as cautious, as liberal or as conservative, as the hearer chooses to make them. Partnership, this committee suggested, consists in:

"the realisation that the European and the African have distinctive and complementary parts to play in the Federation, and that each should be rewarded according to his contribution to the partnership; the recognition of the natural desire on the part of each race to develop on the traditional lines, and the need for bearing this in mind in the provision of facilities and amenities while the present wide differences exist in the cultural levels of the people; the gradual extension of political rights and privileges to those who conform to civilised standards of behaviour and culture, with a corresponding diminution in

special political representation; the acceptance of the principle that persons acquiring political rights can no longer enjoy special privileges."

To the sceptical ear, much of this sounds negative enough to come from an apologia for segregation. The involved thought in the second half about balancing the extension of political rights by a diminution of special privileges is an allusion to the Federal Party's plan for the "withering away" of one of the twelve Specially Elected African M.P.s or three Specially Elected or Appointed European M.P.s whenever an African becomes elected to the Federal Assembly on the "ordinary" vote. Since this is, in effect, a pledge that African representation will not be increased until that very distant day when more than fifteen Africans get elected on the "ordinary" vote, it will hardly excite enthusiasm among Africans or white liberals.

Other speakers in the debate provided further definitions, culled from various sources: they ranged from the dictionary's "one of two playing on the same side in a game" (which provided an ironic laugh during a sombre day) to Jack Cary's "common-sense interpretation", in which a junior partner was nevertheless a "full partner", an arrangement he said he was not prepared to support. Finally, the Minister of Justice put an end to semantic speculation by saying, "It is a joint venture, and further than that I do not think any good purpose would be served in proceeding with any definitions."

But Mr. Harper was short-sighted in calling partnership a "meaningless phrase". It has many meanings, and as many uses, and there is reason for blacks to be cynical about its ambiguities. Dr. Banda wrote in *New Commonwealth* (31st March 1958):

"As for the vaunted partnership policy, it can be mentioned only to be dismissed. The settlers never meant partnership to be anything but a sop to the liberal-minded people in Britain. And the Nyasas, on their part, never believed that

Sir Godfrey Huggins and Mr. Roy Welensky could ever seriously regard them as true partners."

It is unhelpful to dismiss partnership utterly, as Dr. Banda does, or to suggest that it is not only a hypocritical but a dangerous idea, in that it is by its nature even more ferociously opposed to African nationalism than the *apartheid* theory.\* This view asserts that partnership can never be anything more than the mirage it has seemed these last seven years, that it is a trick to divert Africans from the path to independence. The opposite is true. It is rather a weapon ready to be used by Africans and liberals. Gaitskell defined accurately what the word means in the opinion of the world at large, certainly of most people in Britain. For the Federation to survive, the true interpretation must be accepted in Rhodesia, and fraudulent definitions dismissed. After the Nyasaland disturbances, Todd wrote: "Of course, we Europeans are to blame to a large extent for the mistakes of the past five years, for we have not succeeded in implementing the policy of partnership, simply because we have refused to face its implications." It lies with Africans to hold government to its word about partnership, and to persuade the whites to face its proper implications.

\* This is the view of Colin Leys (Balliol don and author of *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*) expressed in his article "Natives No Longer Kill Twins" in *Africa South* (July-September 1959).

## CHAPTER FOUR

# The White Rhodesian

Having brought the story as far as Federation, it is worth pausing to consider some aspects of the white Rhodesian's character, in order to gauge how likely (or unlikely) it was that he would embrace a policy of partnership.

A caricaturist could have fun trying to sum up the group-character of 300,000 whites spread over a vast area. As a task taken seriously, it is almost impossible. Despite the fact that the Federal Government maintains the demand that eighty-eight per cent of the immigrants in any year shall be of British stock, white Rhodesians are far from being a homogeneous group. Very roughly, a third of them were born in the Rhodesias or Nyasaland, a third have come up from South Africa, and slightly less have emigrated recently from Britain. A quarter of those who live in the rural areas of Southern Rhodesia are Afrikaners, according to Dutch Reformed Church statistics. How can one generalise to any purpose about such a diverse group?

The answer is that such generalisations can serve a purpose only if they explain why people behave so differently, when transplanted, from the way they would behave in Britain. Are we a people of double standards who will, when set down as a privileged white minority in Africa, forget the principles of democracy learnt at home? Or is it too much trouble to assert these principles at the expense of popularity among whites and privilege over blacks? Are many Rhodesians more liberal than they seem, and is it merely that

their real views are buried by political lethargy, selfishness and desire to conform?

Some of the finest people I have ever known were Rhodesians—and Rhodesians of all kinds: some born there, others emigrants from Britain or South Africa. The spaciousness of the country and its opportunities have given a rounded completeness to their lives not often found in Britain. Spaciousness leaves its imprint on everyone who goes young enough to Rhodesia; but it works its effects in different ways and is responsible for many of the paradoxes in the Rhodesian character.

The Rhodesian has to be more self-reliant than the inhabitant of Britain, and the independence of attitude which this breeds has, as its obverse, a measure of intolerance. It may seem strange that among the post-war immigrants from Britain are found many of the least tolerant people; the explanation is that they are often fugitives from the restrictions of life in the Welfare State, rebels against the discipline of queues and commuters' trains who have not yet achieved a balance between intolerance and independence in the wider scope which Rhodesia offers.

Like the American Southerner, the white Rhodesian mixes generous open-handedness with narrowness of mind—a lot of ideas have never come his way. Like a Texan, he enjoys talking about—identifying himself with—extravagant and larger-than-lifesize figures. It makes him feel more on terms with the vastness of Rhodesia itself; and to have seven million black men kept smaller in psychological stature than himself increases that feeling.

There are numerous examples of the larger-than-lifesize character whom white Rhodesians admire. There is the legendary Thomas Murray MacDougall, who was the pioneer of sugar planting in the low veld. To irrigate his small plantation he spent seven years cutting a canal through 1400 feet of solid granite hill with pick and shovel, and another

two years dragging the parts of a huge sugar mill up from South Africa along bush tracks and across unbridged rivers. He was the natural choice for Minister of War when the independent-minded town of Fort Victoria decided, one cheerful evening in 1922, to secede from Southern Rhodesia and set about forming its own Cabinet.

There was also a recent Mayor of Ndola, Len Catchpole, who used annually to add to the prestige of his office among thirsty Copperbelt miners by challenging (and defeating) an elephant in a beer-drinking contest. There was the Scottish peer's son who from an aircraft spotted a site he liked for a farm in the hills, built a 15-mile road through to the place, and bought the land by tearing the tail off his shirt and writing a cheque on it. Rhodesians also like their leading politicians to be more than life-size, and in their ways Welensky and Garfield Todd both fulfil that requirement. (Lord Malvern's way to the premiership was along a different path—he was the doctor whom everyone knew.)

People who identify themselves with such outsize characters are more likely to accept outsize stories than they are in Britain, where an attachment to the Cockney character or Strube's "Little Man" produces a salutary scepticism. It is a fact that, although the whites in Central Africa have a reputation for being hard-headed, many of them are extremely gullible.

The supreme example of gullibility was the immediate credence given in March 1959 to the stories of a massacre plot in Nyasaland and of similar plans hatching simultaneously in the Rhodesias. Later, I will be making a full study of the disastrous effects produced by this credulity: at this point there is only room to quote from a letter sent by a housewife in Blantyre—a university graduate—to a friend in England during the arrests. She wrote:

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"We're not sure what the British papers have been saying, but the most Tory of them all is likely to be nearest to the

truth. There is no shred of doubt in our minds as to the truth of the massacre plot, that we were all going to be poisoned. For you will have heard that forty tons of poison ordered and on its way to Dr. Banda's surgery was intercepted. Ever since, we have been trying all our food first on our poor long-suffering animals. . . ."

This housewife lived, as she adds in her letter, "just along from Dr. Banda's house", and her husband as a special constable took part in his arrest. But a hundred nameless fears dwelt between the two houses. In a white minority which feels its ignorance and isolation in a black land, it is hard to distinguish genuine fear from mere titillation of fear from the repetition of horror tales. The superstitions and primitive habits of Africans are a favourite topic at white dinner-tables, and the author Stuart Cloete has for years profited from catering to this macabre taste among his readers. Could the housewife really have visualised eight five-ton lorries being driven in convoy over the Blantyre hills, blocking the main Limbe road outside Dr. Banda's tiny surgery hut, and a great stack of poisonous packages being piled up before being distributed secretly over the length of Nyasaland? It was a fantastic dream-world into which she had been driven by ignorance, tension, and a gullible imagination. But plenty of other people, including M.P.s, shared her delusions in Central Africa.

Lord Malvern, philosophising on the Nyasaland Emergency, said in May 1959: "It is a very good thing the balloon went up in Nyasaland. . . . It has caused the Europeans to do some hard thinking. It is not only people overseas who are ignorant; our own people are grossly ignorant about their own affairs." But ignorance, though it is the cause of much racial bad behaviour, is not a root-cause. Ignorance itself is caused by remoteness. It is difficult in Britain or the United States to realise how remote the three territories of the Federation still are from each other, and how few whites

regularly travel between them. The analogy that is often drawn—that the Federation is equal in area to France, Spain and Italy combined—is helpful here: for the white men living in Fort Victoria, Fort Jameson and Livingstonia are as remote from each other as the citizens of Brest, Brindisi and Cadiz.

Superficially this may sound exaggerated. The same language is spoken everywhere, except in some Afrikaner districts and among groups like the Italians working on the Kariba dam (who have anyway had it discourteously brought home to them by politicians that they are only temporary Rhodesians). The network of seven Argus newspapers makes the two Rhodesias appear closely linked; and the shuttling of Sir Roy Welensky and other Northern Rhodesian Federal ministers between Salisbury and their home towns, as well as the interdependence of the Copper-belt and Salisbury, seems to make distances shrink.

But this is illusory, for this regular first-hand contact is between a very few people only. When James Callaghan made critical remarks after touring the Federation in 1957, one Salisbury housewife complained bitterly to me: "How dare he tell us about our own country, when he was only here for six weeks?" She should have been more self-critical. Callaghan, in a well-organised tour, had seen and learnt infinitely more than the housewife had in all her twenty-five years in Southern Rhodesia.

Another deplorable truth is that Callaghan had seen and learnt more than many politicians whose own home is Central Africa, and who reply to outside criticism by saying, "The man on the spot knows best". In two years Sir Roy Welensky, for instance, paid three visits to Nyasaland: but one visit was to a party rally before the 1958 Federal elections, another was to an airport conference with the Governor during the Emergency, and the third was a short whistle-stop tour in September 1957. On this last occasion he hardly got near any

Nyasas. They were excluded from his airport welcome; only a dozen turned up for a special meeting he held for Africans; and, at the big meeting he addressed on the Limbe tobacco floors, there were few Africans among the audience of a thousand and none of them asked a question. Welensky's comment on this was: "I don't think they are really interested in politics. Those who are, are represented here." Such words read ironically now.

This isolation affects the opinions of all politicians in Southern Rhodesia. I doubt if five of the thirty members of the Assembly have ever been to Nyasaland, or if half have been at all recently to Northern Rhodesia. It is not their fault: their business does not take them there, and they do not legislate directly for those territories. But their legislation does have a direct influence on opinion in the north, a point that seems to have been appreciated in a curious way by those who passed the Preventive Detention and Unlawful Organisations Bills in April 1959.

The lack of inter-territorial contact is bad enough. What is worse is that black and white politicians who should have been doing business with each other (and will yet have to, if Central Africa's muddle is to be sorted out) have never met. This state of affairs is more absurd than American non-recognition of Red China; the Pacific at least separates Eisenhower from Chou En-lai, but Sir Edgar Whitehead was living in the same city as George Nyandoro and Robert Chikerema until he removed them to a prison three hundred miles away. He had two reasons for not meeting them: he felt that it would give them added prestige among their followers, and he thought he already knew what they would tell him.

There are many such examples. Welensky, for instance, has never met Dr. Banda. When I asked him, immediately after his Federal election victory (at a time when he could have lost no votes by his reply), whether he was prepared to see Banda, he answered: "I'm prepared to see anyone in the Federation".

But he never implemented this. Possibly he was concerned not to receive the same rebuff as he had incurred when Nyasa chiefs at Nkata Bay, and Chitimukulu, Paramount Chief of the Bemba of Northern Rhodesia, refused to meet him and left him to complain of their "discourtesy". Banda might have rebuffed him too. But to have been able to say that he had at least tried, that he had come half-way and that it was Banda who had remained immobile, should have outweighed for Welensky the discomfort of suffering some "discourtesy".

The Provincial Information Officer in Blantyre had never met Banda either. He explained: "It would hardly be right for me in my official capacity to call on him. I shall wait until we're introduced at some function or other." Banda went to jail before this could be arranged. Even after the Emergency, Southern Rhodesian M.P.s cling to their belief that they should have no direct contact with African opinion. Mr. Went, a Government supporter, put it: "The Native Department was most excellent indeed in keeping the Government and the people of the Colony in touch with and controlling the Africans". (In Mr. Went's eyes, "the people" and "the Africans" are separate groups.) And Mr. van Heerden, a Dominion Party M.P., agreed during the same debate that "We have no other way of approaching the African but through the Native Department".

It is an *a fortiori* argument that, if the white legislators and officials whose job it is to be informed about African opinion have so little direct contact with Africans, ordinary white citizens can have even less. The dangerous result is that in the cities, where there should be most contact, the races are most remote from one another.

In Southern Rhodesia, the main towns have hardly finished growing out of the countryside which they were built to serve. Salisbury is often described as a junior, gentler Johannesburg; but any resemblance is very recent.

Johannesburg has its roots in the gold reef at the end of its

streets, and has grown steadily from it. Salisbury was a market-town twenty years ago, and tobacco farmers who are hardly grandparents still describe how they used to ride into the sales on carts and, armed with their cheques from the tobacco floors, take over Meikle's Hotel and the whole town.

Salisbury is, in fact, a post-war mushroom city. In 1932 its white population was 9600, in 1946 it was 21,000, and today it is more than 84,000. Its African population has increased, not in the same proportion, but with greater numbers: from 48,000 in 1946 it has risen to more than 130,000 (because of the inadequacy of housing, the exact number is not known). Bulawayo comforts itself for being outstripped by Salisbury with the memory that it was the capital of Lobengula, the last Matabele king, and that it therefore holds some prior claim to wisdom and maturity. It now has a white population of nearly 50,000 and double that number of Africans. Even so, its white population almost trebled in the years 1946 to 1957.

Since the main impetus of these cities came, until recently, from the surrounding countryside, it was natural that the white townsfolk should take their racial attitudes from the white farmer. But while the farmer's paternalism towards his black labourers is understandable—for the feudal system turns a farm into a large family, with the farmer's wife often running both a school and a clinic—this attitude is entirely out of place in a town. The housewife has few of the welfare responsibilities of the farmer's wife, and the only Africans the average white in a town meets to speak to are his cook, his gardener and his office messenger. While the white farmer will probably have most contact with the brightest African on his farm, for he will have made him the "boss-boy", the white townsman will see very little of the intelligent urban Africans, for they will be teachers in African schools, or journalists on African newspapers, or selling insurance among Africans—or, now, sitting in prison facing five years of detention. The machinery of segregation is working to keep black and white

apart in the towns. Since three out of every four whites in Southern Rhodesia live in a town, this factor is of supreme importance.

Salisbury offers a deplorable example to the country. With a city budget of over ten million pounds, the Salisbury Municipal Council is in a position to do more good in race relations than the Southern Rhodesian Government itself. But because of apathy in municipal voting, Salisbury has, in the words of the editor of *Dissent*, "suffered for long from the worst government of any city of comparable size and importance in the Commonwealth. . . . The statements of councillors and mayors also can usually be relied upon to travesty the level of intelligence and humanity in the city." The council is dominated by an old Irish chemist-turned-journalist, Charles Olley, whose favourite targets for shrill abuse are "the white supporters of the Federation 'sell-out' and of the Negro intrusion into the white man's domain". Under his influence, the Salisbury Council has resisted the opening of multi-racial hotels by demanding that hoteliers should provide separate lavatories and wash-basins for the different races.

When Guy Clutton-Brock was arrested with other members of Congress in Southern Rhodesia, there was a rumour, set off in London, that another unnamed white man had been imprisoned. (For some unexplained reason, no list of detainees was published for two months, which added to the distress of relatives.) A *Daily Telegraph* correspondent tried to check this rumour. "Oh, no," a woman who was a liberal assured him. Then, when he looked puzzled at her certainty at such an uncertain time, she added: "You see, we all know each other here." She was right. The number of whites who had tried to bridge the racial gulf between intelligent people was so small that a head-count was sufficient to discover if anyone was missing.

This general isolation appears the more remarkable if, as it often is, it is assumed that white Rhodesians are especially politically-minded. But this is not the case. Only in the last few years has racial tension intruded sufficiently to make politics a more common subject than gardening, and it has still not intruded enough to make more than a few people do any fundamental thinking about their position in this quickly changing continent.

There is a third form of isolation, besides that of black from white, and of the territories from each other. It is the remoteness of Rhodesia from the rest of the world. If one can imagine a conversation about world opinion between a Dominion Party reactionary and an African leader, it is tempting to think that the Dominion Party man would express himself in the terms which Rat used to Mole when he explained that:

"Beyond the Wild Wood comes the Wide World. And that's something that doesn't matter, either to you or me. I've never been there, and I'm never going, nor you either, if you've got any sense at all. Don't ever refer to it again, please."\*

Many whites in Central Africa, that "landlocked island", believe that isolation should work both ways. They resent people from outside who take a critical interest in their country, and their dearest political wish is to become independent, and free from the visits of inquisitive M.P.s from Westminster.

Having sketched this much of the Rhodesian character, and having seen where the dynamic of the white community lies, it is possible to look into the future and ask a single question: if post-war immigrants have produced more than their share of illiberalism and intolerance when they might have been expected to be a progressive influence, and if the large (40 per cent) artisan group, who would mostly be Labour voters in Britain, share none of the socialist colonial views, is

\* *The Wind in the Willows* by Kenneth Grahame.

there hope that anything but outside pressure will persuade Southern Rhodesian legislators to adopt more liberal policies?

The new liberal grouping of the Central Africa Party will act as the Federation's inner conscience, but few people believe that it will achieve much else in Southern Rhodesia for a decade. But there is one neglected aspect of the Rhodesian character which gives hope of an answer to this question: it is that second-generation Rhodesians are usually more liberal-minded than their parents. They are, it goes without saying, often aggressively Rhodesian, taking one glimpse at the Britain their parents grew up in and rushing back to Africa. They might therefore be expected to be more narrow-minded, having solid experience of only one country. In practice, they begin by coming to terms with their own country, adapting themselves while children, whereas some middle-aged Rhodesians wear an aggrieved air of being permanently out-of-place. Again, the new generation has grown up in a period when the values of its environment are being questioned and views are changing. About five hundred young Rhodesians go every year to college in South Africa, many of whom have reacted against *apartheid*. The success of the University College in Salisbury is proof of the leavening of liberals among the staff; but it also suggests that in the yeast of Rhodesian youth there is matter for hope.

## The Colour Bar: Breached or Scratched?

So much has been written about the colour bar in Central Africa that the only point of mentioning it here is to answer two questions. A colour bar was in operation in all three territories before their federation, although with widely differing degrees of severity. This difference raised opposing hopes and fears among the Africans of the different territories. While the Africans of the north feared that Federation would bring white domination in the social and political forms which they associated with Southern Rhodesia, the Africans in Southern Rhodesia hoped that Federation would cause a relaxation of the Colony's colour bar.

The two questions therefore are these. Was there justification for the fears of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that Federation might cause a spreading of the colour bar, or at any rate a slowing down of its removal in their territories? And were the hopes of Southern Rhodesian Africans that it would relieve their disabilities fulfilled?

That a colour bar should have been established in the 1890s is one of the most understandable—though deplorable—facts of African history. There were missionaries, traders, hunters—George Westbeech and Chirapula Stevenson are only two of the more famous—who chose to live a life integrated with the Africans. There are now some 20,000 Coloureds in the Federation as a result. But most of the early immigrants brought with them a starchy, self-righteous set of standards, and looked on the Africans as savages from whom they must protect their wives. This attitude has persisted

down the generations. When Sir Roy Welensky was confronted on British television in November 1958 by Dr. Bernard Chidzero, a Nyasa who took a political science doctorate at McGill University, he was provoked into exclaiming that Chidzero's grandfather was a savage who didn't understand how a wheel worked.

In July 1959 four African editors in Southern Rhodesia wrote an article in the *Manchester Guardian* which was head-lined "Breaches in the Colour Bar". They explained that in 1953 the 600,000 Africans who lived in Southern Rhodesian towns could not buy the houses they lived in, move around without a pocketful of passes, or go into a hotel, café or cinema; chances of getting a good education and opportunities of advancement in industry were slight. They went on to report that "an encouraging change has taken place in the last few years, and more so in the last few months, which will alter the basic concept of the Rhodesian way of life considerably". They quoted new legislation permitting multi-racial trade unions, removing separate entrances to post offices, and allowing Africans to buy lottery tickets and bet on horses. They concluded: "We, as Southern Rhodesians, support Federation wholeheartedly, but we realise that our pattern of life has to change to be acceptable to the Northern Territories—and it is changing."

There is a blithe optimism about the editors' belief that "a big hole has been knocked in the wall of segregation". On the other hand, two Africans who wrote to refute the article, saying that "only a few scratches have been made in the paint of the wall but not a single brick has been removed", were unnecessarily gloomy. When the Emergency was declared, more attention than usual was focused on the colour bar. Garfield Todd called for an "immediate and massive lifting of the colour bar"; Welensky said that it was important that certain "social pinpricks" should be got rid of. The Southern Rhodesian Assembly passed the legislation to

Mr. John Caldicott, the Minister of Defence, has explained: "No African has as yet come up to the required standard".

On paper all these laws suggest big advances. In practice, there has been little yet to show for them. This is the explanation of the contradiction between those who say that a big hole has been knocked in the wall of segregation, and others who say that only a little paint has been scratched off. Obviously there are some Africans who could soon be promoted to senior positions in the civil service, and some capable of holding commissioned rank in the Federal forces. The territorial governments should make it a matter of urgency to find such people and train them for these positions.

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becoming accustomed to the occasional black face. But the local residents' association protested loudly, taking its stand on the Land Apportionment Act, and the Federal Government backed down, salving its conscience by building Savanhu an £8000 house among the hutments of an African township. These three Africans had done all anyone could to qualify as "responsible and civilised persons", the Rhodesian definition of a partner; their experiences will excuse them if they now believe the official policy of partnership to be plain hypocrisy.

Perhaps the most pitiable tale—and the one which puts white Rhodesians and the Southern Rhodesian Government in the worst light—is that of Patrick and Adri Matimba.

Patrick, the son of an Anglican priest, left school at the age of sixteen and went to Cape Town, where he worked for a time in the Archbishop's household. Then he went to England to study, and met and married Adri, a cheerful blonde Dutch girl. In 1957 he brought her back to Southern Rhodesia, where they collided with the colour bar; for by the Land Apportionment Act he could not live in a white area, nor she in a black.

When it was learned that they intended to save their marriage and evade the law by going to live at St. Faith's Mission (for missions are exempt from the Act), a protest meeting was held in nearby Rusape which has been vividly described by Cyril Dunn in his book *Central African Witness*. The kindest person present referred to the Matimba marriage as "a great tragedy"; the local M.P. suggested that it was not "the function of a mission station to provide asylum for people who have done something which is not in the public interest"; and someone in the audience said more simply that the future for Mrs. Matimba in Southern Rhodesia would be "hell with the lid off".

Cyril Dunn does not tell the whole Matimba story, however. They lived happily for more than a year at St. Faith's,

Patrick working at the store, Adri bringing up her daughter Hanneke. They were safe from racial spite there, except for such occasions as when Adri had to go to hospital. Then in February 1959 they moved back to Salisbury to open a small printer's shop, which they called, with endearing optimism, "The Rising Sun Printing Press". But the Land Apportionment Act took control again, and they were unable to make a home together. They went to see Sir Edgar Whitehead, to ask him to amend the Act so that Adri could be legally considered black. Sir Edgar suggested that, instead, they should find refuge in another mission.

The same month, Patrick was arrested on Sir Edgar's orders in the round-up of 495 African National Congress members. He had become a branch secretary, believing in Congress as a non-racial people's movement and remaining the pacifist he had been in Britain. He was taken to Khami prison, three hundred miles away in the hot bush beyond Bulawayo. Adri cheerfully kept the shop going, and "The Rising Sun" became the meeting-place for car-loads of detainees' wives who were to be driven down to see their husbands for a few minutes. She showed her spirit further by standing with the Black Sash women in silent protest outside the Legislative Assembly.

But the weight of two years' prejudice was too much for Patrick in prison. It was brought home to him that all his misfortunes were the result of his marriage to a white woman. He faced five years in prison. He had already been in prison for months, and he was not going to be charged with any specific crime which would allow him to prove his innocence and be released. Then, before his case came up for review by the Beadle Tribunal, the Southern Rhodesia Government offered to release him if he would take his family to Holland, but warned him that he would be rearrested if he ever returned to Southern Rhodesia. He accepted these terms—and who can blame him? But for the Government there can be

nothing but lasting shame. For the Matimbos, life in Southern Rhodesia was indeed "hell with the lid off".

Whereas a Southern Rhodesian African may be hopeful about the eventual breaching of the colour bar and may see the kind of cases just quoted as occasional backslidings in a slow—but now sure—advance, an African from the northern territories looks on the situation in a different way. The establishment of the University College, racially integrated in nearly every way, he will praise, while adding the observation that the bulk of its backing comes from the Colonial Development and Welfare funds of the British Government, which has been able to impress its own, more progressive, views on the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments. But there is ample cause to make a Nyasa or a Northern Rhodesian detest what Southern Rhodesia stands for. With minds clouded by hatred, they have no room to consider rationally the advances which have undoubtedly been made in Southern Rhodesia.

Nyasaland, known for years as "the Land of Missing Men", has about 170,000 (or a third) of its male adult workers absent from home in the Rhodesias or the Johannesburg Rand at any one time. From Northern Rhodesia too a stream of men has flowed south seeking work in the Southern Rhodesian factories or on the farms—a stream which the growth of the Copperbelt has slowed in the last twenty years. This was not a natural flow; the Southern Rhodesian whites wanted labour and, having failed to get Indians or Chinese to settle in Southern Rhodesia as labourers, they took advantage of the tax system in the north. Taxing the Africans at the rate of ten shillings per hut had produced the major part of Northern Rhodesia's revenue in the days before copper; in 1910-11 the tax contributed £57,000 out of the total of £95,000. To earn the money, it was usually found that one member of a family had to go to Southern Rhodesia for many months, for there

were few ways of earning cash at home. Although Southern Rhodesian whites cannot be held responsible for imposing the tax, yet, because of the advantage of the labour they gained, African bitterness at having to do this work has been transferred to the Colony itself.

There were grounds for this bitterness: although no European in Northern Rhodesia was asked to pay any tax until after 1918, in order to encourage white immigration, the Government had always considered that it was reasonable to make the Africans pay for the protection which British administration gave them. The missionaries backed the system for another reason: it taught the black man the lesson of "the dignity of labour". The missionaries' sentiment is not yet dead: writing in the *Daily Telegraph* in August 1959 on British achievements in Nyasaland, Colin Reid declared that "in the townships the British have established peaceful administration, the rudiments of education and consciousness among the Africans of the moral importance of a work and wages routine". Nothing, surely, could be more embittering than being forced to work to pay a tax and then being told that such work is morally uplifting by someone who is exempt from that tax on racial grounds.

The situation has changed since those days. There is still some racial bitterness about taxes; no married European, for instance, pays tax until he earns more than £800 a year, whereas every African adult male pays tax. Although the Europeans now contribute by far the greater part, nevertheless for many Africans in the north their first view of Southern Rhodesia was as the country to which they had to migrate in order to earn their tax-money.

Today, a migrant worker coming to Southern Rhodesia from the northern territories will still experience a shocking contrast. The pass laws have been modified in the south, but in Northern Rhodesia even night passes have been abolished in towns, and they are unknown in Nyasaland. In

the north, there is no Land Apportionment Act—the cause of most resentment in Southern Rhodesia. There are African engine-drivers on Nyasaland Railways, a British-owned company, but there is not even an African fireman on Rhodesia Railways, owned by the Federal Government. A leading Nyasaland tobacco farmer summed it up to me once: “In Southern Rhodesia they forget we are dealing with a totally different kind of African—here they are the last of the landed gentry. They get enough from their land to live on, and they resent being moved around.” Though a Nyasa may migrate to work in Southern Rhodesia for two years, he always has land to return to at home, and he finds his pride as a “landed gentleman” hurt easily and often in the south.

So, although a Southern Rhodesian editor may find the breaches in the colour bar since Federation substantial, a migrant from the north may not notice them. Rather, he notices the objectionable parts which remain.

But what of the other question posed at the start of this chapter: has Federation brought, as Africans in the north feared, a spreading of the Southern Rhodesian colour bar, or at any rate a slowing down of the removal of existing barriers in the north?

This is a most important question, if the interpretation of “colour bar” is broadened to include the franchise and electoral systems. It is a strong point in the anti-Federation case of the Nyasaland Congress that, but for Federation, Nyasaland would be much further along the road to African self-government than it now is. Congress officials point to Tanganyika, which has a sizeable budget deficit and yet has been given self-government, and to Somaliland, which has jumped from an entirely nominated legislative council to full self-government within two years. “But for Federation”, say Congressmen, “we could be in line with Tanganyika or Somaliland. For the British Government could not have used the arguments of poverty of resources or lack of experienced

administrators to stop us. It is Federation that has stopped us." And what reply can one give to that charge?

The Blantyre Synod of the Church of Scotland wrote in their controversial March 1958 *Statement concerning the Present Unrest*:

"In Nyasaland good race relationships were a reality before Federation began: they are now being destroyed. . . . The old boast that Nyasaland is a land without colour bar is no longer true. . . ."

It is a little dewy-eyed of the Synod to suggest that Nyasaland was ever entirely without a colour bar at any time during this century, but probably the boast was never meant to be taken literally. In the last three years it has been distressingly common to hear complaints of social friction in Nyasaland, and even Government officials have been heard to blame "Salisbury"—meaning both Southern Rhodesia and Federation.

The complaints and stories are often trivial: a Nyasa schoolmaster was insulted in the airport restaurant by visiting Southern Rhodesians; a car driven by Southern Rhodesians hooted its way to the head of a ferryboat queue. . . . But they get retold and establish Southern Rhodesia in Nyasa eyes as a land of boors. Worse still, Federation has caused a conflict of loyalties among Nyasaland Government officials—over the issue of federalising non-African agriculture, for example. Any hesitation shown in reconciling these loyalties has resulted in a loss of African confidence. The very issue of Federation itself produced perhaps the greatest of such conflicts. The initial hesitation, when district officers were told that they should give no guidance to Africans about the merits of proposed Federation but simply explain the general system, has now been followed by directives to "push Federation". The most remarkable of these directives was sent in September 1957 from the Nyasaland Government's Director of African Education to his white headmasters.

(It was a secret letter, until Henry Chipembere found a copy and read it to the Nyasaland Legislative Council in December 1958.) The letter stated:

"Government is concerned to learn that on occasion Nyasaland Government officers have failed to do their utmost to stimulate confidence in Federation. . . .

"I must ask you to ensure that you and all European officers serving under you are fully aware that it is the duty of every officer to promote great confidence in the Federation, and in particular to take the greatest care that any personal fears or doubts are never publicly expressed. You will realise that any failure in this respect can only foster distrust in the minds of the African people which it is Government's policy to dispel. . . . Should any officer wish to criticise any action of the Federal Government . . . complaints should be conveyed to me in secret, and I will take such action as is necessary."

Race consciousness began to inject its poison in many places. One small example: undue emphasis on race jeopardised the chances of success for a hotel set in the lovely, wooded foothills of Mlanje Mountain. For some inexplicable reason the *Nyasaland Times* dubbed it "the multi-racial Mlanje Mountain Hotel" whenever there was a news item about it—inexplicable, because every hotel in Nyasaland is officially multi-racial. The result was that many whites stayed away who would otherwise have gone there. Yet it was so far from any town that few Africans ever went there either.

The Indians of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have some special complaints against Southern Rhodesia over Federation. As soon as immigration became a "federal subject", only Indians who were teachers, preachers, lawyers or doctors were admitted as immigrants. Since a similar ban had been placed on Indian immigration into Southern Rhodesia as soon as it was granted self-government in 1923, it was reasonably concluded that this was the influence of Southern Rhodesia working in the Federal Government.

But the deepest suspicions in Nyasaland about the encroachment of Southern Rhodesian practices concerned the land. Not only have the Nyasas been opposed since 1957 to the federalising of non-African agriculture, by which the produce of 17,724 African families, who were tenant farmers on European-owned estates, would pass into Federal control, but the whole plan for the consolidation of African-held land into individual holdings, although purely a Nyasaland Government scheme, smacked to Nyasas of the Southern Rhodesian system of giving individual farmers a plot of six acres for intensive farming. The advantage of being able to improve a bit of land year by year did not appeal to the Nyasa, who feared that he and his family would be herded into small reserves, and equated this with what he knew of the Native Land Husbandry Act in Southern Rhodesia. Gaining individual title to a bit of land did not appeal to him, either: he felt it made it easier for him to be dispossessed than if it were held communally by the village or tribe. This is not the place to argue the merits or demerits of agrarian reform, but Arthur Gaitskell (writing in the *New Fabian Colonial Essays*) is right in saying that some of its first effects on any country in Africa are "catastrophic". In Nyasaland, one of its worst results was to increase the natural suspicion, which was fed by Congress, that the hated Southern Rhodesian system would be imposed.

A white man in Northern Rhodesia in the earlier days thought it inconceivable that the migrant labourer, coming out of his village for long enough to earn his tax-money, would ever want to live permanently in a town, to copy European ways, or to achieve a European standard of living. So segregation began without misgivings. But the African townships at Lusaka are not placed miles away on the far side of the tracks, as in Salisbury and Bulawayo. (This is partly because Lusaka is a new town, which only became the capital in 1935.) Further, the Northern Rhodesia Government set up a

committee to inquire into racial discrimination in shops, an idea which has never occurred to politicians in the south.

A very different situation exists in Southern Rhodesia. In some Salisbury shoe shops, for example, there is a rule that Africans may not try on a pair of shoes before buying them. Victoria Chitepo, wife of the African barrister, was therefore agreeably surprised when a young shop assistant once suggested that she should try on the shoes first. As she was trying on a pair, the manager glanced their way, summoned the assistant across the shop and sacked the young girl on the spot. Victoria had heard the manager's speech of dismissal (as had been intended). She was obviously expected to feel repentant she had lost the white girl her job, rather than to feel angry at the whole system of discrimination.

Because the colour bar is so much worse in Southern Rhodesia than in the northern territories, Africans in the north have come to associate it with the Southern Rhodesian way of life. They cherish the conviction that if Federation did not exist, the colour bar would be greatly diminished (and perhaps remain as an issue only on the Copperbelt). Since Federation is in existence, it is to blame for the colour bar. The argument is perfectly simple.

On the other hand, Southern Rhodesian Africans can thank Federation for certain relaxations in the colour bar. A dramatic example occurred in 1958 when the athletics colour bar was broken after the Northern Rhodesian runner, Yotham Muleya, had found a loop-hole in the rules barring the entry of an African, beating Gordon Pirie easily in a mile race and made Mr. du Bois, chairman of the Southern Rhodesian Amateur Athletic Association, look very silly. For Mr. du Bois had said: "Personally, I think the Kaffir should never be accepted in European athletics". After Muleya, multi-racial athletics became an established principle throughout Central Africa.

It may be asked why few Southern Rhodesian Africans are heard to speak up for Federation on this account. Some do, certainly, like the editors of the African newspapers and the African Federal M.P.s, but they have extra reasons for doing so: the newspapers are white-owned, and the M.P.s are put in by white votes. There lies the answer: the issue of Federation produces an almost clean racial split. While Africans in the northern territories are blaming Federation for their woes, it would offer a poor show of solidarity if Southern Rhodesian Africans praised it for results that their comrades in the north did not think of as blessings at all. By no means all Southern Rhodesian Africans have come to think of the break-up of Federation as a step on the road to a better life. But those who think that Federation can benefit them keep quiet, knowing they would not be appreciated by the nationalists in the north.

There is a third question which this chapter might have examined: to what extent did the continuance of the colour bar help to precipitate the Emergencies by building up African frustration and maintaining European ignorance and suspicion? This question can only be answered fully when the story of this book is complete. Nevertheless, this chapter may have shown how the dangers of political trouble were increased by governments failing to move against the social colour bar in the ways which were available to them. (Governments usually plead that only public opinion can influence these matters, but that is too easy an excuse.) It may also have shown how the Southern Rhodesia Government was held particularly to blame by Africans for this, and with good cause.

## What has Nyasaland Gained?

To convince an African in the northern territories that he stands to gain economically from Federation has been found to be an almost impossible task. James Callaghan, during his 1957 tour of Nyasaland, tried before an audience in the northern province to make the point for Federation that it had brought economic benefits to all. An old African clergyman got up and told him quietly:

"I would sooner sleep in a ragged blanket with freedom, than lie in luxury under nineteen blankets."

This same melodramatic note is heard whenever a Nyasa or Northern Rhodesian African is embroiled in an economic argument. Dr. Banda can be relied on to storm back at any questioner who asks: "But how could Nyasaland exist on her own?" Three Federal M.P.s went from Southern Rhodesia in December 1958 to see Nyasaland and Dr. Banda, and asked him this as one of their first questions. He flared up: "We are not interested in economic benefits. We want freedom." The three came back to Salisbury, shaking their heads and saying that he was quite unreasonable and had refused to face realities.

Kanyama Chiume takes the Nyasaland Congress view a stage further. In *Africa South* (July-September 1959) he wrote:

"Exponents of Federation ask these questions as if economic development and national independence were mutually exclusive. It is the belief of the Nyasaland African Congress that the very reverse is true—that only with freedom will a permanent solution to the country's

economic problems become possible. In any case, whatever happens, Nyasaland Africans would prefer freedom in poverty to plenty in servitude, though it is not yet our experience that servitude brings plenty."

This is in direct contradiction to Sir Godfrey Huggins' prophecy. Commending the federal scheme to Africans in 1952, he said: "Among other things the Federal proposals are intended to do is to increase the real wealth of the three territories, and, if we succeed in that, who will benefit most? Why, of course, the greatest number." Employing Rhodesian "double-talk", he left it in doubt whether he meant that each individual African stood to gain proportionately more economic benefit from Federation than each individual European, or merely that, because there were more Africans than Europeans, the Africans would in gross benefit more. Whichever he meant, it amounted to a half-pledge that federal economic policy would be aimed at implementing the political policy of partnership. Has this happened? Which territory has benefited most from Federation, and what section in the territories has gained most advantage? Obviously all sections of a community—or a federation—are to some extent interdependent, and what is of direct benefit to one section or one territory will produce indirect benefits for the whole community or federation: but a certain amount of useful dissection can be made.

The whole federal area stands to gain, say proponents of Federation, in many ways. They claim that Federation widens the trading markets and cushions the area from economic shocks by creating a more diverse joint economy. A diverse economy would not suffer so much from a price slump in any of the primary products which were, before Federation, the sole supports of each single territory. They also argue that the more stable economy which Federation provides encourages a higher rate of capital investment.

These claims are in part true, but there are important reservations. The claims suggest that the alternative to Federation was entire separation of the territories with no economic links; yet the Central African Council, in its minor way, and the European Common Market have offered examples of how trading pacts or agreements over common services require no political union. Moreover, the "cushioning" is only partially effective in Central Africa because the federal economy is still dominated by copper, which in 1956 accounted for two-thirds of the value of all exports and thirty-seven per cent of the federal revenue. When the value of copper output dropped from £121 million in 1956 to £89 million in 1957, her position in the Federation helped to cushion Northern Rhodesia; but, had there been no Federation, she would have cushioned herself by using the reserves from the earlier, fat years which have gone into the Federal Treasury.

Thirdly, although a stable economy is an encouragement to investors, they also look for political stability. This was proved in the year 1956-7 during which £26 million of new capital flowed into Central Africa, and only £1 million went into the economically more stable South Africa. Since Central Africa has itself become a crisis area, investment has slowed down greatly. Economic and political progress so clearly go hand-in-hand that Chiume's thesis is half way to being proved. There was an outcry in 1957 when the Colonial Development Corporation and Albert E. Reed withdrew from a forestry scheme in northern Nyasaland because of "political imponderables". Since then I have been told by the heads of two great trading companies that they would prefer the stable conditions which an independent Nyasaland would offer to the present situation.

Although the gross national product of the Federation rose, in its first four years, by forty-five per cent, yet this rate was

no greater than in the years immediately before Federation. From 1946 to 1953, the gross national product of Northern Rhodesia multiplied by seven times, but has slowed down since, with copper falling away sharply from its peak of £437 a long ton in February 1956. Instead, the rate of increase has been stepped up in Southern Rhodesia and possibly Nyasaland since, and because of, Federation. (It is impossible to be sure of this, because statistics of the territories are processed together. Even if they could be separated, it would be difficult to judge how much expansion would have taken place, if there had been no Federation, through the working of normal economic forces.) What can be clearly seen is how the Federal Government's allocation of funds has helped one territory more than another. Here it is plain that the white Southern Rhodesians have gained most from Federation.

When the Federal Government took over a proportion of the territorial public debts in 1953, Southern Rhodesia shifted on to the Federal Government a burden of £88·4 million, Northern Rhodesia a debt of £22·9 million and Nyasaland one of £5·5 million. By mid-1957 the three territories were jointly responsible for a Federal Public Debt of £212 million. Southern Rhodesia's debt included £32 million being spent on Rhodesia Railways, as well as a large debt incurred through the post-war policy of heavy immigration. From 1946 to 1953, more than 85,000 immigrants came into Southern Rhodesia, whose white population had been only 82,386 in 1946. The official figure of the capital outlay incurred in providing the necessary services for *each* European immigrant, from a house and school for his children down to the smallest amenities, is £2600. Although these immigrants paid back within about five years (by their labour and their spending power) the money laid out on bringing them in, nevertheless the fantastic figure of £2,210 million must have been spent during those eight years in doubling the white population in this way. This was offset by the money

immigrants brought in, but Southern Rhodesia still came to Federation with a huge public debt incurred through this policy. Indeed, Huggins had been forced, in 1951, to cut down immigration by one-third in order to avoid wrecking the social services.

I do not intend to develop this account into an argument against large-scale immigration; the economic expansion of Central Africa depends on the import of European skills as well as capital. But I do intend it to show how intensely an African from the northern territories disliked seeing his country's wealth used to subsidise white immigrants, whose importation into Southern Rhodesia (he gathered from the speeches of some white politicians) was intended as much to buttress white supremacy as to increase the whole country's wealth.

A further cause for suspicion among Africans is the way in which a large proportion of the monetary resources of the Federal Government is devoted purely to benefiting Europeans. Almost a quarter of the current expenditure in the Federal Budget was spent from 1956 to 1958 on European agriculture in the two Rhodesias and on non-African education. (Under the Federal Constitution, African education and agriculture remain territorial concerns.) Of course, this has released more territorial funds for use on African agriculture and education; on the other hand, it has hardly affected Nyasaland, where non-African agriculture is still a "territorial subject" and non-African education was only a tiny item before Federation. Territorial funds have in any case been reduced by money being channelled to the Federal Treasury. Northern Rhodesia is so short of territorial funds (their principal sources are income tax, companies tax, excise and customs duties) that only 28,000 African children living in the main towns could be enrolled in schools in 1958, and 45,000 others in the towns got no schooling at all. The territory found it could put only £2 million (or 15 per cent) of

## WHAT HAS NYASALAND GAINED?

its current expenditure into education, together with £395,000 capital expenditure in 1957-8.

The disparity between the races in education expenditure is striking. The Federal Government spent an estimated £6.5 million in 1958-9 on schooling for non-Africans—that is, for about 60,000 European children and 4000 Indians and Coloureds—which included a £150,000 grant to the multi-racial University College. This figure was far larger than the entire current account expenditure of the Nyasaland Government, which was £4.73 million, of which fifteen per cent went to education. African education in Nyasaland got a similar (fifteen per cent) share of the development budget, but in 1957-8 and 1958-9 the entire development estimates came to only £2.75 million. The missions help to bridge the gulf by running more than 2000 unassisted schools in the Protectorate, but nevertheless officials are very worried at the small amount of money available to spend on education. They are only mildly gratified that the figure has trebled since 1952. Africans, for their part, cannot help recalling the large sums given to European education by the Federal Government.

The system by which the Federal and territorial governments divide the current revenue works in the following way. The Federal Government takes over all income tax and profits tax as well as the customs and excise revenue. It keeps for Federal expenditure all the customs and excise revenue, and sixty-two per cent of the income and profit taxes; of the rest eighteen per cent is returned to Northern Rhodesia, fourteen per cent to Southern Rhodesia and six per cent to Nyasaland. The result of the collection and redistribution of income and profit tax revenue in 1956-7 was that Southern Rhodesia paid into the Federal pool a net contribution of nearly £7 million, Northern Rhodesia slightly more than £2.1 million and Nyasaland drew out a net £1.5 million.

In customs and excise revenue the Federal Government

drew £12 million from the territories in 1956-7, more than half of it from Southern Rhodesia. (Again, because of the official "scrambling" of statistics, figures must be conjectural to a certain extent.) Nyasaland almost certainly gave £2 million to the Federal Government on this account.

So, though Nyasaland gained a net £1.5 million through tax redistributions over the Federal area, she lost over all more than she gained, by the surrender of £2 million which she would otherwise have kept from customs and excise revenue. Southern Rhodesia seems at first sight to have contributed substantially to the Federal pool both on tax and customs accounts, but this contribution was more than outweighed by the benefits she received through Federal current expenditures on education, agriculture and industrial subsidies and services, particularly on financing immigration. For in 1957-58, when the Federal Government spent £5.6 million on non-African education, Southern Rhodesia had (in proportion of pupils) three times as much benefit as Northern Rhodesia and fifty times as much as Nyasaland. Again, since Federation, twice as many immigrants have settled in Southern Rhodesia as have settled in Northern Rhodesia, and fifteen times as many as have settled in Nyasaland. Northern Rhodesia has made by far the largest contribution to Federal revenue, and has received in return far less benefit than Southern Rhodesia, as the figures above show. Even in 1958-59, after the fall in copper prices, Northern Rhodesia contributed more to federal funds in income tax and companies tax than Southern Rhodesia—£18 million against £16.2 million.

In capital account, the same tendency to favour Southern Rhodesia and ignore Nyasaland can be seen. Out of a total of £122 million allocated in the Federal Government's 1957-61 Development Plan, the Kariba hydro-electric scheme is taking the lion's share with £55 million, and Rhodesia Railways is taking £28.8 million: neither of these brings any

direct benefit to Nyasaland. Less than two per cent of the development budget is allotted to items specifically for Nyasaland—its railways, its lake services and survey for the Shire river project. Put another way, of the £261 million spent in loan money from 1953 to mid-1959, Nyasaland has received no more than £10 million.

Seen academically, this policy of expenditure might make economic sense; for Nyasaland does not offer the quick cash returns which can be expected from the all-out drive to modernise the railways and provide cheaper power in the Rhodesias. But economic policies cannot be worked out in Central Africa as though in a political vacuum. A man who sees this as clearly as anyone is Sir Edgar Whitehead. Before he left in 1957 to go to Washington as the Federal Minister, he told the Salisbury Economic Society:

“Nyasaland is becoming overpopulated, and land may well give out there in a few years. Especially in the Southern Province will there be a land famine and unemployment. All the major troubles in post-war Africa have been caused by land famine. As a Federation, we must give Nyasaland the highest priority after the Kariba scheme is finished. The Shire scheme may not be economically rewarding for years, but it is a political necessity.”

“After the Kariba scheme is finished. . . .” To have tied up £120 million on building this 400-foot high dam may yet be judged to have been the Federal Government’s most monumental mistake. The choice between Kariba and a dam across the Kafue River in Northern Rhodesia was suspected by Africans to have been determined by two political considerations. The first was the obvious geographical one: with Kariba joining Northern and Southern Rhodesia and with the first power-house on the southern bank of the Zambezi, there would be no cause to fear that, if Northern Rhodesia “went black”, higher power charges could be imposed or supplies to the south cut off. Secondly, the Kafue scheme, which would

probably have cost only a third of the sum spent on Kariba, would have provided enough power for the Copperbelt and for the industries in the Rhodesias at the rate they have been increasing in this decade. The decision to build Kariba was therefore based on the determination to step up the growth of manufacturing industries, mainly in Southern Rhodesia, at an unprecedented rate. Kariba is still, in fact, an immense gamble. There is a strong possibility that industrialists will not hurry in quickly enough to prevent Kariba from remaining a liability for years; for the ultimate capacity of Kariba will be double that of all the Federation's present sources. Africans see this official drive to attract industries into Southern Rhodesia as part of the Federal Government's plan to establish white supremacy on a broader front. I shall touch on this suspicion when I deal with the future position of Africans in industry later in this chapter. Almost certainly, political motives were not uppermost in the leading politicians' minds—for Welensky and the Federal Government at first backed Kafue while Todd fought for Kariba—but Welensky's later conversion to the Kariba scheme by Huggins, and the Government's reversal of its decision, confused and alarmed Africans.

The £80-million loan raised for Kariba could obviously not have been raised for diverse agricultural, housing and educational projects which would more immediately have benefited the Africans in the Federation; such projects would not have "caught the imagination of the world" as Kariba was said to have done. But smaller loans could have been raised for the Kafue and for the revised Shire schemes, and the interest money saved would have probably provided £2 million extra a year for African welfare projects. Then Nyasaland would not have become the neglected partner and lost all faith in the partnership.

It is worth digressing to tell the story of the Shire scheme,

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since it illustrates well the now classic pattern of difficulties and paradoxes in a colonial development project: the grandiose plan that runs aground in the financial shallows; the political suspicions aroused among some Africans when action is delayed, and the fears voiced by others when action seems imminent; the sudden discovery that money can be found when a political emergency makes it expedient.

The original scheme, produced by Sir William Halcrow in 1954 after three years' study, would have transformed southern Nyasaland. The harnessing of the Shire River (which is the southern outlet of Lake Nyasa) for power was to be followed by the setting up of an aluminium plant far away near Mount Mlanje's bauxite, a fertiliser factory near the river, a paper industry fed by the reeds of the reclaimed Elephant Marsh, and the springing up of lively secondary industry in Blantyre-Limbe. It would have provided large water supplies for the towns, opened up great stretches of the Lower Shire for intensive cotton, rice or sugar production, and stabilised the erratic lake level—increasing facilities for trading and for building harbours.

The main objection to the scheme was that it would have cost £100 million. Understandably, it was pigeon-holed by Federal ministers intent on Kariba. The Nyasas, who feared that capital investment would have brought a large, unwanted European immigration, were jubilant. Others, like Wellington Chirwa, voiced another point of view. "Why have they still not begun on the Shire Scheme four years after it was published?" he asked me once when he was a Federal M.P., and answered himself: "Because they are holding it as a hostage for our good behaviour. If we are nice about Federation, we might get it . . . some time".

Instead the Federal Government merely tinkered with the scheme. They threw a £60,000 earth bund across the river to stabilise the lake level and to drain the lower river for a soil survey, but the cyclical rise and fall of the lake tricked them,

and they had to breach the bund to prevent the possibility of widespread flooding. Nevertheless, some flooding took place, and £23,700 in famine relief had to be paid out. Simply because a proper dam with sluice gates would have cost £500,000, the Government gambled and lost.

African superstitions were stirred. The other Nyasa Federal M.P., Mr. Clement Kumbikano, declared that the scheme was a mistake and that the bund had to be breached "because the European tried to fight with God". But the intelligent Nyasa African still wanted the scheme—with confusing reservations. As Chiume wrote:

"The Shire Valley scheme will be welcome under an African government, as there would then be no question of the uncontrolled influx of Europeans, and no danger of the land being alienated." (*Africa South*, July-September 1959.)

Federal Ministers announced a revised scheme early in 1958. This was not before time; the population of Blantyre-Limbe had increased sevenfold in ten years, uneconomic thermal power stations were being erected piecemeal, and the local dams were being sandbagged to hold a few extra gallons of much needed water. The sensible suggestion was a "starter" hydro-electric plant costing £2½ million, a 23-mile water-pipeline costing the same amount, and a £5-million polder scheme for 60,000 acres to be reclaimed in the Elephant Marsh for sugar production and irrigation farming for five thousand Africans. But still no money could be found. It looked as if Chirwa's fears were well-founded.

In the event, matters worked out the other way round. After the Nyasaland disturbances, the Federal Government became suddenly convinced of the need to develop the territory. Welensky himself came to London to ask for loan money for the Shire scheme. The lesson that Kenya, British Guiana, Malaya, Malta and Cyprus should have taught—that "the bad boys" get special treatment in the distribution

of development funds—was proved again. In Lord Altrincham's words, "Any Colonial politician, reviewing the post-war years, cannot fail to conclude that moderation is a mug's game".

The general industrial expansion of the three territories since Federation has created more jobs for both Europeans and Africans, and—a departure from the earlier pattern—has improved the money incomes of all races. Previously industrialists had kept African wages at the level of a livelihood for the single worker, whose family normally remained behind in the reserves. This shifting, migrant labour system—Southern Rhodesia used to draw more than half its labourers from other territories—was a thoroughly evil one, and Sir Edgar Whitehead was foremost in condemning it. "Cheap labour is the next worst thing to slave labour," he said.

In the 1950s the pattern altered of its own accord. The Northern Rhodesian copper boom drew away workers who might otherwise have gone to Southern Rhodesia, and the Nyasaland Government campaigned to keep more of its men at home—both at a time when industrial expansion in the south was increasing the demand for labour. Only from Portuguese East Africa has the supply of labour increased.

The result has been that employers have had to depend more and more on Southern Rhodesian Africans, and to offer them better terms so that they can support families in the towns and settle down as a permanent urban labour force. (The same change is seen also in the northern territories, even though African wage levels are lower in Blantyre; on the Copperbelt they are about eight per cent above the Federal average.) As a consequence, African wages and income from "unincorporated enterprises", the trading in cash which goes hand-in-hand with wage raises, have increased far faster proportionately than the European figures. For whereas the average European income has risen by about ten per cent

since 1953, the average African income has gone up by about forty-two per cent.\* These figures, of course, conceal the still vast discrepancy between the average annual incomes of the races, which the 1958 Economic Report reckoned at £1136 per working European and £73 per year per African in cash employment.† (The value of African subsistence agriculture is so conjectural that it is useless to try to include it.)

Will this favourable trend—some of the credit for which should be given to Federation—continue? Or will industrialists, looking no further than quick profits for their companies, revert to the system of cheap labour as soon as circumstances make it possible?

There are two Government actions which have fed the suspicions of those who see European employers as exploiters of labour forced only temporarily into conceding higher wages. The first is the implementing of the Land Husbandry Act in Southern Rhodesia which, by organising a system of individual inheritance, is making half the Colony's two million Africans legally landless. The Government argument is that the land allotted to Africans cannot support more than 330,000 farmers and that the rest must become urbanised for the common good. Against this Joshua Nkomo, the Congress President, has written:

"The Native Land Husbandry Act is ostensibly intended to produce a middle class of African small farmers, holding land in freehold instead of communally. But so far, its main result has been to force thousands of Africans off the land—*providing a useful float of labour for European enterprise.*" (*Africa South*, July-September 1959.)

The other move which has created suspicion is the one

\* In terms of real income, European wage increases have barely kept pace with the rise in the cost of living, while African real incomes in 1957 were 20 per cent up on 1953.

† This compares with an average wage in Nyasaland of £35 per year per worker.

referred to earlier in this chapter: the emphasis which the Kariba scheme puts on developing manufacturing industry. On the face of it, a rapid growth of industry can only better the lot of the urban Africans, if the labour demand exceeds the population growth. But some people suspect that industrialists may concentrate on highly capitalised firms with assembly-line production, which will increase productivity without the need of more skilled (and consequently better paid) African labour.

Either outcome is possible. But the present signs are that employers will find it profitable to pay better wages and encourage a more permanent labour force. Twice since Federation the Southern Rhodesian Government has raised the minimum wage for unskilled workers, by twenty-eight per cent in 1953-4 and by up to thirty-six per cent in 1958. This second raise was one of the last acts of Garfield Todd as Premier and Minister of Labour, and it called down on him the spite of his Minister of Native Affairs, Ben Fletcher (who had not been consulted in the final stages), and of many industrialists (whose wage bills could have soared). Mr. Fletcher led Todd's Cabinet out in revolt the same month, but the industrialists balanced their books by sacking some workers and increasing productivity. However, in an expanding industrial economy stimulated by Kariba power wholesale sackings should not follow wage increases. The need for higher productivity will encourage employers to increase the skills of African workers and this will lead to a breaching of the industrial colour bar. The setting up of multi-racial trade unions in the 1959 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act is a recognition, it might more charitably be called a positive expression, of this trend, "the most sincere step towards partnership", as it was described in the *Central African Examiner*, by Peter Gibbs, a liberal industrialist.

There are only two reservations concerning the hopeful aspects of industrial growth and of rising wages. The first is

made by economists who say that the emphasis on industrial advancement has meant that not enough can be spent on improving and increasing African agricultural production, and that this will result in the economy becoming lop-sided, for there will not be enough cash in the hands of farmers to buy what the factories produce. The factories can hardly exist on the market provided by their own employees, and the size of export markets for secondary industries can never be large for Rhodesia.

The second reservation is that population increase in the towns may keep African industrial wages down; that in fact, as Joshua Nkomo suggests, employers and politicians may even contrive to keep a float of unemployed in towns in order to provide cheap labour. Sir Edgar provided an impressive answer to that fear when unemployment increased in mid-1958, by introducing a Bill to control the influx of Portuguese Africans at the frontier and announcing that, if unemployment persisted, immigration from the northern territories might have to be similarly controlled. This decision may not seem liberal in a federal context, but it was certainly the best move a Southern Rhodesian Premier could have made to protect his own people and refute the charge that he wished to base his economy on the cheapest possible labour.

These figures should be kept in proportion by the reminder that, out of a population of seven million, only about 400,000 Africans are in urban employment, and that the benefits of industrial wage increases affect only a small percentage.

The converse question to this discussion of the economic benefits of Federation is the hackneyed query: how would Nyasaland do on her own, if she were allowed to secede?

In March 1958, Mr. Phillips, the Nyasaland Financial Secretary, who has the brisk appearance of a city executive rather than of a Colonial Service official, undertook an

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exercise in persuasion in Legislative Council. He made a lengthy speech, in which he imagined Federation to have been broken up and asked where the newly independent Nyasaland was going to find the extra £4½ million a year which, he reckoned, was needed to maintain her at her current rate of development and which the Federal Government was then contributing. He prophesied that the education programme, in particular, would be torpedoed for lack of funds.

Neither his figures nor his conclusions were accepted by the African members, and important European traders in Nyasaland believe that Mr. Phillips' figures do not give the full picture. For Federation, they say, harmed Nyasaland in hidden economic ways. Secondary industries which would have otherwise been planted in Nyasaland went to better communications centres in the Rhodesias when Federation removed the power of Nyasaland to place tariffs on Rhodesian imports. Since a quarter of all the goods now made in Southern Rhodesia for the African market (like agricultural implements, textiles and enamelware) go to Nyasaland, an independent Nyasaland could collect considerable extra customs duties in addition to recovering the £2 million she has annually lost to the Federation in customs and excise duties since 1953.

These critics also pour cold water on the Federal boasts about local achievements in the territory, such as the building of the impressive Group Hospital in Blantyre and for the stepped-up road programme. They point out that these were already planned as territorial projects when the Federal Government took over. Officials go further and claim that the Federal Government has actually let them down: they were proposing to spend £1½ millions on public works programmes both in 1958-9 and 1959-60, but this was cut to £250,000 and the money diverted to projects in the Rhodesias. For their part, Africans point to the colour bar in the Group

Hospital, and say that their race has received only a third of the benefit of the £750,000 spent on it. A sad little story told me by a settler's wife illustrates this point. She was in the Group Hospital having a baby, when she heard through her room-door an angry European voice reprimanding an African. He was saying: "Hey, leave that alone! That's a *European* trolley!"

Enough has been said in this chapter to show that, although Nyasaland has drawn certain economic benefits from Federation and although her Government would feel the cold winds of poverty if she were allowed to secede at this moment, yet she has not received enough attention in economic planning to convince her that Federation has been interpreted in Salisbury as a fair economic partnership among the three territories. Would Nyasaland have been given her due if she had waited quietly until Kariba was finished in 1961? Possibly. But in the event, by making a disturbance she has obtained the money sooner. Following the logic of a child wanting food, if she keeps on screaming, how much will she get to keep her quiet? The Labour Party leaders, before the 1959 Election, pledged themselves to raise British Government expenditure on "the underdeveloped areas" (mainly the Colonies) from £100 million to at least £180 million a year. They reckoned that £3 million a year, to subsidise Nyasaland's development until she could stand on her own feet again (her economy was viable, though simple and static, before Federation), was worth spending in order to avoid trouble. Since Britain has given Kenya £29 million to help pay for the Mau Mau Emergency, there is precedent for Nyasaland's hopes.

The Federal Government assert that Nyasaland has done well out of Federation, and that she would sink into poverty if she were left to herself. Yet she has certainly not yet enjoyed enough of the fruits of Federation to persuade her that she is

## CHAPTER SEVEN

# The Failure of Capricorn

Salisbury people heard for the first time about the open unrest in Nyasaland on 21st February 1959. They learnt that crowds had rescued Congressmen from Karonga jail and that Fort Hill airfield had been captured by a mob of two hundred Africans armed with pangas. On that sunny Saturday afternoon, two meetings, with poignantly different atmospheres, were held in Salisbury.

Contrasts are nothing new in the capital of the Federation. In the centre of the sparkling, well-ordered city a spirit of impersonal prosperity broods; a prosperity which had just been epitomised that month by the placing, at a cost of £15,000, of a gigantic pearl on top of the fifteen-storey Pearl Assurance building to shine at night like a lighthouse out of the Rhodesian sea of "bush". But three miles away, across the railway tracks, past the cemetery, the tobacco auction floors and a no-man's-land of garages and factories, there is a very personal, but far less prosperous, world. It has been made by the 50,000 Africans whom industry has attracted to live in Harare township. Harare was traditionally the centre of African political thinking in Southern Rhodesia; but, when Congress established its permanent headquarters in the backroom of Paul Mushonga's general store in Highfield, much of the ferment was transferred to this newer township, three miles farther out. It was in Highfield, on the spot where Dr. Banda had two months earlier exhorted the crowd to "fill the prisons in your thousands, shouting 'Hallelujah!'", that John Stonehouse faced a staring young audience in the

sun that Saturday. Meanwhile, back in Salisbury six miles away, the Capricorn Africa Society was holding its annual general meeting in the brown coolness of the Methodist Hall.

Stonehouse disappointed thousands of listeners. They were flattered that, for the first time, a British M.P. had flown out to speak specifically to Congress Africans, but they also expected that he would bring some important message from the Labour Party or at least throw in a violent denunciation of Rhodesian whites to keep everyone happily defiant for an hour or so.

Instead, he appealed to their highest feelings. He told them that the British Labour Party, having won the working man his rights after a century's struggle, was concerned that others should achieve a decent standard of living. He warned them, though, that Congress would lose the sympathy of the Labour Party if it used violence.

The speech went slowly, as George Nyandoro, the Congress Secretary-General, had to interpret each sentence into Shona. Stonehouse, slicing the air with his hand to drive home his theme of non-violence, went on:

"You must work for your rights in peace, and then you will be much more likely to have the rest of the world behind you. Your slogan should be 'Work hard, educate yourselves and organise'."

George saw a mischievous opening and added in his Shona translation, "Work hard—for Congress". The crowd broke into a cheer which baffled Stonehouse.

Stonehouse called on them as Rhodesian citizens:

"I ask you to have pride in your country. Hold your heads high and behave as though the country belonged to you. If you behave in a way that you are ashamed of, you cannot be surprised if people who are now your friends become ashamed of you."

His loudest cheer came at the words: "behave as though the country belonged to you". Transport House had vetted and approved his speech before he set out. But Winston Field

read this sentence in the *Rhodesia Herald* and asserted that it was "seditious poison . . . inciting people to civil disobedience". A hullabaloo was raised, and John Stonehouse was expelled from the Federation, by order of the Federal Government, the following week.

Six miles away, the Capricorn Africa Society was debating the same subjects—peaceful agitation and a common patriotism—but the scene could not have made a sharper contrast. In Highfield there had been thousands, hanging from walls and window ledges or huddled on the ground; they were young and ignorant of political niceties, some were rowdy, but they were clinging to every word and felt vitally involved. The eighty Capricorn representatives were older, pensive, subdued. There was a suffocating odour of feudalism; it was like a Conservative meeting in an English village, where the classes find their own levels, and the more humble, having accepted a lift to the hall, head quickly for the back row of seats.

No one was precisely complacent, but they were all too well-mannered to look distraught at an hour of crisis. Capricorn members had worked for ten years for racial harmony but could not honestly claim that much ground had been gained. The Society had seen its principles carried into the 1958 Federal election on the banners of the Constitution Party, and had inspired the College of Citizenship, still at the blueprint stage. When the new president, Michael Wood, cheerfully declared that Capricorn was like a goose "bewildered at having laid two golden eggs", he was ignoring the fact that the Constitution Party had failed to win any seats, and had since disbanded itself.

There were plenty of suggestions for future action. The fair-minded allowed that there were grounds for fears and grievances among all races. "Let's gather a list of grievances from all races and organise a rally to discuss them." No one pointed out that the people who had rallied at Karonga and

Fort Hill were far beyond discussing grievances in the restrained Capricorn manner.

"We need more lunch clubs, more multi-racial tennis matches," appealed a very urgent young public-school voice. "More rural reading rooms," pleaded an African school-teacher who had travelled two hundred miles to ask for them.

Spirits were rising. An African in the back row made a rambling speech ending up: "The Africans aren't the problem now. The white men are the heathen," which was given a good-natured Conservative chuckle.

An Austrian baron, *chef de protocol* to a copper company, and devotee of the local Wine and Food Society, made the most stirring call. "We must show clearly, dramatically, what principles we stand for. We must boycott the hotels that will not become multi-racial. We will march out of their doors like that" (dramatic fling of the arm). His self-sacrifice was properly applauded.

This military note quickened the pulse of a retired colonel, who spoke up excitedly if somewhat vaguely for "real action", for "a campaign committee—though I'd rather call it a combat committee. We'll have a big subscription drive, get everyone to fill in bankers' orders". He plunged into a long argument about how many Africans could use a banker's order.

But the Nyasaland troubles, only then beginning, eventually put all these trivial thoughts in the shade. The meeting appointed a committee of two Methodist ministers and a former leader of the Southern Rhodesia African Congress to frame a Capricorn motion on Nyasaland. For three hours they argued and could not agree. One clergyman urged that Capricorn should condemn *the use* of violence as a political weapon; the others wanted to deplore *the outbreak* of violence and "work for the peaceful removal of all conditions that may excite men to violence". But what were those conditions? Some members feared that the motion implied too much

criticism of Government, especially at such a critical time. The idea of a resolution was abandoned. Soft drinks were passed round, and the meeting settled down to watch a restful film about the exotic flowers of Kashmir.

To contrast these two meetings is unkind to Capricorn. What was there that liberals could do in Rhodesia, when stones were already flying and the Federal troops had drawn their bayonets from their scabbards? There were plenty of people who were openly or latently "liberal". Those who were active worked through the United Rhodesia Party, Capricorn, Christian Action, the Inter-racial Associations or occasionally as Government officials or Members for African Interests in the different legislatures. But the failure of liberals to take a united stand—in both Britain and Rhodesia—on the middle ground and to keep the antagonists apart has been one of the saddest episodes in the Federation's history. Why have they been so ineffectual?

The description of the Capricorn meeting offers some clues to this question. It is strange, in parenthesis, that in his book *Central African Witness* Cyril Dunn never once mentions Capricorn, a curious omission, both because Capricorn has made a lasting impression on Central Africa and because the failure of Capricorn and the other liberal groups to make people face the implications of partnership is a very significant fact.

Some will suggest that the impression left by Capricorn in Central Africa is a harmful one; that because it was a vehicle to which many liberals committed themselves in the early enthusiastic days, its misfiring made the conservative whites and the mass of Africans lose faith in liberalism generally—and particularly in the liberalism of those seven thousand who had become Capricornists. A Capricornist would reply that such a selfish view could only be held by people ready to leave others to tackle the most difficult task of human relationships

in the world, and glad to scoff at Capricorn's failure to accomplish it at the first attempt. Capricorn, he would maintain, has done invaluable work in forging, out of the sweat of some 350 preliminary meetings and the final conference on the shores of Lake Nyasa at Salima, a Contract embodying principles for a multi-racial society which has had a wide (though unacknowledged) effect on the governments of East and Central Africa. Where does the truth lie?

For the first ten years after its formation in 1949, Capricorn and its founder, Colonel David Stirling, were inseparable in the public mind. To mention Capricorn was to evoke the dominant personality of Stirling, "the Phantom Major" who showed incredible daring in attacking German airfields with the Long Range Desert Group in Libya.

The qualities which make a superb saboteur and commando leader do not always suit a political career. His abounding optimism and dashing energy sometimes struck pedestrian liberals in Rhodesia as unrealistic. If progress seemed slow in Southern Rhodesia, he would fly off to pour his enthusiasm into some new scheme in Tanganyika. It may be a good military principle constantly to switch the direction of attack in order to find a weak point; but land-bound politicians who considered that the Rhodesias alone presented enough problems for any man's lifetime felt that his habit of speeding all over the world proclaimed him a dilettante, not fundamentally concerned with Central Africa. Their suspicions were reinforced by the sight of the charming young Old Etonians who were elected to Capricorn executives, working with great spirit but patently possessing a "return ticket" to Britain for use if their cause seemed hopeless or if (as the worst cynics might have put it) they just became bored with one of the world's currently fashionable problems. But this is too harsh a judgement on Capricorn. Anyone who is prepared to spend even a single year working for racial harmony is to be welcomed. But inevitably someone whose whole stake is in

Africa resents a sermon from a Capricornist with one foot on the continent. There is, too, about Capricorn an air of High Tory benevolence which attracts many Rhodesians who consider that they have nothing to lose by being liberal because they will belong to the élite in any situation. This atmosphere of "progressive paternalism" stands in such contrast to the ascetic socialism of the Africa Bureau that it is easy to see why a liberal front has not been achieved between them. The Africa Bureau, dominated by the dedicated, self-doubting personality of the Rev. Michael Scott, detects a suspicious Fortnum-and-Mason scent about Capricorn, and Capricorn in turn sees the Bureau as guilt-ridden and black-biased. Yet they are guided by the same principles and working for the same ends.

A more serious charge against Capricorn is that of inconsistency of policy. In 1950 David Stirling was co-author of the pamphlet "A Native Policy for Africa" with N. H. Wilson, who later became secretary of the Dominion Party and then resigned even from that reactionary body in protest at what he considered its "middle-of-the-road" views. The sentiments expressed in the pamphlet could hardly be called liberal: it urged the Southern Rhodesian Government to *raise* its franchise qualifications, and applauded its "two-pyramid" policy of separate development. Stirling once favoured a federation of all six territories of East and Central Africa, but later became one of the most energetic advocates of the present Federation, exercising particular influence, it is said, on Attlee's thinking. Finally, seeing the strength of African opposition, he switched his views again and came out against compulsory federation for Africans.

As a result, Capricorn lost credit, first with the Africans in the northern territories and then with the Europeans. In Nyasaland it has made little headway, and in Northern Rhodesia it has never fully recovered from that early inconsistency, despite the adherence to Capricorn of such respected

figures as Dr. Charles Fisher, the Rev. Mervyn Temple and Dr. Alexander Scott. Among some Africans there, the word carries odium. A Zambia Congress memorandum, made public in the Ridley Report's investigation into Zambia's proscription in 1959, has this instruction: "Every Action Group member should be clever (alert) at all public and private meetings to keep a watch for Capricorns who carry information. . . ."

While David Stirling may account it a matter for pride that Capricorn should be abused by extreme nationalists (he is opposed to black nationalism as much as to white), yet the fact that Zambia—or anyone else—can make mud stick to its name is deplorable.

All that is on the debit side. There is much to Capricorn's credit. As Stirling himself has put it: "If we could define the word 'partnership' in a way acceptable to all races, we would have the basis of a good political structure. The Capricorn Contract is our definition of partnership. We spent three years creating the machinery which enabled us to put up our proposition. We had over 350 meetings of Citizenship Committees, and it was deeply moving to me to see, at the end of these meetings, how the word 'we' was used as meaning 'our countries' and not 'our race'." Stirling, who boyishly refers to white men in Africa as "Palefaces", has been emphatic that whites should be "doing things *with*, not *for*", the Africans.

The Contract, signed by European, African and Indian delegates at Salima in Nyasaland in 1956, begins with these words: "We . . . wish to affirm our faith in the greatness of our common destiny and our resolve to reject the barren doctrine of racial nationalism". It sets out its principles in six Precepts, and then attempts through five Provisions to apply the Precepts to the franchise, to land reform, labour relations, education and immigration. Racial land barriers are to be broken down by stages to avoid wide-spread speculation.

Definite steps are suggested toward an ultimate goal of integrated education. The importance to East and Central Africa of the skills and capital of white immigrants is recognised, but African fear of wholesale immigration is to be reassured by stricter control over the type of white man allowed in. Multi-racial trade unions and apprenticeship schemes are called for, and the "rate-for-the-job" principle laid down in these clear terms: "Individuals holding positions of equal responsibility and producing work equal in quantity and quality shall be entitled to equal rates of pay."

The Salima Convention received an almost unanimously favourable press, and the Contract was frequently compared to Jefferson's Bill of Rights; the *Observer* alone complained that "it would be a mistake to think that the Capricorn outlook should be accepted in Britain as an adequate basis for policy". The *Observer's* cold attitude was based on its disapproval of Stirling's earlier inconsistencies and of his denunciation of the black nationalism of Congress as *ipso facto* bad. The editor, David Astor, once explained his position in these words: "White nationalism I would define as the attempt to maintain a white aristocracy as supreme; whereas black nationalism *can* mean the extinction of the white by the numerically greater black, but it *may* also mean their willingness to work out some accommodation". There have been Africans who were members of both the African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia and the Capricorn Society, reckoning that the organisations were not mutually exclusive; but their first loyalty has been to Congress, and this supports David Astor's view that its outright condemnation of black congress nationalism lost Capricorn support and influence among Africans.

The big tactical mistake which Stirling made was to campaign for nearly two years to get his Contract adopted in its entirety by an existing (and, if possible, governing) political party. He had three reasons for this: it was the quickest road

to achieving his aims since it involved no electioneering; the Capricorn Society was registered in law as a charity for fund-raising purposes and therefore had to stay on the fringe of politics; and a new liberal party might have taken enough votes from the governing party to let the reactionaries in. This last was the reason why the Progressive Party, formed in the Copperbelt in 1953-4, disbanded before the first federal elections; however, there were no general elections on the horizon in 1956 when Capricornists gathered at Salima.

Garfield Todd's United Rhodesia Party was more likely than the Federal Party to adopt the Capricorn Contract, but that hope was never more than slim, for Todd had inherited from Huggins a party which was little more than Huggins' own personal following, widely varying in its political views, and he could hardly be expected to commend the Contract to URP members who also belonged, for instance, to the Segregation Society.

The Contract contained (as one of its expendable Provisions, but not as a basic Precept: a distinction not clear in many people's minds) a plan for a multiple voting system. Capricorn does not hold with universal adult suffrage as a primary goal, as the Labour Party does; it believes that "the vote is not a natural right, but a responsibility to be exercised for the common good", and that "there must be degrees of fitness among those who have earned the privilege of a vote". Capricorn suggested a complicated set of fourteen possible qualifications which might give a person a maximum of six votes. The system provided a curious picture of David Stirling's ideal Rhodesian: an ex-Army lieutenant with military decorations and a secondary school education, who was over forty-two and had bought a farm from which he made £1500 taxable annual income, was to be entitled to six votes, while a younger industrial tycoon might only get two. Stirling calculated in 1957 that his proposals would give 40,000 votes to Africans in Southern Rhodesia (instead of the

400 then registered) and 120,000 to Europeans (about double the present electorate). It was a new slant on qualitative franchises, but one too revolutionary for URP members who believed that income and education should be the sole criteria. Besides, the URP had already appointed the Tredgold Commission in December 1956 to recommend a new franchise system for Southern Rhodesia.

So Capricorn lost momentum during a vital year, and engaged in an exciting but unproductive battle with that other curious non-political charity, the League of Empire Loyalists. A debate staged in Salisbury between the two charities in 1957 had Africans hanging through crowded windows in a way which, a year later, only a Congress meeting could have achieved. It produced one memorable moment when David Stirling, appealing for quiet in the uproar caused by the leading Empire Loyalist, said: "It isn't often that we have the privilege of hearing a fascist speak". But the Loyalists' superior skill at packing a meeting brought about a majority for a motion condemning Capricorn's work in Africa. Mrs. A. D. Wall, a fervent Empire Loyalist, celebrated this victory by informing readers of the *Rhodesia Herald*: "As long as opposition persists against this unnecessary canker in our midst, so will hope spring eternal in this human breast".

When the Constitution Party was formed in October 1957 to fight on Capricorn principles, its genesis was as much reaction against Congress violence in the boycott of beer halls in Northern Rhodesia as against the unprogressiveness of the Federal Party. It announced that it would fight the Federal Party in the federal field and in Northern Rhodesia, but would not oppose Todd in Southern Rhodesia. Since Todd was then about to merge his URP with the Federal Party in hopes of liberalising the federal franchise proposals, this may have looked like a loosely coordinated attack on the Federal Party, from within and without. Stirling foresaw the defeat of Todd's plan, and announced: "If he has his horse shot under

him, we'll have another one ready for him to mount—in the shape of the Constitution Party". But it was an offer Todd never accepted.

The Constitution Party's parliamentary leader was Dr. Alexander Scott, who had branched out from his career as a railway doctor to become a large shareholder in Lusaka's newspaper and in a building society. He is a politician who has kept the confidence of a wide range of Africans throughout a long life, both by his own sincerity and because of his enduring personal dislike of Welensky. Despite early hopes that the Constitution Party would enlist the four African M.P.s from the northern territories and the two Europeans nominated for African Interests, Dr. Scott remained its only representative in the Federal Parliament. Sir John Moffat and the Rev. Andrew Doig stayed outside it because as nominated members they felt they could not join a political party; and the four Africans because they feared that an alliance with a Federation-wide party would compromise their views on secession.

The first—and only—election which the Constitution Party fought was the Federal election of November 1958. By then, Todd and his re-formed URP had gone down to such total defeat in the Southern Rhodesian elections that they decided not to contest the Federal elections five months later, and the morale of liberals was at its lowest. Of the eight candidates the Constitution Party put up, all but Gaston Thornicroft, the wealthy leader of Salisbury's Coloured population, came bottom of the poll. Dr. Scott lost his seat when the Indians deserted him for the UFP, after Welensky's promise that a secondary school for Indians would get priority.

When the Central Africa Party was formed in February 1959 to fight the Northern Rhodesian elections, its stated principles were based on more pragmatic considerations than the Constitution Party's had been. With the weight of Sir

John Moffat as leader behind it and a "states rights" platform to appeal to the larger African electorate, the CAP fared much better than the Constitution Party, and won four seats out of twenty-two. Dr. Scott, for personal reasons, could not come to terms with the CAP, and he and his wife Grace fought the elections as Independents, and were defeated. So Capricorn policies are now no longer directly represented in any parliament in Central Africa, although Moffat, for one, has publicly acknowledged Capricorn's part in laying the foundations for non-racial policies.

David Stirling, troubled by thrombosis, resigned the Presidency of Capricorn in August 1958, and his successor as Central Africa chairman, Mr. Tyndale-Biscoe, went to extreme lengths to emphasise that Capricorn had "divested itself of its political associations". But the resilience inherited from David Stirling sent Capricornists off at another angle—into the sphere of adult education with ideas inspired by the Danish folk-schools.

A College of Rhodesian Citizenship was set up on mission land ten miles out of Salisbury—the Land Apportionment Act prevented a multi-racial foundation being built any nearer—with the object of nurturing "a concept of nationhood and common citizenship commanding the loyalty of all races". A full practical survey by Mr. and Mrs. Guy Hunter proposed also the foundation of adult education centres in Bulawayo and the northern territories. Three hundred people a year could attend three-week residential courses at the college, and discussion of "race relationships" would be introduced naturally, they thought, rather than pointedly, into courses which would deal primarily with para-technical subjects for groups of agriculturalists, industrial workers or people in social science posts. The calculated cost was £35,000 to launch a college and £10,000 a year to maintain it; within a year Capricorn had raised enough money to set up pilot colleges in Salisbury and Nairobi.

If from these pilot colleges and the excellent Hunter Report springs a coordinated system of adult vocational education, with an emphasis on common citizenship, throughout East and Central Africa, that will be the greatest achievement the Capricorn Society can desire. Their political disappointments will be forgotten—some will add that their political aspirations, which cut across the natural evolution of parties, will have been channelled to the best purpose. Those who have equated liberals with “impractical visionaries” in Central Africa, quoting Capricornists as examples, have already been confounded by the way the Society has persuaded international funds, such as the Dulverton Trust, to put large sums into education schemes in Africa; they may well be completely refuted by the achievements of these colleges.

If the name of Capricorn carries odium among Africans in Northern Rhodesia, that of Michael Scott is the most likely to raise hackles among whites in Southern Rhodesia. He shares many attributes with David Stirling; tall, rangy, full of restless zeal, he has the same habit of striding over Africa to give a personal example of action, with his piercing eyes and his power to stampede the hesitant into action. But whereas Stirling is at home on a grouse moor or in a Government House—his sister is Lady Dalhousie, wife of the Governor-General of the Federation—Michael Scott was brought up in a Southampton slum, where his father had a parish. In his autobiography\* he makes it clear how many times he has been racked with doubt about the best course of action. In conversation he is impressively humble; burningly eager to learn and yet diffident about putting forward his own opinions. But he resolves these doubts and overcomes this diffidence through private discussion, and unlike David Stirling, has shown consistency in his public actions.

\* *A Time to Speak*: Faber & Faber Ltd.

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## THE FAILURE OF CAPRICORN

safeguard the rights of all communities against domination by any minority or majority.”

As one result, it has spent much money on providing legal aid, for instance briefing Mr. Dingle Foot to watch Dr. Banda's interests during the Devlin Commission's tour.

Scott himself explains in his autobiography why no linking of liberals was possible in his opinion. He writes:

“The tasks of building an organisation are slow and complicated and, in our case, beset by a great deal of misunderstanding, petty jealousy and efforts on the parts of other organisations to ‘co-ordinate’ us, on the plea of unity in the common fight. From their point of view this had the laudable aim of extending the scope of their own influence and support; but to us it would have meant limiting our own possibilities of influencing opinion to that which was already enjoyed by them. All the same, our refusal to be co-ordinated under the umbrella of the Movement for Colonial Freedom or Christian Action was often interpreted as a form of egotism or superiority.”

The result of this policy has been that the different organisations in Britain interested in Africa have been ranged, in the popular mind, along a spectrum. The Movement for Colonial Freedom, together with the Union of Democratic Control, are placed at the extreme black end, identifying themselves with the Committee of African Organisations. It was at the Committee's London headquarters in Gower Street that Chiume found a home when he escaped from East Africa and a detention summons. At Gower Street, the Africa Bureau is looked on doubtfully as a group of moderates, a fact that would arouse amused disbelief among those whites in Rhodesia who recall that it has pursued an anti-Federation line ever since its publication of Arthur Creech-Jones' *The Fallacy of Federation* in 1952.

Since then the Africa Bureau has concentrated on being an information centre to spread knowledge of African problems and opinions in Britain and elsewhere, work which ranges

He came on to the Central African scene for a brief week early in 1953, when with Paramount Chief Mwase's backing he persuaded the Council of Nyasaland Chiefs and the Nyasaland African Congress to petition the United Nations to stop Federation. This accorded with the philosophy of non-violent resistance which he had accepted since his days of working in a Southampton orphanage, and which had led him to a term in a Durban jail. When Chief Gomani went further and advised civil (though still non-violent) disobedience, the police arrested him, but he was removed by his tribesmen from the police car, and Scott went with him when he fled into Portuguese East Africa. Gomani was sent back in handcuffs by the Portuguese and suspended from his chieftainship, to die in banishment soon afterwards. (His widow was given a position of honour at Dr. Banda's return—it was she who placed the civet-cat's skin over Banda's head.) Scott, for his part, was declared a "prohibited immigrant" and flown back to England.

The week's trip established him as a "meddling cleric" in the eyes of most white Rhodesians. The same dislike attaches to the African Bureau, which he formed in 1952 and has directed since; and to St. Faith's Mission, Rusape, whose farm was linked by financial trust with the Bureau. The Bureau shares a London building with such curious neighbours as The Over Forty Association for Women Ltd. and Mosley's magazine. However, it has at least one congenial companion in the Anti-Slavery Society, run by another prohibited immigrant, Commander Tommy Fox-Pitt, who was once a Provincial Commissioner in Northern Rhodesia but earned Welensky's enmity. There is about the Bureau a professional air quite lacking in Capricorn and, though it has the same broad aims, it applies different priorities to them. Its first stated aim is:

"to further the best traditions of Britain's policy in Africa, especially in regard to the moral and legal obligation to

rewarding: she started a clinic for children suffering from deformities or malnutrition, and by long hours of remedial exercises got heart-warming results. The good she did for spastics and other children became known all over Central Africa.

Inevitably, though, the reputation which the Clutton-Brocks established for St. Faith's was suspect in certain quarters. When it was known that a white man, Cedric Widman, was working under John Mutasa for the wages of an African labourer, those whites who hailed St. Faith's as an example of partnership in action were shouted down by others who equated a "common farm" with Communism. When weekend political conferences were held at the Mission, these considered this proof that Clutton-Brock was bent on fomenting political unrest and changing the established order of things. Had not he and his wife and John Mutasa joined the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress when it was restarted in 1957? There were many whites who were happy to see Guy arrested when Congress was proscribed in February 1959, and to watch St. Faith's Farm being reorganised along more orthodox "Rhodesian" lines a year later by the Diocesan Standing Committee. None of them had probably ever visited St. Faith's.

The story of Guy's arrest and the cardinal blunder which Sir Edgar Whitehead made in detaining him belongs later in this book, and so does an assessment of his influence on Congress. Here it is only necessary to make two points. First, because the land question is an explosive question in Central Africa, and because Guy was doing something unique in Southern Rhodesian agriculture, he was inevitably drawn into politics when African politicians came to consult him about land. Yet, secondly, he is no politician in the ordinary sense. Like Boris Pasternak (whom he resembles in features—strong cheekbones, searching eyes, a noble head), he has been pulled on to the political stage. He sees Rhodesian problems as

from forming delegations to Ministers and framing appeals to the United Nations to providing platforms for African speakers. It has attempted to keep all-party backing; but, though it is heartily supported by both Labour and Liberal politicians (Mrs. Laura Grimond was chairman of its executive committee in 1959), Conservative enthusiasm for its work has waned. The only Tory who has remained in staunch support has been Lord Hemingford, who was for many years a schoolmaster in Africa. Because of this, and because he went so far out of line as to vote against the Government in the Devlin debate in the Lords, he has been regarded as an embarrassing oddity by his fellow Conservatives.

This side of the Africa Bureau's work is remote from Rhodesians who saw its chief manifestation in St. Faith's Mission Farm, which was run for nine years by Guy Clutton-Brock. After years of work in the London slums, where he was Chief Metropolitan Probation Officer, Guy and his wife Molly went out to put in order a district which was rapidly becoming derelict. The African men had gone to well-paid jobs in the cities, the women had been left to till the poor sandy soil. Because of soil erosion, the families were threatened with dispossession of their lands. Because of the separation of man and wife, family life itself was in danger.

The Clutton-Brocks worked wonders. Guy persuaded John Mutasa, a kindly and natural leader of men, to give up his £20 a month job as foreman in a Johannesburg boot factory and become farm manager at one-eighth of that salary. His example brought other men back from the cities. A common farm was first established, where improved farming methods were tried, then John Mutasa adapted them for his separate holding, and finally the African farmers copied him on their eight-acre holdings, having earned enough money on the common farm to afford better tools and fertilisers. Molly tackled a task which was quite as gruelling, and as

Their standpoint is closer to that held by Guy Clutton-Brock and the Africa Bureau. Nevertheless, the university staff finds itself able to speak with a sufficiently unanimous voice on political issues for all but four of them to have signed a strongly-worded letter of protest to Sir Edgar Whitehead against his first Preventive Detention Bill.

Until the Emergency the College staff seemed to consider that the part they could actively play in Rhodesian politics—or even in the moulding of Rhodesian political thinking—was circumscribed. Sensibly enough, it was thought that establishing a racially integrated college in the face of white Rhodesian prejudice was a sufficiently heavy task for the first few years. It was a task which the Principal, for one, approached very cannily. During the first year the nine African male students were put in a hostel separate from the sixty-four white students; but, because of the shortage of kitchens, they were soon all eating meals together. The following year, the building programme made it necessary for one of the men's hostels to be integrated. A letter was sent to all parents asking if they objected to their sons being in an integrated hostel, and only three demurred. At the start of the third year, the races had been mixed in the two male and the one female hostel.

Dr. Walter Adams consulted parents, but he looks to the students to set the pace. In private, he will explain that his policy in racial matters is "not to hurry further integration; but if the students press for it, they will be both forcing my hand and strengthening it". This is what has happened. The students have made it clear, in dealings with the town, that they all expect to be equally treated. They made it, for instance, a condition of their joining the Mashonaland Rugby League that they might field a racially mixed team.

Prejudice and hostility have reared up in the College's face from time to time. A photograph of a mixed jazz band set tongues clacking in Salisbury. The news that the single

primarily agricultural, and underestimates the importance of industrialisation. He has seen so much evil come from urbanisation, in the form of the break-up of families when the husband leaves the land for a single man's life in a factory town, that he takes a firm stand against what he regards as the self-destructing, materialistic attitude of white politicians.

Open discussion, however, is what is important to him. St. Faith's was a good place to hold political conferences, because white and black would spend a weekend on mission ground without offending the country's laws. The speakers at one conference included the Archbishop of Mashonaland and Mr. Winston Field, which hardly suggests a crypto-Communist gathering. Similarly, his decision to join Congress was made because he wished to see it live up to its non-racial ideals, and hoped to influence its policies by Christian advice from inside. In the talk he gave about Congress to the National Affairs Association in Salisbury in December 1957 (from which I quote at length in Chapter 12), he clearly expresses his interpretation of the role of Congress in Rhodesian politics. It should also have been clear to his critics that here was a man who could never conceal a sinister design.

Standing in the wide gap between the Capricorn and Africa Bureau brands of liberalism is the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which opened its copper-roofed halls to students in 1957. The Vice-Principal, Basil Fletcher, has become chairman of the Citizenship College's management committee and thus has taken up a position close to the Capricorn viewpoint. Two Lecturers, Terry Ranger and John Reed, were so appalled by what they called "the political and moral crisis" of the Southern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Emergencies that they began publishing a cyclostyled broadsheet *Dissent*, whose hard-hitting and closely argued criticisms of Welensky's and Whitehead's policies soon brought it fame.

College had "taken the expedient way out of a nasty corner, but in so doing has damaged its traditions. The College," it added, "will now have to revise its pretensions."

Dr. Adams' ideas of expediency were presumably based on two considerations: he feared that the future enrolment of students would suffer if the Chidzeros were accepted, and that the Federal Government might pare down its annual grants during the next five-year period—or, at any rate, be less willing to increase the current rate of £150,000 a year.\* It might indeed have had a slight temporary effect on enrolment, but the Federal Government is reluctant to show antagonism to the racial policies of the College, since it is fond of pointing to it as the most thorough-going and visible example of partnership. Anyway, the British Government has contributed far more—nearly £1½ million—to the College funds, and if the College authorities are to dance to any tune of clinking coins, it should logically be to the tune played at Westminster. The Chidzero affair hurt the College in the eyes of Africans and foreign backers, and it needed to do a good deal to redeem its liberal reputation.

It would be churlish to suggest that the College saw the Southern Rhodesian Emergency as an opportunity to do just that; but it was certainly a convenient occasion for speaking out strongly against the repressive "security" legislation. The Salisbury City Council (whose reactionary ways have already been described) and the Nyasaland Tobacco Association spotlighted the College's stand by threatening to withhold their grants, worth £1700. In fact, the staff were in the good company of the Anglican Archbishop, Mr. Todd, and the Salisbury Bar Council in protesting against these Bills, and the gesture of City Council and the Nyasaland tobacco farmers was an empty one.

Summing up this incident, the *Central African Examiner* wrote:

\* The annual grant was doubled in December 1959.

African woman student was going to be accommodated in the women's hostel provoked outside concern, and a protest was made by some of the other women students—a move not unconnected with the fact that the Dominion Party leader, Stewart Aitken-Cade, had a daughter at the College. As a result, the African girl was moved into a warden's lodge until the storm blew over. When she later acted as a bridesmaid at a white girl's wedding, and when end-of-term dances were held for all students, the Salisbury tabloid the *Citizen* was quick to spread the terrible tale to its suitably scandalised readers.

It must have been awareness of this strong, though usually latent, prejudice that made Dr. Adams act so uncourageously in the Chidzero affair and blot so badly the College's liberal reputation. Dr. Bernard Chidzero, born in Southern Rhodesia of Nyasa ancestry, is the leading African academic to have sprung from Central Africa. He took his doctorate of political science at McGill University and was all set to return to Salisbury and join the College staff on a special research fellowship which an American foundation was prepared to furnish. His outstanding record, his lack of commitment to active politics, the special form of his fellowship, all made him eminently suitable to be the first black member of the non-student body.

However, he suddenly made himself most unsuitable, just before the appointment was to be made, by marrying Miss Dusablon, a French-Canadian girl. Dr. Adams announced that the post was no longer open to Dr. Chidzero, and that his marriage was "a major factor" in this decision. He was applauded by the *Citizen* for having "his head manifestly well screwed on", and the *Salisbury Sunday Mail* assured him that he had taken "the only course open to him; for if there is one thing on which the Europeans of this country and of South Africa are agreed, it is that there shall be no mixing of blood, now or ever." Another member of the Argus Group, the *Chronicle* of Bulawayo, suggested on the other hand that the

This chapter should have made it clear why the main pressure groups for liberalism outside the party system have found it impossible to form a broad liberal front. Many agree with Michael Scott that it is limiting an organisation's own freedom to unite with other organisations; others believe that divisions have weakened the effectiveness of liberals. This is hard to deny; yet if unanimity had been achieved, it might have fossilised, rather than crystallised, liberal thought in a rapidly evolving situation.

Before going on to consider the failure of the only party (as opposed to pressure group) with pretensions to liberalism and effective power—Todd's United Rhodesia Party—it is important to examine the chances which have been offered to the African politician willing to work for racial harmony in the middle ground between the two nationalisms. It is perhaps the saddest fact in all the Federation's sad history that such Africans have, almost to a man, found that middle ground a treacherous ridge, from which they either slide towards black nationalism or else career down towards the white camp, to be discredited by their own race as "stooges" or "sell-outs".

"The truth is that what the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland needs is not less political activity and less interference in the life of the community, but *more*. If any criticism can be levelled at it it is not that it has had too much of an impact on, or too deep an involvement in, Rhodesian life, but too little."

It is probably asking too much of an overworked group of fifty-odd teachers to expect that they should do the liberal politicians' work for them, especially since in Rhodesia, as elsewhere, a newcomer who takes an active part in politics is unpopular. (This is a view the Federal and Southern Rhodesia governments endorse by stipulating two years' residence as one of the qualifications for a vote.) Besides, the staff are more vulnerable than individuals to a counter-attack by opponents. Nevertheless, now that the College has overcome its own internal problems of racial integration, it can play a larger part in liberalising the country. An Institute for Adult Education, costing £15,000 a year, is being set up, although its influence will not be as general as it might be, since it has been decided not to run it as an extra-mural department with classes all over the country. In the more directly political field, *Dissent* has become recognised as the only unequivocally liberal publication in Southern Rhodesia, a melancholy situation which will be explained in the Appendix.

Other organisations, such as the Inter-racial Associations and Christian Action, have been working for the same object—"the promotion of good race relations". Their membership overlaps the other liberal pressure groups, but they have found their own fields of work. The Inter-racial Associations have been quick to present any political commission of inquiry with well-documented memoranda, while Christian Action distinguished itself by organising relief for the families of detainees during the Emergencies.

Rhodesians and thirteen others chosen by the British Government. Gaitskell had said that “political advancement, particularly in Nyasaland, is bound to be obstructed so long as the politically active and, on the whole, best educated Africans are locked up in prisons and detention camps.” He had added that “it is certainly no good to try to have Africans represented at the conference through their Governments by those who are simply ‘stooges’ of either the Government of the United Kingdom or the Federal Government.” Macmillan called this “a depressing insinuation” and Lennox-Boyd asked rhetorically whether the four African editors who had written about “Breaches in the Colour Bar” to the *Manchester Guardian* that day could be called “stooges”.

This was the strongest and most provocative language the Labour party could use. One of the changes the Beadle Tribunal in Southern Rhodesia laid at the door of George Nyandoro was that he had kept a “dictionary of Quislings” who were “to be dealt with at a suitable time”. Tom Mboya and six other Kenya nationalists had been convicted and fined £75 each for calling other African candidates “stooges” and “sell-outs”. Callaghan himself, a year earlier during the debate on the Amendment of the Federal Constitution, had told the Commons:

“The *Observer*, very unkindly, called these elected Africans ‘stooges’. I being a moderate and reasonable man, would not dream of using such a term.”

Yet, by mid-1959, he and Gaitskell were peppering their speeches with the word. Had they become immoderate and unreasonable, or had the situation worsened so far that no prominent Africans could co-operate with the governments without sacrificing their principles?

Obviously the Labour leaders believed that the latter had happened, and that the only way to bring it home to the British Government and to retain confidence among Africans was to use the straightforward, blunt terms used by the

## “Stooges” and the Slippery Slope

Mr. Godfrey Lagden (Conservative, Hornchurch): Does not the hon. Gentleman understand that by using such a word as “Quisling” with regard to Africans who may want to help their country, and in our opinion do, he is putting them in an impossible position to carry out any request or any duty that may devolve on them?

Mr. James Callaghan (Labour, Cardiff South-East): There is always this difficulty that, if we represent what we know to be the view of hundreds of thousands of Africans, we are accused of putting that idea into their heads. I must ask the hon. Gentleman to take it that this view will be strongly felt by millions of Africans living in these territories. I am sorry if he does not accept it. It only means that the Government benches are unfitted to handle this problem.

*Hansard, 22 July 1959.*

The Conservatives and the present governments in Central Africa would, no doubt, retort that the Socialists are the ones unfitted to handle this problem if they dismiss as “stooges” those Africans willing to co-operate with the governments. In Major Wall’s words, during the same debate, “The greatest disservice we can do to the future of Central Africa is to say that any African who expresses his belief in federation and a multi-racial society is a ‘stooge’.”

Of course, neither Callaghan nor Gaitskell had done that. They had been attacking the terms of the proposed 1959-60 Central Africa Commission, on which Mr. Macmillan had suggested that five Africans (appointed presumably by their local governments) should serve, together with eight white

false evidence about the forest conference give a repellent flavour to this form of “co-operation”.

In a sense every African is an informer who tries to spread information among whites about his own race. This attempt may be admirable, and the four African Federal M.P.s, who were elected mainly by the whites of Southern Rhodesia, can claim to be acting in the public interest. But the situation is complicated. When African M.P.s make a speech which is published in *Hansard*, well and good. Any other African can assess his words and attack him on his public record. But opinions given in private in the party caucus, or the even more confidential remarks which were apparently made to Sir Edgar Whitehead and convinced him of the need to round up 495 Congressmen in February 1959, come into a different category. None of this can ever be assessed on its merits.

Whitehead disclosed, as one justification for the arrests, that four Africans had told him that their lives were being threatened. It was soon widely known that three of these were Federal M.P.s from Southern Rhodesia, and, also rumoured (and never denied), that one of them—Chad Chipunza—had gone round with the police cars on the night of the arrests directing them to the houses of Congressmen. Inevitably, Chipunza and his colleagues have to take a full share of blame for the many injustices committed in the round-up. More, these men were decisive in swinging the balance and provoking Government action. Some people argue that these were patriots who put the country's good before racial loyalty; but for most Southern Rhodesian Africans the Emergency has seemed very far from being to the country's good, short-term or long-term, and the M.P.s are little better than common informers—a little better, because at least part of their role is a public one.

Chipunza's collaboration represents a late stage (not the last stage) in the process of co-operation on the white man's

Africans themselves. If the Africans chosen for the Monckton Commission inspired no more confidence among their countrymen than the eight African Federal M.P.s who were put into the Federal Assembly by a predominantly white electorate in November 1958, then the whole concept of partnership had better be scrapped. Whether those few Africans openly co-operating in government could reasonably be considered 'stooges'—and if not, whether other Africans could be persuaded that they were patriots—was therefore a vital question for the whole Federation.

Some Africans who try to co-operate are discredited in the eyes of their fellows because of the motives which drive them; others because of the terms which white officials set on their co-operation.

In the first category come the police informers, shadowy people caught for once in the searchlight of the Devlin Commission. The use of "copper's narks" in Britain is humiliating enough; the employment of Africans as informers against politicians of their own race is a far more demoralising practice, and calculated to excite as much racial hostility as any extremist politician's speech. The Blantyre Synod gave its opinion about police informers when, before Dr. Banda returned, it said that "the widespread employment of police informers, directed against essentially law-abiding people whose only offence is their attitude to Federation, is creating contempt for the law as such."

It could be argued that informers are an essential part of the machinery needed to maintain law and order, but it would be difficult to convince Africans of that. The fact that the Devlin Commission dismissed the evidence of the chief informer about the forest "massacre plot" conference as "most unconvincing" did nothing to bolster up the institution. The example of Rawson Macharia in Kenya, and the suggestion by John Stonehouse that a Nyasa photographer, Thomas Karua, was trained by the Acting Solicitor-General to give

for North Nyasaland when Nyasas boycotted the elections, had been absent from his native country for many years, and had to hurry back there in order to complete the required three months' residence before nomination day. The same charge of being unrepresentative because of long absence can be made against Dr. Banda. The difference lies in the fact that, when Chingattie went back to Nyasaland, he had to live for the three months in the establishments of John Foot, another Nyasaland Federal M.P., and of another UFP supporter, because no African village would welcome him.

But the factor which has most discredited the “co-operative” Africans has been the lack of results to show for their policy. The Federal Government has never conceded enough fast enough. The careers of Jasper Savanhu and Mike Hove, the original two African M.P.s for Southern Rhodesia in the Federal Assembly, illustrate this clearly.

Savanhu was a teacher of carpentry who turned journalist, as so many Southern Rhodesians of talent did when the *African Newspapers* chain began to spread after the war. As befits his first profession, he has thin, sculptured, totem-pole features, in striking contrast to the liveliness and mobility of most African faces. During the pre-Federation talks he was the newspaper group's editor-in-chief, and a natural choice as a representative of Africans at the London Conference in April 1952. The other African Huggins took to London was Joshua Nkomo, who had risen from being a social worker on Rhodesia Railways to the post of organising secretary of the African Rhodesian Railways Union. Both Savanhu and Nkomo had been officials of the early African National Congress; both of them opposed the London proposals for Federation; and neither of them was asked to the second London conference on Federation in January 1953.

But at that point their paths diverged. When Federation began, Savanhu accepted it as a *fait accompli*, and welcomed Huggins' backing when he put up for the Mashonaland

terms. Most of the slippery slope lay behind him. We should take a closer look at this gradient.

An African who sets out to work for a multi-racial society in Central Africa has many difficulties to contend with. One is the stomach-turning attitude of patronage shown him by most white politicians. An example of this was the way in which William Harper commended Isaac Samuriwo to the Dominion Party voters of Gatooma in November 1958, when he wrote:

“As a matter of fact, I asked Samuriwo what he found in the Dominion Party which made him join, and he said he found us the only honest, realistic-policed party not making a lot of rash promises. He comes of the right stock, his father is a chief, and I think most people favour the chiefs, except the African National Congress! I see that Samuriwo’s manifesto has been sent out. I have, in fact, just received a copy myself. If you feel that you want to throw it in the waste-paper basket, please read it first. He struck me as a reasonable sort of chap, and thinks as we do. Remember, this matter of African candidates has been forced on us. . . .”

More daunting is the suspicion among Africans that he is only doing it for what he can get out of it—specifically, a Federal M.P.’s salary of £1650 a year. The fact that, of the twelve African Federal M.P.s, only Samuriwo, with his fleet of trucks and chain of general stores, had known the feel of such money before, sharpens these suspicions. As an African correspondent wrote in the *Central African Examiner*:

“If to many Africans the Federal Parliament seems a very paying employment house, to others—the ones outside it—it seems important that the Africans elected should possess ability and intelligence as well as just moderate views.”

There is no doubt that the United Federal Party and the Dominion Party failed to get candidates of the highest calibre (with perhaps three exceptions) and had to resort to candidates who were laughably unrepresentative of their people. For instance, J. G. S. Chingattie, who was returned unopposed

however, that it discriminated against Africans since, in the old Assembly, a voting bloc of nine (six Africans and three Europeans sitting for African interests) carried more weight than a bloc of fifteen (twelve Africans and three Europeans) in the new Assembly.

But it was the proposed method of electing the six extra Africans which placed Savanhu and Hove in an impossible position. The Government had seen how satisfactorily they had behaved, but had suffered four years of unceasing opposition from the four African M.P.s from the north, who were elected by the African Representative Council in Northern Rhodesia and the African Protectorate Council in Nyasaland. So they decided that the extra six should be elected in a similar way to Savanhu and Hove—that is, by an electorate with a qualification so high that it barred all but a few hundred Africans. Since this electorate was almost entirely European, they added a second roll of special voters who could, as the Minister of Law once explained in Harare location, “get practice at voting” by voting for eight Africans (for the six new seats and the seats Savanhu and Hove were holding) but not for the forty-four ordinary seats.

A special voter had to have the qualification of earning £180 a year. Mr. Greenfield, the Minister of Law, estimated that enough Nyasas could be immediately registered as special voters for Africans in Nyasaland to control the election of their two new African M.P.s; in Northern Rhodesia, Africans could outnumber Europeans “within a few years” in these special elections; while in Southern Rhodesia the whites would continue to decide these elections “for the foreseeable future”.

Hove disliked the Bill intensely. Nor did he accept Greenfield’s estimates. As he explained during the Third Reading:

“My main objection to the Bill is that it is proposed that eight African representatives must be elected by a very

African Federal seat. So did Mike Hove, another protégé of *African Newspapers*—he had edited Bulawayo's *Bantu Mirror*—who stood for Matabeleland. Nkomo fought Hove, and Savanhu was faced by Stanlake Samkange, yet another journalist whose clergyman father had led the old Bantu Congress for years and who himself had been influential in the ANC. Nkomo and Samkange made it clear that they would express an independent view in the Federal Assembly. Savanhu and Hove were easily elected by the overwhelmingly white vote, and soon afterwards joined the Federal Party.

Their tactics since have been based on the motto "Make the best of things as they are" and on a belief that the best way to change the views of white politicians was to get mentally as close to them as possible and try to influence them in private caucus, and that this would be more effective than standing outside and criticising publicly at a stage when it was difficult for a Government to retract decisions without losing face. These are excellent tactics—but only if you have the numerical and moral weight to affect policy inside the party caucus, and if other Africans are able to see you succeeding. Savanhu and Hove may have "liberalised" the Federal Government's thinking in a number of minor matters, but their fellow Africans were not impressed by the results and saw the Federal Party making disproportionately good use of the pair for overseas propaganda, pointing to them as models of moderate Africans who were contented with the Government policy. Savanhu and Hove submitted to playing this part, making only minor complaints about the speed of African advancement which the Government was setting.

Their dilemma came in 1957 when the Government brought forward a Bill to enlarge the membership of the Federal Assembly from thirty-five to fifty-nine. Among the extra members were to be six more African M.P.s. This addition preserved the strict ratio of ordinary seats to African seats and to Europeans sitting for African interests. Critics claimed,

because he had failed to serve African interests. But his loyalties were too divided to be reconciled, even in this curious way. Any other African who put up for his vacant seat would have had to admit that he was taking a stand, not for Greenfield's "party system", but for the white man's viewpoint on what the African Affairs Board had defined as a racially discriminating measure. Since no African was prepared to be thus labelled a "stooge", Savanhu was persuaded by the Federal Party to stand for re-election and was returned unopposed. Since then, neither he nor Hove has considered it worth while to make public appearances or speeches in African locations, and in return they have hardly been counted as African representatives.

It was inevitable, after this unsavoury start to the enlarged Assembly, that the six extra Africans would inherit the odium which Africans attached to the new system of election. Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland considered the system so unfair that they boycotted the Federal Elections almost to a man. The result was that even the original two Nyasaland African seats (one of which had been held in the first Parliament by that stout individualist Wellington Chirwa) went to two more UFP nominees because a few UFP supporters were the only Africans to vote.

Africans now number a quarter of the Federal Government's party caucus (nine out of thirty-six), and it is argued that, so far from being "stooges," these nine can—and do—play an important part in liberalising Government policy in its formative stages. If this is so, there is no public proof of it. On the contrary, the first sycophantic utterances of the newly elected M.P.s must have been embarrassing even to Sir Roy Welensky and his ministers. In the Federal Parliament's first session in April 1959, one Nyasa M.P., Mr. Malunga, hastened to reassure his white colleagues concerning the recent disturbances in his country:

small number of Africans and a very large majority of people of other racial groups; but at the same time, the people who form the greater part of the House under the proposed legislation must have almost a negligible number of African voters. . . . I cannot see myself supporting this Bill. There is nothing I can do to appease my conscience if this Bill is passed with my support, because in my heart of hearts I believe it is not in the best interests of the country. . . . My conscience would punish me so that I would lead a very miserable life from now on."

The votes of Savanhu and Hove were vital to the Government, who needed a two-thirds majority to pass the amendment. The four Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans, and three European liberals, were fiercely opposed to the Bill. Savanhu had voiced, in the Committee stage, his dislike of the way in which the Southern Rhodesian method of election was being extended to the north. Delegations of Africans came to see him and Hove on the night before the vote on the Third Reading, urging them to oppose the Bill. Yet the next day, after attending the Government's caucus meeting, Hove and Savanhu voted for it. Hove switched without a word of explanation, and has never given an explanation since. Savanhu made a short speech "to state emphatically that my final decision has been reached without taking into consideration any pressure, if there ever was any, that has been brought to bear on me." Nevertheless, he immediately resigned his seat "for reasons which I cannot state". Greenfield spoke of their "greatest possible courage to take a stand for the party system and not for the racial system", and said that he had been persuaded by the pair to lower the special voters' wage qualification from £180 to £150 a year. But many Africans reckoned that Savanhu and Hove had sold their principles for £30.

For Savanhu to resign after voting with his party was nonsensical but inevitable, given the anomalous position he was in. He voted the way his white electors wanted; he resigned

Africa are baffling to a newcomer who might suppose that the Federal franchise is more attractive to an African (since at least twelve Africans are assured of election) than the Southern Rhodesian franchise, by which no African has yet been elected. In fact, the opposite is true. Todd's franchise has a lower qualification roll, but the special voters on it have full voting rights as in a normal common roll—the differentiation being that a closure will be placed on the lower roll when its number reaches one-fifth of the whole electorate. The Federal system is one of communal rolls, and the ordinary M.P.s will never need to depend on the votes in the lower roll, as Southern Rhodesian M.P.s soon may.

Africans in the northern territories will never register in numbers for a federal vote until a common roll is offered; and the Federal Government will not consider making the £150 a year lower qualification sufficient for a full vote for all M.P.s, for it would mean abolishing the special African seats and in their place filling about a third of the Assembly with ordinarily elected African members. So on that point the franchise is deadlocked. The African M.P.s will continue to be elected predominantly by Europeans, and to say, as did Chad Chipunza in April 1959, “I do not believe for a moment that universal suffrage is a panacea for our problem here . . . Any form of lowering the franchise would be wrong”; while other Africans and forthright British Socialists will continue to listen sceptically to their professions of loyalty to “the party system”, and to call them “stooges”.

Charitably, they may be considered victims of the present system, but their cooperation tends to perpetuate rather than alter that system, by giving the outside world the impression that the system is working well in that a group of moderate Africans is sitting with Europeans in the Federal Assembly and dividing on party lines.

The appointment of Savanhu as a junior minister in April 1959 was more impressive to outsiders than to Africans in the

"Sir Roy Welensky was right in saying that the trouble-makers got their instructions from the Accra Conference in Ghana . . . We know that the present disturbances are more Communistic than nationalistic."

And Godwin Lewanika went further still in the historic parallel he chose to draw:

"I would like to say a word on the criticism levelled on the leadership of the hon. Prime Minister of the Federation. They do not really surprise me . . . Jesus Christ was crucified by men whom he came to save."

It is reasonable to doubt whether men who make such statements in public can be firm in pressing an independent line in the privacy of the party caucus. But their nine votes are important to Welensky (though, with forty-six party members in an Assembly of fifty-nine, he does not really need them, except for the purpose of suggesting racial unity). If ever another Savanhu situation occurs, there is every indication that the nine will choose to vote with the party, and not for the interests of Africans. For even if, as Greenfield maintains, Africans could control the election of some of these M.P.s, the fact remains that the terms were not made attractive enough for Africans to register in any numbers and that the nine are therefore beholden to Europeans for their parliamentary salaries.

The solution, of course, is to have a franchise low enough so that not only African but also European candidates have to depend substantially on African votes to get elected to the Federal Assembly. Passing this stage is what Hugh Gaitskill termed "getting over the hump" on the road to democracy, and he instanced Tanganyika as a country in which this stage had been happily left behind. This does not mean that a majority of the electorate needs to be African, but merely that African votes must be patently the decisive factor in any member's election.

The differences in the various franchise systems in Central

are not; but they all fall under suspicion. To remove the suspicion, the system needs to be altered, which is often no easier than getting the franchise broadened. Three examples make this point.

The system of “indirect rule” through the chiefs which Lord Lugard instituted throughout the African colonies is rapidly becoming obsolete. In Southern Rhodesia, less regard than elsewhere has been paid to the great administrator’s scheme, and chiefs have been turned into Government employees. In the northern territories the Lugard system prevails more strongly, but in all parts of Africa veneration for old chiefs is being replaced by respect for educated youngsters. The Nyasaland Government has seen this change coming, but has only taken half-measures to meet it. The matrilineal system of many Nyasa tribes prevents government officials from identifying the heir to a chieftaincy in time to give him a good education. Uneducated men still succeed to chieftaincies, and the government policy of appointing its own chiefs, called “native authorities”, is hardly an effective substitute. For these native authorities have none of the religious sanction of traditional chiefs, and they have to overcome the disadvantage of being Government nominees set over a proudly independent people.

The setting-up in Nyasaland of multi-racial district councils was hailed by Government as a progressive measure, but in many cases it defeated its own purposes, for Africans looked at the European councillor beside them and the district commissioner sitting as their chairman, and saw the “thin end of the wedge” leading to white domination of their traditional councils. In Tanganyika the development of district councils, with Africans acting as chairmen, is a more advanced and healthy one.

It is partly frustration over these half-measures that has sent young educated Nyasas into the ranks of Congress. All but three of Nyasaland’s university graduates were arrested

Federation as an example of partnership. For Africans are in two minds on this: they had long ago ceased to consider Savanhu as an African representative, but on the other hand the sight of a black face in a high position in the Ministry of Home Affairs, as Parliamentary Secretary, set a hopeful precedent for a truly representative African to follow.

But again, this concession came too late for the Federal Government to gain credit from it. During the Federal elections, a poster war was waged in Bulawayo over the prediction in *The Economist* that Welensky would appoint Savanhu to a ministry. The Dominion Party thought to scare voters by plastering the city with posters which read "African Cabinet Minister: Secret Leaks Out". The Federal Party hastened to quieten fears with its own poster, "No African in Cabinet Except by Merit—Welensky". As it turned out, Savanhu was not considered to have acquired sufficient merit for five more months, and was not appointed Parliamentary Secretary until after the Emergencies. The critics who called it "another measure of panic liberalism" were hard to refute; and many more Africans came to believe that only by might could they get their rights.

As for Savanhu himself, he flew to Britain and the States to spread his optimistic views: "I think that in the implementation of our policy of partnership, something more than just continued progress is going on. What is happening is a snowballing effect, an acceleration in the breaking down of racial divisions. . . ." His infinite patience stopped him from adding that one of the remaining racial divisions had just frustrated the Federal Government's plan of giving him a pleasant house near the University, and had sent him back to the location.

Any African is liable to be called a "stooge" who has been placed in a position of authority and is maintained there by European power or money. Some are genuine stooges, others

short and unpredictable. The Governor declared a state of emergency and rusticated thirty union leaders. Katilungu had to re-build the union and its depleted funds almost single-handed. For its misfortunes he blames Lewanika.

Lewanika, for his part, having been the first President of Congress when it was formed out of various welfare societies in 1948, has swung through many degrees in politics since. Congress leadership was taken over by the young school-teacher, Harry Nkumbula, before it became militant in the days leading to Federation. Lewanika kept out of Federal politics for years, and first entered them tentatively to send greetings to David Stirling and Dr. Scott when the Constitution Party was being formed. But within months he had become the first African member of the United Federal Party in Northern Rhodesia, and was rewarded with a seat at the Federal elections. His subsequent loyalty to Sir Roy Welensky he expressed in the striking terms already quoted.

Katilungu's political course has been more straightforward. He briefly accepted a position in the Constitution Party's executive, and fought and lost the Federal and Northern Rhodesia elections as an independent. He would probably have allied himself to Moffat and the Central Africa Party if he had been elected to Legislative Council. Few Africans objected when he accepted a place on the Monckton Commission. The one certain thing to be said about Katilungu is that he is nobody's stooge. But the course of his quarrel with Lewanika has confused union and national politics, and has led Lewanika to put himself and his Association into a position liable to be misinterpreted.

*African Newspapers* furnish a final example. The Group is owned by Rhodesia's "Big Four" companies—Rhodesian Selection Trust, Anglo-American Corporation, the British South Africa Company and Imperial Tobacco—and is run for them by Mr. B. G. Paver, a South African-born writer who

during the Emergency. In reply, the Nyasaland Government's first declared aim, after the arrests, was to bolster up the power of the chiefs and the native authorities. By a sad and inexorable process, the chiefs and native authorities were set up as enemies of Congress (except for the powerful chiefs who could resist manœuvrings) and incurred the charge of "stooge". An unhappy clause in the new Northern Rhodesian constitution made it necessary for every African candidate to get the signatures of two-thirds of the chiefs in his area before being nominated to stand for Legislative Council. This resulted in some appallingly difficult paper-chases. In payment for the comic sight of Harry Nkumbula, President of the Northern Rhodesia Congress, scurrying hundreds of miles by bicycle to get thirty signatures, a great deal of harm was done to the prestige of the chiefs. African nationalists were able to say that the chiefs were being used as mere instruments to weed out "undesirable" (Congress) candidates.

A second example comes from the Copperbelt, where the charge of "stooge" is often heard in trade union battles. In 1947 the British Labour Government sent out Mr. W. M. Comrie to teach trade unionism to the African copper workers. The two candidates for chairmanship of the first union set up there were Lawrence Katilungu and Godwin Lewanika. Katilungu, once a mission teacher, is a distant relative of Paramount Chief Chitimukulu of the Bemba; Lewanika comes from the Royal house of Barotseland. When Katilungu was elected, personal enmity complicated their tribal rivalry.

Years later, in 1953, Lewanika formed the Mines African Staff Association as a union for monthly-paid workers. When the mining companies granted recognition to the Association, Katilungu saw it as a conspiracy to scoop off the cream of his union's talent and destroy the "unity of African labour". Hatred of the Association grew in the union. While Katilungu was abroad, his lieutenants began a series of "rolling strikes",

patient attitude that it is unrepresentative of African thought. Its editors are concerned to show responsibility, and too often they lean to the Government side and present an unbalanced case, as in the article “Breaches in the Colour Bar”, already quoted, which the four editors wrote to the *Manchester Guardian*. The pity was that the *Westminster Press* was thwarted from buying up *African Newspapers* in 1956, and making it a visibly independent group, thus placing its editors beyond reproach. The story of how Welensky put a melancholy end to those negotiations I shall tell in the Appendix.

When the pressure groups of liberal organisations were being proved ineffective, when the Africans prominent in racial cooperation were being discredited by the terms imposed on such cooperation, who was left to prevent the clash of opposing nationalisms, to show the Africans that there was something to hope for in partnership, someone to look to who would safeguard their interests, some other course open to them except the violence of desperation?

There were two repositories of hope for Africans. Garfield Todd, at the head of the URP Government of Southern Rhodesia, could be expected to press African advancement with all his energies. And the African Affairs Board in Salisbury and the British Government between them could veto any discriminatory legislation introduced into the Federal Assembly. But when Todd was removed from the premiership by his rebel ministers, and when the African Affairs Board's appeal to the British Government was ignored, Africans began to believe the worst. They were forced to act in desperation.

published a book called *His Own Oppressor* in 1958. The phrases he employs in it show how out of sympathy he is with African popular movements. The members of the African National Congress, "prone to Buddha-like contemplation of their navels", are, he considers, "obviously determined to crucify colour by nailing it to a cross in the polling-booth". The Central African situation requires that "the civilised minority must continue to dominate, guide and govern the uncivilised majority". The civilised minority, he hastens to explain, consists of the Europeans and certain Africans who possess "sincerity, integrity and dignity", like Mr. Savanhu and Mr. Hove.

It is not surprising that Africans generally do not hold in high regard papers run by a man who has published such views. And since Savanhu and Hove fell into the toils of "the party system", it is doubly hard for other editors following after them not to inherit the same labels. Two prominent African nationalists, Elias Mtepuka and Wellington Chirwa, had resigned from *African Newspapers* years before because they could not abide the Group's general policy. In many African eyes it followed that anyone who did not resign was a Government hireling.

*African Newspapers* has been used as a nursery for Africans of talent who can later be given Government appointments either, like Savanhu and Hove, as M.P.s or, like Lawrence Vambe, as Information Assistant in London. Again the big companies are, inevitably if incorrectly, so closely associated in African minds with Government that the Group has come to be thought of as a Government organ.\* Although it has on occasions taken an independent view (criticising for instance the logic of the Beadle Tribunal's report on the Congress detainees) it has in general shown such a moderate and

\* When I asked a Salisbury taxi-driver, in April 1960, to drive me to the *African Newspapers* office, he thought for a moment and then said: "Oh, you mean the State papers."

patient attitude that it is unrepresentative of African thought. Its editors are concerned to show responsibility, and too often they lean to the Government side and present an unbalanced case, as in the article “Breaches in the Colour Bar”, already quoted, which the four editors wrote to the *Manchester Guardian*. The pity was that the *Westminster Press* was thwarted from buying up *African Newspapers* in 1956, and making it a visibly independent group, thus placing its editors beyond reproach. The story of how Welensky put a melancholy end to those negotiations I shall tell in the Appendix.

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## Todd's Reforms

At first sight, Garfield Todd seems much too good to be true: square-jawed, a straight line of mouth ending in a twinkling curve, heavy black eyebrows emphasising piercing eyes, wiry greying hair springing upwards. He has the face of a heroic senior space-pilot in a boy's magazine. And when he stands, legs astride, on a platform and flings across the audience his attractively rasping voice—with the strong New Zealand accent which twenty-five years in Southern Rhodesia have not blurred—he resembles no one so much as a spruced-up Abraham Lincoln.

He did not exactly split rails in his youth, though he worked in his father's clay-pits for a lower wage than African unskilled workers get in Rhodesian towns. After going to university in Johannesburg he came to Southern Rhodesia at the age of twenty-six, and for twelve years he and his wife ran an isolated mission station where he kept himself as busy working with his hands as with books and Bibles. In 1946 he went into politics, with the main object of pressing a campaign for African education. He saw this as the best chance to transform the country into a modern and progressive state. His philosophy of action is summed up in his often quoted remark: "We're taking the African people by the scruff of the neck and saying 'Come with us into the twentieth century'. But they'll be glad they came."

It was clear, during his seven years as a back-bencher, that he was an outstanding member; it was also clear that he was making enemies. Some Rhodesians were jealous of his talents

and his energy; more were suspicious. "We just don't trust him. You see, he was a missionary once. And what's an ex-missionary doing with a large ranch, eh?" He was under fire from both sides. The missionary who had become a settler in his possessions but not in his attitudes was doubly suspect.

His great political friend in those days was the son of a Presbyterian missionary, Julian Greenfield, a lawyer, and Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs. When Federation was approaching and Huggins was about to become Federal Prime Minister, there was no obvious heir to the premiership of Southern Rhodesia. Ben Fletcher, the Minister of Native Affairs, lacked the zest and ideas needed to meet the new era. Edgar Whitehead, the Minister of Finance, was suffering from increasingly bad eye-sight as well as deafness—and in fact temporarily retired from politics to his hill-farm in 1953. Greenfield was too dry and humourless; he had a good brain and worked hard, but he was more of a right-hand man than a leader.\* It was clear what would happen, if a choice was

\* Perhaps because of his unassuming appearance, Greenfield's importance in Federal and Southern Rhodesian politics is overlooked. Yet, time and again, he has played the decisive part, having looked further ahead than other politicians towards the sort of social and political conditions he wishes to see in Central Africa. He and Whitehead brought to the London Conference in 1952 a full-scale blue-print for a Federal constitution, and he was particularly concerned that the African M.P.s from the northern territories should be elected in the same way as in Southern Rhodesia (i.e. by what was then, and still is, a preponderantly white electorate). Having failed in this attempt, and having earned at one point from Lord Salisbury the rebuke "We are not going to have what amounts to a unitary state", Greenfield finally got his way in 1957 over the method of election of the new African M.P.s, in the Constitution Amendment and Electoral Acts which he introduced.

He is also credited (if that is the appropriate word) by Africans with being the master-mind behind the drafting of the Native Land Husbandry Act, and the illiberal Inter-Territorial Movement of Persons Act in Southern Rhodesia, which especially restricted the movement of Asians. He was by then a Federal Minister, but his influence was said to linger in some Southern Rhodesian Cabinet offices; certainly his own Immigration Act was equally harsh in restricting the entry of Africans from the Union and Asians into the northern territories.

His part in the removal of Todd, the passing of the controversial Federal franchise Bills and the UFP's attempt to win "responsible

made between him and Todd. Instead, the issue was side-stepped by Greenfield announcing that he wanted to "go Federal" and leaving the way open for Todd to jump straight from the back-benches to the premiership, leap-frogging only over Ben Fletcher. Yet all three—Fletcher, Whitehead and Greenfield—were to play major parts in the removal of Todd from the premiership four years later.

Liberal apologists for Todd were quick to suggest, after his 1958 defeat, that he had never been anything but an all-round progressive, and that when he had seemed to be advocating paternalistic—even repressive—actions, he was only doing so against his own better judgement in an attempt to keep in with his more reactionary colleagues. This cannot be wholly true. His stern suppression of an African strike at Wankie coalfield with troops, and his criticism of the Federal Government in 1955-6 for not insisting that the Northern Rhodesia Government show similar severity with African copper miners during their "rolling" strikes and with Congressmen during their shop boycott, indicate that he was more paternalist than democrat. He had worked out an economic plan for the good of the country, and he was not going to have it upset by African politicians and trade unionists who could only see one part of the plan and could not understand that all the parts were interdependent. The Native Land Husbandry Act would deprive many of their communal claim to land, but it would give the real farmers a chance of making cash profits rather than just scraping a subsistence. Those driven from the land would be offered better jobs in industry after benefiting from better education. They would have a chance of buying their own houses in a township, and could become a stable,

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government" in Northern Rhodesia in 1959 is an integral part of this book's story. As Federal Minister of Prisons he also wielded certain powers over Dr. Banda's detention throughout 1959; and, for instance, forbade Sir John Moffat to visit Banda, although Moffat had permission from Banda's titular warder, the Governor of Nyasaland.

urban "middle class" to whom no legislator would balk at giving the vote. Only unreasonable—because untimely—demands by African labour or political leaders could spoil the scheme of progress, and must therefore be suppressed before the reactionary M.P.s dug their toes in. So Todd seemed to reason.

If Southern Rhodesia had been in a political vacuum, with neither the Federation nor the outer world exerting a pull on her; if the Africans had been even more patient; and if the other white politicians in Todd's United Rhodesia Party had cast aside their jealousies and prejudices and fully accepted his leadership, his plan might have succeeded and Southern Rhodesia might have been saved immense trouble, both then and in the future. But many factors made it inevitable that he should fail.

Since Todd's defeat, Sir Edgar Whitehead has brought Government policy back to this original course set by Todd. He has certain advantages over Todd in pursuing it: although equally intelligent, he does not excite the same jealousy from subordinates; he has a more united party than Todd ever had, for he has shed some of the worst heel-draggers and lost its liberal wing; and he has been able to show quick results in legislation, like the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, by finishing off work mainly achieved by Todd's men.

The chances are small, however, that Whitehead will now be able to move from economic paternalism to a more democratic régime. The Emergency has soured African support for his government, and he will get no whole-hearted co-operation from that direction. By ridding the United Federal Party of Todd and the other "liberals" he has put himself in a position from which it will be nearly impossible to broaden the franchise; for the bulk of any newly enfranchised voters can be expected to vote for Todd's Central Africa Party, re-formed on Whitehead's left wing; and, while Southern Rhodesia's "preferential voting" system will con-

tinue to favour the centre party, yet Whitehead will find it difficult to reform the franchise further without yielding advantage to Todd; yet if he does not offer to liberalise the franchise, there will eventually be an explosion from the Africans in Southern Rhodesia, which will split his centre party, driving most of them into the reactionary camp and a few to the liberals.

Hopes that Whitehead can finish the job which Todd began, along the same liberal paternalist lines ("I know what is best for you"), are therefore slim. His failure will be ironic, for he originally helped in the attempt to destroy Todd as a political force, and then failed to dispose of him decisively. And it is tragic, as well as ironic, that Todd and his supporters should now stand as the great obstacle to Whitehead in Southern Rhodesia, and to Welensky in the Federal sphere, by their very existence preventing them from taking a single step to widen the franchises. There has always been an obstacle in the reluctance of white legislators in both governments to enfranchise blacks. Now there is the certainty that they will thereby begin to lose power, for they cannot hope to attract the new voters into the Government party. So many other advances depend upon these two franchises being broadened first that a deadlock will soon arise. How that deadlock will be broken—violently, or by the gradual falling apart of the Centre parties—is not yet clear. The history of Central Africa, however, and the evidence of recent white attitudes, suggest that the break will be violent.

It has been argued, as another Southern Rhodesian paradox, that although Todd was credited (or weighed down) with the reputation of being a liberal, yet his record of legislation was not impressive. He has since said that he realises that he did not do enough for African advancement when he was Premier. The answer may be that he was then grappling warily with new problems, the right solutions to

which are now clearer, although at the same time more difficult to achieve. Yet he managed a good deal.

In his own field of African education, the five-year plan which he began in 1956 aims to give at least five years' schooling to every child in rural areas, and at least eight years' schooling to every child in the towns. In 1958, four children in every five were getting a basic primary school education—a much higher proportion than in the northern territories—but the pyramid became appallingly narrow towards the top, and only thirteen children stood at the university entrance level. Indeed, it has been described as "not so much a pyramid as a Cleopatra's needle". But with a heavy programme of school building and plans to train ten thousand teachers, Todd hoped to broaden the top of the pyramid greatly within a dozen years. He doubled the African poll-tax—to £2—in order to undertake this programme.

Todd was also responsible for putting into force the controversial Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951. He believed in it whole-heartedly. Since 1900, the African population of Southern Rhodesia had increased fourfold to more than two million, and their population of cattle had multiplied fourteen times over. The legal consolidation of land holdings and the encouragement of better farming methods were necessary to stop fragmentation and wastage of land. The 1955 five-year plan for African agriculture called for the spending of £6,600,000 on development, and it was hoped that crop yields would double within five years and that the annual cash income to African farmers would rise from three million pounds to eleven million pounds.

This dream of prosperity is still far from being realised. The effects of the early stages of reformation have been unsettling. The process of destocking has hurt the keen stock-breeder worst, and has caused resentment among farmers who look on the size of a herd rather than its actual value as the

have concluded that the Act needed altering rather than that the Congressmen needed jailing. But Todd had never given a hint that he thought the apportionment of half the land to a few thousand white farmers was unfair or that he intended to alter it; and the real bone of contention will not be removed until Africans are given more land, rather than taught to produce more on the little they have.

Todd's attempts to tackle the problem of the role of Africans in industry were completed by Whitehead's government, but the initiative had been his. He planned, by an Apprenticeship Bill, which became law under Whitehead's administration, to teach them skills so that they could hold their own and to alter the trade union rules so that skill and not race might become the main consideration.

Under the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934, Africans had been specifically excluded from the definition of "employee", and consequently from skilled employment in most industries, since the European unions under their Industrial Agreements forced the adoption of the "rate for the job" principle to keep Africans out. Todd began with a Native Industrial Workers' Unions Bill, which provided for the proper recognition of African unions. This was primarily necessary so that Africans could give evidence to the Native Labour Boards which arbitrarily controlled their conditions of work. When it became clear that this system would lead to racial unions negotiating independently—as in the Copperbelt—Todd set out to have the original Industrial Conciliation Act amended so that all races would be subject to the same legislation, and the only distinctions drawn would be between levels of skills or categories of work. This involved the overcoming of much prejudice, as well as the complicated drafting of a Bill which would leave no loophole for the setting up of racial unions. But the two Bills which Todd presented in 1956 and 1957 were found to have so many loopholes during the severe probing which they were given in debate by

gauge of wealth. Inequities have occurred in destocking. And the change from a system of shifting cultivation to one of continuous cultivation has been criticised by a Land Development Officer who felt sufficiently strongly about the whole subject to resign his job.\* His argument is that most of the poorest soil has been allocated to African areas, and that African farmers cannot be expected to adapt themselves to intensive cultivation of six acres of poor soil requiring capital expenditure on a scale unknown to them. When they compare their condition with that of neighbouring Europeans, who are making handsome profits while cultivating, on average, only three per cent of a holding of one thousand acres of land, and leaving vast areas unused, they condemn the Land Husbandry Act as their worst enemy. Yet it is the apportionment of land that is unjust, rather than the Act itself, which seeks to improve methods of farming on the unfairly small amount of land given to Africans. Africans see the Land Husbandry Act as the Government's way to perpetuate an unfair apportionment, and loathe it for that reason as well.

Some of the Congress leaders are among those who, under the Act, lost their communal land rights, and the Southern Rhodesian Congress at once made the Act its main target. Having found a legal loophole in the Act, they won, at High Court level, several cases which arose out of a refusal by farmers in the Sipolilo reserve to apply for grazing permits which would have made them liable for destocking. The farmers who did not apply for permits were acquitted, and so in consequence were the Congressmen who advised them not to apply. This Congress victory over an unpopular Act added greatly to its prestige among Africans in the last months of 1958, and confirmed Sir Edgar Whitehead in his belief that Congress was challenging the Government in a way he should not tolerate. Had Todd been Premier at the time, he might have accepted the attacks on this Act as a valid challenge, and

\* "Land in Southern Rhodesia" by Ken Brown. Africa Bureau.

have concluded that the Act needed altering rather than that the Congressmen needed jailing. But Todd had never given a hint that he thought the apportionment of half the land to a few thousand white farmers was unfair or that he intended to alter it; and the real bone of contention will not be removed until Africans are given more land, rather than taught to produce more on the little they have.

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reactionary M.P.s that they had to be returned to the select committee stage.

While Todd bore the brunt of the right-wing attack for bringing in this measure, Whitehead has received the credit for getting it on the statute book, a credit he fully deserves. Unhappily he has since marred this achievement, nagged by fear that the African National Congress would attempt to seize control of some unions and use that power for political ends—Britain is quoted as a baleful example to Rhodesians in this respect. Probably he was right to believe that this was one of their intentions, although the multi-racial unions were obviously in less danger than the purely African ones. He should have taken comfort from the fact that the two large African unions in the Rhodesias—the Mineworkers' Union and the Railway African Workers' Union—had been conspicuous over the previous few years for not "playing politics", and from the fact that their leaders, Lawrence Katilungu and Knight Maripe, had set a high standard of responsibility.

Some Congress leaders were also high up in the union hierarchy—Jason Moyo, for instance, was both vice-president of the African T.U.C. and vice-secretary-general of Congress in Southern Rhodesia; and Josias Maluleke, secretary-general of the T.U.C., was on the Harare committee of Congress. Although one would have thought it natural for the most talented men to hold both union and political posts, Whitehead's Southern Rhodesia Government saw it as part of a Congress plot "to infiltrate and obtain control of other African organisations" (as they submitted to the Beadle Tribunal set up to review the cases of detained Congressmen). So one of the motives for rounding up Congress leaders in February 1959 was to put out of the way, before the new Industrial Conciliation Act became law, those who were also likely to be trade union leaders. Whitehead admitted as much to a delegation of five African leaders who came to protest against the declaration of the Emergency. His

submission to the Beadle Tribunal, naming Moyo and Maluleke and others, is further evidence of this.

Of course, Congressmen would have caused the Government embarrassment through the unions, if they had been able to. But to do so, they would have had to find genuine grievances to air, as they did over the Land Husbandry Act. Removing the grounds for grievance, rather than the Congressmen who voiced the grievance, would have been the course taken by a statesman in a civilised democracy.

But all that lay in the future when Todd's support began to slip from him in May 1957. His United Rhodesia Party then held twenty-five out of the thirty seats in the Assembly, although it was more a conglomeration of "Huggins's men" than a tight-knit, like-minded group. His Cabinet, for instance, consisted of Fletcher, two men who had come over at the time of Federation from the right-wing Rhodesia Party—the energetic accountant Geoff Ellman-Brown and Rubidge Stumbles, the crabbed Minister of Justice—and only one man who could possibly be called liberal, Cyril Hatty, the Minister of the Treasury.

The first open split came when one of his own backbenchers, Max Buchan, proposed "that the Immorality and Indecency Suppression Act be amended to prohibit illicit sexual intercourse between a European male and an African female", on the grounds that this amendment would make the law fair for all races, for since 1903 illicit intercourse between white women and black men has been a crime carrying the penalty of imprisonment. Buchan recalled, with settler arrogance, that the law had originally been one-sided because "the conqueror considered . . . that one of the fruits of victory was the women of the conquered race"; but he thought that that phase was over. His seconder weakened the argument by saying that he, a doctor, knew of only four cases in thirty years of white women becoming pregnant by

Todd had become increasingly dictatorial as a leader and declared that liberalism was not at issue. This argument was more convincing in February than it would have been in the previous May, when members of his Cabinet first considered resigning. Had they done so then, it would have been clear that principles rather than personalities were the real issue, and Fletcher would have been obliged to take an openly illiberal stand against Todd's franchise proposals. They delayed their resignation until their hand had been strengthened by the merger of the United Rhodesia Party with Welensky's Federal Party, and until the issues had become confused in the public mind.

Todd's franchise was based on the recommendations of the Tredgold Commission, set up in December 1956 to "consider and report on a system for the just representation of the people of the Colony in its Legislative Assembly, under which the Government is placed, and remains, in the hands of civilised and responsible persons. . . ." The Tredgold Report has been dissected and pronounced rotten by Colin Leys in his scholarly book *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*. Leys claims that the Commission, headed by the Federal Chief Justice and highly respected for its impartiality, argued fallaciously when setting out its "principles". For instance, the Commissioners suggested that racial issues merely "confused" the "real issues" dividing the parties. The crucial point was that people had no right to vote unless they could vote skilfully, interpreting "civilised and responsible persons" as those "capable of exercising the vote with reason, judgement and public spirit".

Leys challenges the criteria of income and education which the Commission laid down as a test of "skill at voting", on the grounds that nearly all Europeans qualified by compulsory schooling and high wages while very few Africans had an opportunity. Further, he points out that the Commissioners exposed the fallacies in their general principles by adding a

"special" low qualification of fifteen pounds a month wages. A "special" clause in this qualification provided that the votes of such voters should never count for more than a third of the votes cast in any constituency. (They were to be devalued to a third of the poll when the votes had been counted.) This "reducible" vote, requiring different ballot papers, was put forward as a way of enfranchising more Africans while offering fearful Europeans tangible proof of protection against being "politically overwhelmed by the backward and illiterate sections of the African population". Leys reasons that this makes nonsense of the Commission's claims to lay down principles about "skill at voting", for either an African is backward and illiterate and should not have a vote, or else he should have a full vote under all conditions.

He is right. The Tredgold Report relied on expediency rather than on universal principles when it reached the point of defining the qualifications for voting. Sir Arthur Benson, when he worked out a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia the following year, was more honest. He made no pretence of following principles, but decided what racial proportions would be both desirable and practicable in his next Legislative Council, and planned a franchise system to fit. The Northern Rhodesian franchise and electoral system has plenty of faults, and was criticised from all sides; but it achieved the object Benson wanted, and a quarter of the electorate is now African. Benson, though, was a Governor who could impose a constitution without rationalising, whereas the Southern Rhodesian Assembly had to be democratically persuaded by a set of principles. In the event they had to be Southern Rhodesian "principles", warped by expediency.

There is, however, one important and genuine principle which Tredgold laid down and the Southern Rhodesian Assembly accepted, and which Leys ignores: the principle of the common roll. There was, it is true, already a common roll, but the principle itself had never been admitted. In 1951 the

franchise qualifications had been raised to £240 annual income, and an attempt was made to abolish the common roll. Huggins scotched this temporarily, but he only succeeded in getting agreement to leave the matter in abeyance until a thorough review was made. The Tredgold Commission made that review; it laid down the principle of the common roll, affirmed that, up till then, the franchise qualifications had been so high that the common roll had been in practice "though not in name, a system of racial representation", and suggested that Southern Rhodesians both accept the principle and also put it into practice for the first time.

Todd faced these implications more honestly than his Cabinet. While his Minister of Justice, Rubidge Stumbles, took the course, which an outsider would find curious, of commending the Government's proposals to the Assembly on the grounds that the ordinary qualifications had once again been raised (in the simple case, from £240 a year to £720 with literacy), Todd looked in the other direction. The Commission had calculated that it would take an African policeman ten years' service, or a Native Department messenger thirty-seven years' service, to reach the £15 a month level which would qualify him for a "reducible" vote. Convinced that there were many other Africans who had proved themselves "civilised and responsible" in their careers but had not reached this income mark, Todd proposed that Africans who had had ten years' education and held an established job should be given the vote under the lower qualification. He estimated that there were six thousand Africans in this category. When he found private resistance to this among his Cabinet, he took the unusual step of threatening to resign as Premier in the middle of a speech to the Inter-racial Association. If those six thousand were not enfranchised, said Todd, "we would be so betraying the spirit of Rhodes that I would not continue to lead my party".

His Cabinet was furious. For Todd to go behind their

backs and appeal to the people from the platform was unforgivable. Hardwicke Holderness, the most loyal of Todd's back-bencher M.P.s, once declared that the word "inter-racialist" was the "ultimate term of abuse in the dictionary of the honourable the Minister of Native Affairs." Yet there was little Fletcher could do at that time: he could not ask the whole Cabinet to resign on a clear issue of liberalism, especially when the name of Cecil Rhodes had been invoked by the other side. So a compromise was reached, and a combined "special" qualification of ten years' schooling and £10 a month income was laid down.

Todd also got his way in amending Tredgold's reducible vote system to a plan for closing entry to the common roll by way of the "special" qualification. The roll was to be closed at the point when the special voters numbered one-sixth of the whole registered electorate. Though this amendment has been criticised for halving the numbers who can qualify as special voters, as compared with Tredgold's scheme, in fact it is a better system for many reasons. Tredgold's plan kept special votes down to a value of one-third of those cast in any constituency; Todd makes it possible, even likely, that special voters in certain constituencies can elect an African candidate all by themselves. There is no need in Todd's scheme for the discrimination involved in using different-coloured ballot papers, and it avoids the possibility, latent in Tredgold's, that, if there were a low-percentage poll of ordinary qualified voters, the special votes would have to be disproportionately reduced. Todd and other liberals looked on the closure amendment as a sop to right-wing Europeans, and trusted that it would never have to be applied, or that, if it did, the political situation in Southern Rhodesia would have so far altered that no right-winger would dare provoke the Africans, by then on the roll in heavy numbers, by insisting on it. Fletcher, who saw through this tactic, asked that the closure should come when special qualification voters

numbered only ten per cent of the electorate, but Todd gained the day. Humphrey Wightwick, a bluff but astute Australian-born businessman, called Todd's stand "an act of intolerable dictatorship" and was the first of Todd's M.P.s to leave the party, three months later.

Africans generally welcomed the new Act, recognising the spirit behind Todd's stand. A few weeks before, they had been heartened by the relaxation of the Liquor Act, enabling them to drink "European" beer and light wines, and they were specially pleased that the credit for this measure was given by Todd's Government to an African, Stanlake Samkange, who had lobbied for it in party congress. They began to hope that a new era had begun. Yet, though they welcomed the new Franchise Act (with obvious reservations) they were slow to register.

There were various reasons for this. Before the Bill was presented, there had been a rush to register under the old qualifications since past experience had led Africans to expect that the ordinary qualifications would be raised: so during the first eight months of 1957 total African registrations had jumped from 550 to 911. Furthermore they feared that if they registered as voters before the Delimitation Commission had reported, there would be governmental gerrymandering of boundaries in order to minimise the effect of the African vote. Thirdly, the registration form had been made into a stiff examination of literacy, and the claimant had to fill it up in the daunting presence of a registering officer; under the earlier system a claimant could collect a form, return to his kraal or township and get the wisest man around to help him complete it. Formerly, the regulations concerning registration of voters had been incorporated in the Bill itself; this time Todd and the liberals made the mistake of leaving it to Stumbles to make separate regulations, with the result that they were as discouraging to new voters as they could be. Finally, the Southern Rhodesia Government, through

Fletcher's Native Affairs Department, took no active steps to encourage African registration.

This lackadaisical attitude was in marked contrast to the high-pressure sales campaign run by the Northern Rhodesia Information Department to get Africans to register before the March 1959 elections. A hundred thousand eye-catching posters were sent out with the very unofficial approach of "A Message to All Progressive Africans: if you disagree with Government policy, you can help to change it by choosing your own representative in Legislative Council." The result was that 8,000 Africans registered for the Northern Rhodesian elections, while in Southern Rhodesia, where such a campaign would have been unthinkable unless some of Todd's liberals had been in charge of the Department, only about 1000 Africans were registered in time for the June 1958 elections, nearly all of whom had been on the rolls before Todd's franchise was enacted. So that, although Todd risked (and eventually lost) his premiership for the sake of enfranchising enough Africans to convince them that there was real hope of achieving progress through the party system, he did not even gain by it the reward of increasing support for his party from Africans entering the roll.

Having succeeded in getting his own franchise scheme enacted, with these modifications, Todd's next most urgent task was to "liberalise" the Federal franchise proposals. He believed that the good he had been able to do in Southern Rhodesia would be nullified by the harm done at Federal level if the proposals went through and communal rolls were established. Unhopeful of influencing the Federal Party leaders from his position as United Rhodesia Party leader, he became anxious to effect a merger of the two parties.

A merger had been first mooted a long time ago. At the start of Federation a number of URP ministers had, by "going federal", resigned from the URP, for Huggins wished

the two Government parties to be separate, so that one could not dominate the other. Nevertheless, the party supporters usually wore both caps, even if it was noticeable that when they were dressed in URP colours they tended to think more liberally than when they were wearing the Federal Party uniform. When the Dominion Party began in 1957 to organise on both territorial and Federal levels, the call to merge the two government parties into a combined counter-attack became popular.

Todd and his liberal wing were naïve in making obvious the crusading reasons behind their wish for the merger. Those who had accused Todd of "dictatorship" in his handling of Southern Rhodesian affairs felt that he was now trying to extend his empire into the Federal sphere. This could have happened, for had he succeeded in his professed aim of "liberalising" the Federal franchise, Welensky's prestige would have sunk and Todd's have risen to the point at which he would have been placed, willy nilly, in the role of rival to Welensky for the post of Federal Prime Minister. It is unlikely that Todd calculated things in that way: power to him was, and is, a means to the end of legislation. Welensky, however, sees power both as a means and an end in itself, and he judged that Todd would become a threat to his own personal position if a merger was agreed. He was right, for his position would have been in jeopardy—unless he could change his spots and offer more solid claims than Todd to the liberal leadership. But he was afraid of losing his right wing, and stayed trapped in the middle position. Todd and Welensky thus got themselves into the position of threatening political death to each other. Welensky is still Federal Prime Minister more than two years after the events, but in the end Welensky's position is likely to be destroyed by Todd.

Greenfield had reason to resent Todd's interference with the Federal franchise proposals, since he was their chief architect, and he saw himself being once more elbowed gently

aside. As for Fletcher, he encouraged Todd to merge the parties. The curious reason he once gave me for this was that he did it "in order to save Todd from himself". Fletcher's later actions lead me to believe that his real motive was to save himself from Todd, by enlisting more allies in order to get rid of his leader.

And that is what happened. From the start, everything went wrong with Todd's plans to liberalise the new United Federal Party. No "fusion congress" to agree on the final points of the merger ever met: too much had happened—Todd's defeat, Whitehead's by-election fiasco, the Todd group's departure from the party—before the date set for the congress. But in the meantime the Federal Party, meeting for their annual congress at Ndola in November, had approved the plan to merge. Very quickly off the mark, they re-appointed all their Federal Party officials as UFP officials, while the few URP officials who attended in their secondary role of Federal Party delegates were left unplaced in the new interim organisation. To them it must have seemed not so much a merger as a take-over.

This had extremely important repercussions after Todd's Cabinet resigned. For Todd then accepted advice that the question of party leadership ought to be determined by a vote at an emergency party congress. Since the two parties had not formally merged, Todd's supporters reckoned that it should be a URP Congress, in so far as it was possible to sort out the branches. For instance, they thought that where URP and Federal branches had not yet merged in the same district, the URP branch only should send delegates; and that the eighty-strong URP Central Executive should certainly attend.

After an afternoon's fierce argument, however, they had to give way to Greenfield, who as Federal Minister of Justice had the last say. Greenfield laid down that delegates from both URP and Federal Party branches could attend the congress,

and that the URP Central Executive could not because it had been supplanted by the UFP Central Executive, which should come in its place. He also ruled that the sixteen Federal M.P.s from Southern Rhodesia in his party could attend. Since the Federal Party delegates could be expected to vote against Todd, the congress was loaded before it assembled. Since, too, Whitehead led Todd by only sixty-four votes (193 to 129) in the second ballot of the congress, after Fletcher had withdrawn his name and his supporters had switched to Whitehead, it is clear that Greenfield's constitutional rulings played a considerable part in Todd's defeat.

To tell the whole story of Todd's removal from the premiership in chronological detail would take up a good deal of space, and most of the detail is not relevant here. What is relevant is the fact that none of the leading characters came out of the affair with his reputation unsullied or his position enhanced.

Perhaps, in the long term, the least damaged was Todd himself. His Cabinet finally resigned in January 1958 in protest against the passing of a new regulation raising the minimum wage for an African industrial worker to a lordly £6 10s. a month. They claimed that Todd had become intolerably dictatorial, the final straw being that he should issue an important wage regulation without consulting them in the final stages—and do it by proxy, during his own absence on holiday. It was tactless of Todd to be so off-hand with his Ministers, but on the other hand he was Minister of Labour, the Native Labour Boards had made lengthy inquiries and offered definite recommendations, and industrialists and other Ministers had been consulted at the appropriate stages.

The grounds for resignation were flimsy, but they were the best that Fletcher and Ellman-Brown could find. They rallied the support of businessmen (who had to pay the higher

wages), and added to the charge of 'dictatorship' the imputation that Todd lacked the ability to unite them in victory in the elections later in the year. The attempt to convince the outside world that the issue was merely one of personalities was prolonged but half-hearted. Welensky, usually swift to comment on events, kept an embarrassed silence for days but eventually felt compelled to pretend that there was no policy split by declaring, "To give the impression that the issue of liberalism is at stake is not in accordance with the facts".

At this time a curious distinction was made. Suddenly the term "liberal" acquired good standing and Fletcher's men were assuring inquirers: "We're all liberals in the party, but Todd and his lot are ultra-liberals".

Yet the division in the Cabinet and party was clearly along the classic lines of "You mustn't go too fast" against "There's not much time left". The supporters of the first view were so fearful of the right-wing Europeans and showed so little courage in leadership that they actively encouraged the resurgence of a right-wing party.

The quirks of the Southern Rhodesian constitution aided the rebels. Todd was advised, by the Federal Chief Justice himself, that if he resigned the Governor would have to ask him to form another government, and that he should not bring the Governor into a political quarrel. Similarly, if he asked the Governor to dissolve parliament and hold a general election at once, the Governor would have to refuse since this was constitutionally a party matter and not something which concerned national interests. The narrowness of this interpretation was effectively exposed by the world-wide anxiety and interest aroused by the crisis.

However, this was the advice Todd acted on, and he faced a generally unfriendly press. Wasn't it the mark of a dictator to "cling to power" after his Cabinet had resigned and his parliamentary caucus had voted 13-7 against him? Stories told

of his outwardly light-hearted behaviour in those days cheered his supporters, but made his opponents more deeply irritated. When a press conference was momentarily interrupted by a mouse scurrying across the room, Todd gaily commented: "Just so long as it isn't a rat. . . ." He had supposed that the battle at the congress would be a straight fight between Fletcher and himself, and was confident of winning. The last-minute entry of Whitehead's name as "a compromise candidate" was the inspiration of an American woman, and was melodramatically brought about by urgent transatlantic telegrams from the Umtali delegates to Whitehead, then Federal Minister in Washington. Todd's supporters had no answer to this shrewd move.

Todd took his defeat well and agreed to serve in Whitehead's Cabinet as Minister of Labour to paper over the party split, but by May the continuing crisis (now labelled "the Todd Crisis") was still being blamed on him. Whitehead, recalled from Washington to head the new Cabinet, had the choice of a dozen safe seats in order to make his entry by by-election into Parliament. Incomprehensibly, he chose one in Bulawayo, which was five hundred miles from his own home and had a tradition of opposition. The sight of a Premier defeated at a by-election added an unexpected twist to the whole depressing drama.

Whitehead did not increase his stature by putting the blame on Todd, but he was tactically wise to do so. If Todd and his group of six M.P.s had not been driven out of Whitehead's caucus, the Dominion Party would probably have won the election outright. As it was, Whitehead got the benefit of most of the votes of Todd's supporters as second preference (under the "preferential vote" system), after these voters' first choice had come bottom of the poll; and he did not have either to agree to any of Todd's policies or share the prejudice against Todd. The UFP's election slogan, "Not Left, not Right, but Straight Ahead" satisfied 16,840 voters that the

steering-wheel was in steady hands again. But even so, a majority of the voters (18,314) on the second count opted for the Dominion Party. Whitehead, in fact, began his administration with no friends on the Left, and with a superiority of seventeen seats to the Dominion Party's thirteen, due to a freakish vote: not a position of prestige. He was not succeeding in the job he had been recalled to perform—healing the party split. And his virtues as an administrator were doubted by those whites who remembered the controversies of the seven years, from 1946 to 1953, when he had been Finance Minister, and had been forced to introduce unpopular taxes to cover his heavy immigration scheme.

Welensky's prestige had also suffered badly. The whole quarrel was described by his own party newspaper, *Federal Outlook*, as an "unedifying backyard squabble" and many people looked to him to bang Todd's and Fletcher's heads together and restore sense. Instead, he kept a brooding silence. He held his first mass meeting with six hundred Africans in Harare during the early days of the crisis, every one of them bursting to hear him say a word of support for Todd. But he satisfied no one with his mild compliment to Todd as "a man of high standing and integrity" and his pious hope that the political crisis would be "settled as quickly as possible." Africans came away with the feeling that Sir Roy had something to hide, and their suspicions hardened when he declared that the issue of liberalism was not at stake, and forbade political meetings during the week before the UFP emergency congress, a time when the need for discussion and explanation was especially urgent.

When Todd's candidates were all defeated in the June elections, Africans went about greeting each other with that special embrace which denotes sympathy at the death of a friend. The enrolment of Congress members rose rapidly. And Africans in Southern Rhodesia have never forgotten

that one clear word from Welensky in January would have saved the situation for Todd, and thereby given them a chance to believe that the future held promise for them if they could be patient. If they were to get anything, it now seemed that they would have to battle for it themselves.

PART III

THE CRISIS

## Britain Backs Away

One final hope remained for the Africans that they might get a square deal—true partnership—out of Federation without having to battle for it. In many ways, it was the strongest hope of all. For it was based on their faith in the traditional fairness of the British Government. The efforts of Garfield Todd to improve the position of the Africans of Southern Rhodesia were always threatened and, finally, suppressed by the way his own Government put the racial fears of the white electorate before all other considerations, often before such fears were expressed. Liberal pressure groups like Capricorn, and those Africans who were prepared to co-operate with the Government, turned out to be ineffective and were often discredited for reasons peculiar to Central Africa. But the British Government stood apart and there was nothing to prevent it exercising an impartial and effective influence.

The Conservative Governments have certainly shown inhibitions, but these were born of failings in the Conservative mind rather than of outside pressures. These Conservative inhibitions include over-sensitiveness to white settler opinion; a fear of provoking trouble by facing issues firmly, unless the need is overwhelming; and a traditional bias in favour of any governing party. This bias produces a precipitate readiness to credit a governing party with the best motives and, conversely, to pay too little attention to African fears, dismissing them as "misguided" and certain to disappear when the benevolence of government is recognised.

African confidence in the British Government as their protector was shaken by the introduction of Federation. But the Conservatives believed that they had done enough to quieten African fears by writing into the Federal Constitution the institution of the African Affairs Board. Africans, who had seen the constitutional safeguards in South Africa crumple up like the paper they were written on, were sceptical about the effectiveness of the Board to obstruct the passing of laws discriminating against Africans. The events of 1957 and 1958 showed how right they were to be sceptical.

Three separate plans were put forward for an African Affairs Board, which was to be the principal safeguard of the blacks. A great deal of time was spent trying to balance the mutual fears of blacks and whites. The first scheme, suggested when officials held their exploratory conference in London in 1951, was that a Minister of Native Affairs should sit in the Federal Cabinet but be responsible directly to Westminster, and not to the Federal Prime Minister or Assembly. This extraordinary suggestion became even odder when it was agreed, at the second Victoria Falls Conference in 1951, that most African affairs would remain the legislative responsibility of the different territories. Huggins put much energy into smothering this Federal Minister idea.

The second plan brought the pendulum swinging back the other way. It suggested that men on the spot should be made responsible for seeing that the laws were racially fair. The plan came out of the conference held in London in April 1952, at which the only Africans attending were Savanhu and Nkomo—and they opposed it firmly. An Advisory African Affairs Board was to be set up outside Parliament; the Governor-General was to appoint its chairman with one black man and one white man from each territory—none of whom was to be a member of a legislature. The Secretaries of Native Affairs of the three territories were to complete the Board's membership, and the Board's task was to register objections to

allegedly discriminatory laws and refer them to the Governor-General for his final decision.

Eric Walker, in his *History of Southern Africa*, mildly describes the scheme as "scarcely more practicable" than the idea of a Federal Minister responsible to Westminster. But Huggins, though he disliked the idea of Native Affairs remaining a territorial responsibility, liked the new scheme for an advisory African Affairs Board. In a typical, deliberately off-hand phrase, he told his Assembly: "You will notice that this Board has been very considerably changed, and might even now be quite useful". Todd held a different view. He said: "I believe it is unnecessary and could cause a great deal of trouble and difficulty and could do, perhaps, more harm than good". He added that the Board might be better called the "Human Rights Board" and have wider responsibilities—an idea which Sir John Moffat expanded into his scheme for a Constitutional Court, though it met with no response from the Federal Government in July 1958.

The third scheme for an African Affairs Board was a compromise between the other two, and, as such, did not satisfy anyone fully, although it was finally adopted. The Board is a six-man Standing Committee of the Federal Parliament, made up of the three European Members for African interests, and of one African from each of the three territories elected by those same Europeans with the (then) six African Federal M.P.s. Its chairman and vice-chairman are chosen by the Governor-General "at his discretion"—which is a hint that he should consult the Prime Minister. Its powers are severely limited; its main function is to decide whether any Federal Bill is "a differentiating measure" and, if so, to ask the Governor-General to reserve it "for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure". This, in plain language, gives the British Parliament a chance to debate the Bill and ask for the Royal Assent to be withheld.

The complications of parliamentary procedure confused

Africans utterly. They simplified the Board's purpose drastically, and thought it had the power, if not actually to veto legislation itself, at least to see that it was vetoed by the British Government on appeal. They could hardly be expected to understand that the Board was required to reserve a Bill if any provision in it seemed discriminating, while the British Government had to decide whether the measure, taken as a whole, was fair and just. They could not appreciate, therefore, that if the British Government recommended that the Royal Assent be given to a Bill which the Board had reserved, this was not exactly a rejection of an appeal from the Board.

The Church of Scotland Committee fell into this error in its "Report on Central Africa", when referring to the Constitutional Amendment Bill. The Report says: "Lord Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, stated that the United Kingdom Government would not support the Board", and later it speaks of a "decision by the British Parliament rejecting a reference from the African Affairs Board". Sir Gilbert Rennie is quite right to correct these phrases in his reply *Why Not Be Fair?* But it was perfectly clear that the African Affairs Board "reserved" the Constitution Amendment Bill and the Electoral Bill, not only because they considered some clauses were "differentiating", but also because they thought the Bills, taken as a whole and in view of their probable effects, to be discriminatory. Sir John Moffat, the Board's chairman, and the Rev. Andrew Doig, the Nyasaland representative, made that clear in their speeches. Doig ended a letter to *The Times* by writing:

"If the Bill is approved by the British Parliament, the African Affairs Board is seriously discredited in African eyes, confidence in the desire or ability of the British Government to exercise its protection of Africans is further undermined, and the prospects for the Conference in 1960 are dismal indeed."

Which is exactly what happened. The British Government chose to interpret the letter of the constitution most narrowly—after all, this saved them from having to face the issue firmly—and lost African confidence. The Board is now thought to be powerless, and any mention of “constitutional safeguards” provokes a mocking reply.

It was inevitable, even if it was unfortunate, that the whole prestige of the African Affairs Board should have been tested during the long struggle about broadening the Federal franchise and enlarging the Federal Assembly. All six members of the Board made their opinions plain during the debates, and it was too much to expect that, when the Board “reserved” these Bills because of certain clauses, Africans could have appreciated the distinction between the reservations and the members’ expressed dislike of the major points in the Bills—the high franchise qualifications, the communal rolls, and the system by which the extra six African M.P.s were to be elected. In view of this misunderstanding, it would have been far better if the African Affairs Board had been composed of men outside the Federal Assembly.

It was useless for the Federal Government to point out to Africans (and in the British Parliament, for the Conservatives to point out to Labour) that African representation was being doubled (six to twelve) while the whole Assembly was only being enlarged by less than two-thirds (thirty-five to fifty-nine). The Africans could see that four of the six extra African M.P.s would be elected by predominantly white electorates in the two Rhodesias; as for Nyasaland, while it was possible that Africans could control the election of the two new M.P.s if enough voters registered, the price paid was too high. For registration as a Federal voter would involve, in Nyasa eyes, a general concession to the idea of Federation itself.\*

\* The Federal Assembly consists of forty-four Ordinary Members elected by voters on the general roll only; one European Member (from

Mr. Greenfield and Mr. Alport (the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations) made the most cheerful predictions of the number of Africans who could register under the new franchise—the figures given were about 20,000 in each of the Rhodesias and seven thousand in Nyasaland—but, because of the interplay of income and schooling qualifications, the predictions remained conjectural. The onus should have been on the Federal Government to prove their figures correct; the only way to do that was to persuade the Africans that the franchise was a fair one and thus to encourage Africans to enrol. It was perfectly clear at an early stage that the Federal Government was failing to persuade Africans of this, and that the numbers claimed by Greenfield and Alport would never be verified.

When launching any new franchise system in Africa, a high degree of salesmanship is needed to get it accepted as fair—in so far as any qualitative franchise is fair. The Southern Rhodesian franchise was accepted by Africans because it embraced the principle of a common roll; the Northern Rhodesian was accepted by many Africans because of its high proportion of African seats and its quasi-common roll. But the Federal franchise had as high qualifications as the others—

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Southern Rhodesia) for African Interests and eight Africans (four from Southern Rhodesia, two each from the other territories) elected by voters on the general and special rolls; four Africans elected by Africans on the provincial councils (in Northern Rhodesia) or Protectorate council (in Nyasaland) and all Africans on that territory's general and special rolls; and two Europeans for African Interests nominated by the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The qualifications for the Federal general roll are the same as the Southern Rhodesian ordinary qualifications (a sliding-scale of income and education standards ranging from income of £720 a year with literacy to £300 a year with four years' secondary education). For the special roll, they are an income of £150 a year or property of £500, or income of £120 a year plus two years' secondary education—again the same as in Southern Rhodesia, but with the all-important difference that a special qualification voter has a full vote on the common roll in Southern Rhodesia, but in the Federal elections such votes count only in the election of thirteen of the M.P.s.

and no common roll. A late amendment by a Government M.P., Manfred Hodson, to fix a single uncomplicated qualification for the general roll at £384 a year income, would have brought in more Africans, but would not have done away with communal rolls. It was, in any case, voted down by his own party.

Sir John Moffat and the Rev. Andrew Doig believed these calculations of the number of potential African voters to be wildly optimistic guesses. They knew that Africans would consider the franchise unfair and would not be persuaded to make it work. Because of this, they could do nothing but also declare it unfair in its broadest implications. But, when submitting the Bill to the British Parliament as a "differentiating measure", they had to narrow the points of complaint to matters of the white-black ratios in the old and new houses. The Conservatives showed the bias described at the beginning of this chapter. They accepted as significant the Federal Government's conjectural figures and dismissed without any detectable hesitation the certainty that Africans would not be persuaded to register and show whether these figures were right or not. Their attitude was strengthened by the advice of Lord Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, who paid a brief visit to Central Africa that October. Lord Home combined exquisite manners with an apparent inability to understand the first thing about African fears.

It was useless for the Federal Government to protest that the new franchise scheme (which also included a "withering away" plan for the African and special European seats) was a move away from racialism. If they were not to be accused of hypocrisy in this argument, they would have had to abolish the communal rolls and let the special voters take a hand in the election of the forty-four ordinary members.

It was useless for the British and Federal Governments to protest that the African Affairs Board had done a splendid job over the four previous years, on the grounds that its very

existence had stopped any measure which might have been considered "differentiating" from even being drafted. The fact was that the first time the Board used its powers positively they were seen to be ineffective.

It was little more than a polite irrelevance for Lennox-Boyd to say of Sir John Moffat:

"There is no man in Africa for whom I have a higher regard, and he, alike for his personal qualities and his great family traditions, is a man to whom everybody will listen with great care and consideration."

The fact was that he had not been listened to with great care and consideration. Sir John told Federal M.P.s with a heavy heart:

"The African peoples were told in meeting after meeting of the safeguards which the Constitution contained for them. They were told they would have their own spokesmen in the Federal House and—mark this well—that they would elect their own spokesmen. We pledged our word.... Must I tell them now that the assurances which I have are false, and the Federal Government . . . will see that European voters flood them out?"

The action taken by the members of the Board afterwards shows their own final disillusionment and a reflection of the African loss of confidence. Andrew Doig resigned from the Federal Assembly at the start of its next session, saying:

"In my opinion, further service on the Board is useless. I feel we have got past the 'point of no return' as far as an approach to real partnership is concerned."

Sir John Moffat remained through the Parliament's final session, hoping to get his idea of a Constitutional Court adopted. It was treated with casualness, almost with contempt, as I will describe shortly. So, although renominated by his Governor to the second Federal Parliament, he resigned before it reassembled and formed the Central Africa Party to fight Welensky's men in the Northern Rhodesian elections.

Wellington Chirwa did not stand for re-election either, but withdrew to Nyasaland to watch the storm break. The only Board member who returned to the second Parliament with blithe unconcern was the Southern Rhodesian European member, Advocate Harry Davies. Davies's performance on behalf of African interests in the first Parliament was curtly but accurately summed up in the *Central African Examiner* as

"... appalling in its seeming non-existence. He opposed Moffat, Doig and Scott and the northern Africans on the Constitutional Amendment and Electoral Bills; devoted his 1958 Budget speech to discussing European schools, only passingly referred to the Budget's most contentious measure, the effect on Africans of the maize subsidy cut (which he pooh-poohed); and he failed to speak in either the 1957 debate on Racial Discrimination or the 1958 Debate on Racial Cooperation except to second the motion for adjournment on the fourth day. . . ."

When Africans see Davies still on the African Affairs Board, and Doig and Moffat gone in disgust, and when they see that the three Africans now on it were elected to the Assembly by predominantly European votes—a direct result of the two Bills which the old Board tried to get the British Government to veto—it is not in the least surprising that they lose all faith in the principal safeguard which the British Government wrote into the Federal Constitution, and also a great deal of their faith in the British Government itself.

Symbolically, the successors to Doig and Moffat on the African Affairs Board—Moffat's brother Robert and Mr. J. L. Pretorius—have chosen to sit on the back-bench in the remotest corner of the Federal Assembly, and are rarely heard in debates.

Once again, the appalling remoteness of rulers from the ruled was revealed during the months of wrangling over the Constitutional Amendment and Electoral Bills. In October 1957 a meeting arranged by the Inter-racial Association

brought Greenfield and the local M.P., Mr. Alec Winterton, down to Harare to explain and commend the Bills to Africans. It was not an evening for conversions: neither speaker offered an evangelical performance. But they were put squarely on the defensive when James Bassopo-Moyo, the local URP chairman, complimented the Interracial Association with elaborate sarcasm for bringing Mr. Winterton to Harare, since he had never come of his own accord to consult them about these Bills. Winterton, who was Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Native Affairs for two years, stood shamefacedly silent for a taut minute, and then blurted out defiantly: "I did not come to ask your consent because I was very well aware what your views were".

The point could not have been more clearly made: so long as only a few Africans are on the general roll which elects the forty-four ordinary M.P.s, none of those M.P.s will consider it worth spending time consulting African opinion, unless they are considerably more conscientious than Winterton.\*

In this case, the remoteness was not just that of the rulers from the Africans. At the Ndola congress of the Federal Party, in November 1957, a number of white delegates said that they deplored the failure of the Federal Cabinet to consult the Party's branches on this vital matter of the franchise. The delegates gave the impression that a more liberal Electoral Bill might have resulted had local views been canvassed, particularly on the questions of how the African special members should be elected and whether a common roll should be attempted. It seems probable that Welensky was lagging behind a significant section of his own Party on

\* Greenfield's estimate at the time was that, under the new franchise, Africans could make up  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the electorate on the general roll; in the event, Africans comprised only  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent of the Southern Rhodesian general roll in the federal elections. Winterton lost his seat, but not through alienating the African vote: he was defeated by Humphrey Wightwick, once a Todd supporter, who came up on his right-hand side and ran a clever campaign, playing on the racial fears of white artisans.

the franchise question at that time, and certainly well behind the URP with whom his party was then preparing to merge. Had he chosen to support this element, he could have swung the rest of his Party into line behind him. Instead he chose caution and a communal roll. As a result he lost Todd and any possible African support. He failed the test of leadership which Hardwicke Holderness put in these terms:

“The only sort of leadership which is adequate to the challenge of our present times is a leadership which is capable of rallying the non-Europeans as well as the Europeans of this country.”

Sir John Moffat stayed on in the Federal Assembly mainly to put his Resolution in a debate he initiated on “Racial Co-operation between Peoples of the Federation”. Although he made little visible impression on the Federal Government, in that no vote was ever forced, yet it is worth studying the debate for two reasons. First, because in a low sombre Scots voice Sir John made a speech worthy of Edmund Burke, placing Rhodesian problems in clear historical perspective, foreseeing with complete realism the catastrophe to come if power passed in a spirit of ill-will to Africans who were untrained to wield it. Secondly, because the Federal Government showed so clearly, by the embarrassed way in which they dampened down the debate by relegating the motion to the foot of successive Order Papers, how little long-term thinking they had done about what Sir John called “this central problem of the Federation”, the transfer of power, and how narrow was the pragmatic approach on which they prided themselves.

Years before, Sir John had succeeded in getting the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council to carry the Moffat Resolutions without a division. They were accepted by Government and Congress alike as the yardstick by which all inter-racial questions should be judged and as an agreed

objective of policy. For the federal debate, he shortened the original wording of the Resolutions and suggested a method as well as an objective of policy. His Resolution read:

"1. The objective of policy in the Federation is to remove from each race the fear that the other might dominate for its own racial benefit. Until this objective can be achieved, a period of transition remains during which special arrangements in the machinery of Government must be made so as to ensure that no race can use either the preponderance of its numbers or its more advanced stage of development to dominate the other for its own racial benefit.

"2. Every lawful inhabitant of the Federation has the right to progress according to his character, ability and industry without the distinction of race, colour and creed."

Straight away, Sir John said that he considered the motion was "to some degree a measure of the good faith of hon. members in their acceptance of the Federal Constitution". He believed then (although two years later he sadly cannot say the same) that "the moderate Africans who desire to co-operate with us number at least ninety-nine in every hundred", and that "the vast majority of Europeans fully realise the need to come to terms with our African fellow citizens". Yet fear was universal. The Europeans feared that the granting of concessions would only mean demands for further concessions until they were swamped. The Africans feared the repression generated by European fears. Fears, Sir John acknowledged, were inevitable in a society in transition. They needed to be recognised and ways to lessen them must be frankly considered.

He then poured cold water on the democrats.

"Democratic government," he said, "is a hazardous business. Every continent is littered with the remains of democracies which were established and failed for no other reason than that they were too advanced for the people they were designed to serve. It is my belief that the African people can obtain a majority in this Federation on

the voters' rolls far sooner than they could be trusted with the power that goes with that majority."

This point he made very emphatically, dismissing the Government's belief that African political advance could be regulated so that it happened smoothly over a long period. For he was convinced that there was little time left in which to provide safeguards, not so much now for Africans, but for Europeans against the eventual abuse of real power by African extremists. He believed that the African Affairs Board should be superseded by some body which would protect the interests of the European minority as much as, if not eventually more than, the interests of the present voteless African majority. (Todd, speaking six years before about his preference for a "Human Rights Board" rather than an African Affairs Board, had seen the same truth.)

Sir John's practical suggestion was that a Constitutional Court should be set up following the 1960 constitutional review, which would have "genuine teeth and a capacity to use them", unlike the African Affairs Board. It would have the power to rule differentiating legislation "illegal because it is unconstitutional". He quoted the Capricorn precepts as an "admirable summary" of the rights of a Federal citizen which such a court should exist to protect; and he added that "this wholly impartial arbiter" must be inside and not outside the Federation and "administering on behalf of her Majesty's Government the reserved powers and the protective duty", subject to the British Government's over-ruling power. Those Rhodesians who resented the prying of Socialist M.P.s and the British Government's powers of direct interference, may have been mollified by that clause.

The theme of Sir John's speech was the urgency of the problem, the need to get some governmental machinery working and respected for its fair judgements by Africans before the time came when Africans had real power which they would abuse if no such constitutional check were

established and honoured. He did not intend that this constitutional check, which he admitted was undemocratic, should be permanent; but he explained that "the need to get our peoples working together to achieve a common purpose is far greater than the need to maintain a democratic structure which is unsuited to our present circumstances". (He was in any case stretching a point in calling the Federal Government a "democratic structure".)

Greenfield replied for the Government. He accused Moffat of playing on fear, and produced an amendment which, he said, "states the objective of policy much more widely and in a manner that is much more beneficial".

His amendment, though lengthy, is worth quoting in full since it stands as the Federal Government's most succinct statement of policy. It read:

"1. The objective of policy in the Federation is that the different races comprising its population, while preserving their identity, should work together in partnership and co-operation for the establishment of a strong nation within the British Commonwealth of Nations, imbued with British ideals of character, freedom and justice; a nation in which every lawful inhabitant shall have the right to progress according to his character, ability and industry.

"2. The main obstacles to the attainment of this objective consists in

- (a) the wide gap between European and African cultural and economic standards, and
- (b) the propagation of misguided African nationalism by certain so-called African leaders.

"3. The removal of these obstacles entails a political system under which there are reasonable safeguards to ensure that political power is vested in the hands of responsible and civilised people representative of all races.

"4. This House believes that the Citizenship Act of 1957, the Constitution Amendment Act 1957 and the Electoral Act 1958 together form a basis on which this political system can successfully be established."

Greenfield's amendment was full of phrases which Africans have come to distrust, like "responsible and civilised persons"; there was a noticeable omission of Sir John's phrase "without distinction of race, colour or creed" and that omission, taken with the ominous phrase "while preserving their identity", was enough to make Africans reckon that the Government would continue to abet racial discrimination and segregation. The amendment condemned "misguided African nationalism" but tacitly condoned European racial bigotry. It was bound to be opposed by independent Africans, since it demanded a renewed vote in favour of the Government's two most controversial Bills (the Citizenship Act endowed all British Protected Persons with the further benefits of Federal citizenship and was generally a welcome law). And, finally, although it gave broad definitions of policy, the amendment proposed no new action. Sir John, whom Greenfield had described as "soaring into the realms of philosophy", had suggested positive action to allay fears.

Sir John's scheme for a Constitutional Court was only a half-finished blueprint, but the Government, instead of suggesting alterations or additions, thrust it aside with scarcely a glance. This they did because they did not care to admit the motive which prompted the scheme—the recognition of universal fear between the races. They preferred a superficial motion "to establish confidence", which did nothing of the kind. Instead it convinced Africans and white liberals that the Government was, at best, complacent in the face of a rapidly deteriorating situation and, at worst, repeating a string of hypocritical clichés about partnership while planning to make the system of white domination even more secure. Pragmatism is all very well if you can foresee events and know how to deal effectively with them in good time, relying on well-founded principles. Sir John was not alone in believing that the Government's principles were ill-founded and its Ministers short-sighted.

Eighteen months later, in his New Year's Eve message for 1960, Welensky seemed to be taking up Moffat's scheme when he suggested that the African Affairs Board should be superseded by a body which would safeguard the rights of all races. This was, however, not so much a late conversion to Moffat's plan as a way of getting rid of the British Government's powers of veto over Federal legislation. No one believed that Welensky was in favour of Moffat's idea of a supra-Parliamentary body.

Even more than this demonstration of the Federal Government's refusal to face the fact of mutual fears, the signing of the Joint Agreement in April 1957 in London increased African fears and drove them to drastic action based on fear. For some months the full implications of that Agreement, signed by Welensky and the Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, were not appreciated by Africans. But, when they grasped the implications and saw what use Welensky intended to make of the Agreement, they realised that time was short if they were to make a more effective protest than they had made against the introduction of Federation, and if they were to prevent what they believed would now be a swift political conquest of the northern territories by Southern Rhodesian whites.

The three clauses in the Joint Agreement in which Africans suddenly found sinister shadows were these. It was agreed that the British Government "would not initiate any legislation to amend or repeal any Federal Act, except at the request of the Federal Government"; that "all Civil Services in the Federation would eventually be locally based", and that "the Conference to review the Constitution would be convened in 1960".

At face value, all three clauses sound unexceptionable. Welensky came back boasting that this Agreement had put paid to the danger of having the "half-baked ideas" of the

Labour Party imposed on the Federation, if it ever came to power again. The Labour leaders replied swiftly that they did not accept the Agreement as binding on them. But few people in Rhodesia saw for months what its full implications were. Then, stage by stage, it became clearer. Now that the African Affairs Board was seen in practice to be ineffective, the denial of the British Government's initiative in Federal legislation confirmed a feeling among Africans that they had lost both guarantees of British protection. This may not have been a correct assessment of the situation by Africans, but they certainly believed it to be correct, and acted on it.

The federalising of the Civil Service, when it became an imminent reality for individual Africans, appeared as another threat to their independence. The use of the phrase "R-day" in connection with the Nyasaland "murder plot" shows what an effect this threat had already had. For R-day was originally the name given by the Nyasaland Government to the date in 1959 when an African civil servant seconded to the service of the Federal Government had to decide whether he was going to become a full-blown Federal Civil Servant or retire. The fact that this choice and its implications were dreaded in Nyasaland explains why "R-day" should have been used by informers to denote the day Congress was allegedly going to strike back. The connection between the Federal threat and Congress counter-action could not be more clearly illustrated than by this single phrase.

(which he fervently hoped would be a Conservative one) into granting the Federation Dominion status and, with it, full control over the northern territories.

Welensky began to make exactly the moves they dreaded during 1957 and early 1958. He began to call with increasing force for Dominion status: the Dominion Party's appearance on his right may have made him use this war-cry more often than he would otherwise have done, but Africans could not be expected to dismiss all his belligerence against Britain (which the agitation for Dominion status involved) as mere election tactics. Worse still, he began suggesting how the territorial Governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland might be run after 1960, and came up with some remarkable bits of "thinking aloud" (as he called it) at the Federal Party's Ndola Congress in December 1957. It was a plan which could only alarm the Nyasas, for he said: "I visualise—purely on the basis of thinking aloud—that someone must be in the position to nominate members of the Government of Nyasaland when the United Kingdom Government has gone, and I have considered that the Governor-General of the Federation might be the choice for the task". A really terrifying implication followed when he added that he had not worked out whether the Governor-General would make these nominations on his own initiative or *on the advice of his Federal ministers*.

The prospect of the British Government withdrawing the Governor from Nyasaland after the 1960 talks and the Federal Ministers choosing the members of the Nyasaland Government appalled Nyasa politicians. A new territorial constitution for Nyasaland was due in 1960, but might not be implemented in time to send a strong enough group of Nyasas to the Federal constitutional talks to oppose such schemes of Welensky's. The urgent need, decided Nyasas, was for a strong nationalist leader to make their protests more articulate, more organised and more effective. Forced into a

corner by fear, believing quite rightly that time was not on their side, they sent out a desperate appeal to Kumasi in Ghana, where Dr. Hastings Banda was deep in his fifth year of quiet work among the Ashanti. Britain, they felt, had failed them; they turned and appointed Dr. Banda their "saviour".

## Banda the Catalyst

Why is there such strong disagreement about the character of Dr. Banda? To many whites in the Rhodesias he is a shrieking demagogue reminiscent of Mussolini. By thousands of his white patients in Willesden in north London he is remembered as a quiet and devoted doctor. The Devlin Commission commented: "On first impression, what strikes one about him is his charm rather than his force of personality", and ended by saying, "We thought Dr. Banda to be a frank witness". The Beadle Commission flatly concluded: "Dr. Banda is not a witness on whose word much reliance can be placed". Some people charge him with runaway egotism and megalomania: the *Central African Examiner* put this view most clearly, if unpleasantly, when it suggested that:

If listened to and deferred to, Dr. Banda can be a very engaging person indeed. Anyone who has attempted to argue with him will agree that he is incapable of reasoned and logical disputation. A simple question is enough to change the dapper little doctor to a screaming incoherent troll.

Others, including his closest friends, will say that he is a humble man, often uncertain of the rightness of his course of action and requiring reassurance. Where does the truth lie?

A number of these seeming paradoxes can be resolved quite simply. A man who is uncertain of himself in a novel situation often covers that uncertainty with a loud show of egotism, as one might whistle stridently in the dark. Banda was not

interested in making a good impression on the Beadle Tribunal, which he considered had been appointed by the Southern Rhodesian Government to justify *post factum* its political decisions; it was a matter of honour to defy it. But the Devlin Commission he hoped would be sympathetic to his case, and he set out to co-operate. The result was that he charmed them.

To those whites inclined to believe that the legendary Dr. Banda would turn out to be the unbalanced ogre they suspected every black nationalist leader to be, he offered more evidence than they could have expected. But, in a sense, this was an ogre they had created for themselves in the eight months between his return and his arrest. For, except for some Nyasaland Government officials and some white liberals and churchmen, they treated him with suspicion and hostility from the start. On his one and only stay in Southern Rhodesia, airport officials frisked and questioned him for an hour like a criminal suspect; there was pious horror shown when he made an angry "I hate Federation" speech in Highfield township the next day. No other African leader had been so quickly rocketed into prominence. Both Nkrumah and Azikiwe, who also went to the United States for their university education, then endured a ten-year struggle to the top and learnt during that decade a great deal about political tactics: when to show anger, for instance, and when to keep quiet. Banda had stayed so long away from Africa that he had practically no memory of personal colour discrimination. He returned to bear the brunt of white hostility, which was founded on fear, and his reactions were raw and undisguised. But despite the blows and struggles of those months, he maintains, "I am not, and I cannot be, anti-white. I owe too much to them". When I went to see him in prison, the first visitor he had after his arrest, he was anxious to convince me of this: he directed his machine-gun of rage at Welensky and Lennox-Boyd (who had just spoken of the "murder plot"), but not at

Armitage. He had great respect for the Governor, he declared; and I believed him. There was no paradox here.

But it needs some explanation to understand why he was not bitter against the man who had done as much as anyone to thwart his plans. For nearly every white Rhodesian reckoned that Banda's unrelenting antagonism to Federation was based on a desire to be the first Prime Minister of an independent Nyasaland. While nobody can claim to know the secret ambitions of another man's heart, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that those who say Banda was egotistically seeking personal power are talking nonsense.

Banda has had, nearly all his life, a sense of mission that he was marked out to do something important for his country. But until 1958 it was not clear to him what that was to be. His career until then had been brilliant but, in a strict sense, directionless. At one stage, after initial wanderings, he thought he had given it direction—as a medical missionary. But the war jogged him off that course, and not until he was nearly fifty-five did he see the clear object of his life: to break up Federation.

I believe that he honestly did not look further than that at the time when he determined to return to Nyasaland. He saw Federation as a monster of evil; once destroyed, his country could be happy again. Or, since he thinks in medical rather than crusading terms, Federation was a sickness and he had to cure his country of it; once cleansed, the body would act healthily and naturally. The doctor would then leave his patient, and perhaps retire to the London he loved.

For politicians, white and black, who look on power as the object of their career, such motives are alien and incredible. They judged that he was a power-seeker, like the rest of them. The fact that he would not produce a scheme for an independent Nyasaland, that "a simple question" would (in the *Examiner's* opinion) make him "incoherent", merely led

whites to dismiss him as an incompetent politician, unfit to govern. It never crossed their minds that he had never wanted to be a politician, and never intended to govern.

It may have been extraordinarily limited of him to think that a man who had led his country to independence would not be asked to remain as its first independent leader. But it seems that he did believe this before his return. After his return, he was so immersed in daily events that he had little time to think of the days that would follow independence. When whites asked him how he thought Nyasaland would survive economically on its own, he took the question as irrelevant to his mission; anyway, he believed the questioners were merely asking it in order to sidetrack him. What economic plans Congress produced were provided by his Secretary-General, Dunduzo Chisiza, and Banda was glad to leave them in someone else's hands, for it had hardly occurred to him that he would ever need to be personally concerned with such matters.

But to support this judgement of Banda's motives, and the suggestion that Banda is unlike any other political figure in Africa, I must go back over his career in more detail.

The bare facts are well enough known, though there are slightly conflicting versions about where and when he did various things. But they are usually given as a mere list of achievements, and offer little insight into what moved him to do them.

In June 1939 when he was studying at Edinburgh, he wrote: "All along my aim has been to obtain a liberal and professional education and return to Nyasaland in the service of my people". And, two years later, when he had obtained his diploma, he wrote: "I am personally interested in missionary and religious work. This is only natural from the very history of my life, which began in a mission school." The exact direction of his service was never as clear to him as

his general aim; but the sense of service, originating in mission schooling, was with him from the start.

His long travels began because of a pathetic mistake. In 1915 the Livingstonia (United Free Church of Scotland) Mission held an examination for a teacher's training course. There was a large number of examinees in the small church hall, and one short thirteen-year-old pupil-teacher placed right at the back could not see the blackboard properly. He stood up to see more clearly over the shoulder of the man in front. The invigilator did not realise that the child Banda was a brilliant pupil, and thought he was just a slothful boy trying to cheat. He disqualified him from the examination.

Three weeks later Banda crossed the Zambezi alone, heading (he hoped) for Lovedale College in South Africa. He had not told his parents, who were poor farmers in Kasungu, when he left, and for months they gave him up for dead. The road from Nyasaland to Salisbury is hardly a joy-ride now, but walking down to the Zambezi forty-five years ago through the hot sandy wastes and trudging up again through endless miles of monotonous savannah must have been a daunting experience for a solitary child of thirteen. At Hartley, near Salisbury, he worked for a spell in an African hospital as an orderly, and was appalled by the conditions. Years later, this was a factor in deciding him to study medicine, but meanwhile he was discovered at Hartley by an uncle who took him on the last seven hundred miles to Johannesburg.

After working as a gold-mine clerk for some time, he was persuaded by an American missionary to go to the United States for his education. He saved enough from his wages for his fare, reached the States, and enrolled at an Ohio high school, Wilberforce Academy. He graduated from Wilberforce in 1928. He was then already twenty-six. A university education was not so easy to find: he enrolled at a Southern university but disliked it so much that he left within a week.

Fortunately, a professor studying Bantu languages at Chicago University heard of him and offered him a place, since he was the only Bantu-speaking student then in the States. It is an ironic thought that he owed his university opening to his ability to speak chiNyanja, while the career which universities gave him destroyed that ability. He now has to have his speeches interpreted into his native tongue.

In 1931 he graduated as Ph.B. from Chicago. But nothing he had learnt there directly fitted him for work in Nyasaland: he had been studying history and political science.

The decision to study medicine he seems to have made quite suddenly. This, he reasoned, was the best way to help his country: the memory of the hospital at Hartley remained strong with him. He went to Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennessee, where he worked with absolute single-mindedness. When he graduated as a Doctor of Medicine in 1937, he had a ninety-nine per cent mark in surgery, but he found he could still not practise in a British territory with such a degree. So he came to Britain; by 1941 he had a diploma from Edinburgh and Glasgow, and then he took a course in tropical medicine at Liverpool. While in Edinburgh he had also become an Elder of the Kirk. He was, in fact, fully qualified to return to Nyasaland as a medical missionary, and would have done so if two things had not stopped him: the war was at its height, and he had very little money.

Instead, he stayed in Britain and worked on Tyneside at a mission for coloured seamen. But he had certainly not turned his back on Nyasaland: in 1944 he helped to translate and write a preface for three prize essays by Nyasa authors. (Through a pleasant coincidence he found himself doing this with the missionary who had been his invigilator at Livingstonia, and they were able to laugh over the generation-old injustice.) The book of essays *An African Way of Life* is interesting because it reflects Banda's own concern to preserve tribal customs, and he seems never to have wavered

from the path of true conservatism since. When he set up his practice in North London after the war, he used to meet occasionally in a Soho basement with other men who have since become famous names in Africa. Among them were Kwame Nkrumah and his pan-African adviser, the West Indian George Padmore, but Banda remained quite untouched by Padmore's Marxist background. He has never read a book on Communism and the idea of Communism is abhorrent to him. Friends were exceedingly sceptical about an interview he gave in Nyasaland when he was reported to have said: "If we have to go Communist to get out of Federation, we will do it". Their explanation was that he was using hyperbole, to emphasize that he would stop at nothing to break Federation.

Conversely, his form of Africanism, suggested by these essays, is by no means a rejection of western ways. For instance, he has been against the teaching of vernacular languages in the schools and, when in 1951 he was thinking of setting up a newspaper in Nyasaland with Wellington Chirwa in charge, he was firm that it should be entirely in English.

I have heard him described as "an awful old Tory" by a great friend, and his conversation takes that rather endearing form. He is, surprisingly, an expert on the British peerage. He has been heard upbraiding someone who spoke of "the Commonwealth" with these words: "It's the Empire, the British Empire, and you should be proud to call it such!" He has great loyalty to Britain—"the Queen is Queen of Nyasaland"—and when he lived in Ghana he used to read biographies of British politicians more for love of their historical aura than to learn about practical politics.

Nyasaland's future he considered secure in the hands of Colonial Office administration, and he believed that the administration should remain in British hands until Nyasaland had made a sufficient economic advance. His views on

economics, then as now, were hazy: the only time he has put his views on paper was in *New Commonwealth* in March 1958 when he wrote, with some vagueness, of Nyasas (after independence) transforming "their land of the lake into a veritable Central African Denmark, by embarking on extensive and intensive schemes of agricultural development through individual and co-operative efforts". He was clear in the days before 1949 that Nyasas should devote themselves to the land and leave politics alone. When the brilliant journalist, Elias Mtepuka, quarrelled with the moderate line enforced on *African Newspapers* and resigned, Banda's response was typical of his thinking then: he set him up, far away from politics, as assistant manager on the farm his brother Hancock Banda ran for him at Kasungu. Not surprisingly, the idea failed: Mtepuka returned to political journalism and became editor of the hard-hitting, independent *African Times* before his sudden death in 1958; but it was a significant example of Banda's conservatism.

In 1949 he saw this pastoral dream threatened. Years before, in 1935 when the Italians invaded Abyssinia, he had seen the same pattern: encouraged by Sylvia Pankhurst, he had written a thesis denouncing the retrogressive Italian action—retrogressive because he believed that on the whole European Governments stood for progress in Africa and that the Italians were betraying this principle. Then in February 1949 a few white settlers from Nyasaland and the Rhodesias met at Victoria Falls and cheerfully produced a scheme for Federation. A group of Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Africans who were in London met in alarm and voted unanimously against union with Southern Rhodesia; they asked Dr. Banda and Harry Nkumbula, then studying at the London School of Economics, to put their protest into a memorandum. As it turned out, Nkumbula left the actual writing to Banda, and the memorandum is interesting for the sidelights it throws on Banda's way of thinking at that time.

Banda published it at his own expense in 1951, and it is well reasoned and pungently phrased. It includes all the arguments which have been repeated thousands of times since, and expresses a fundamental hatred of the Southern Rhodesian colour bar and land policies and a suspicion that white politicians plan to amalgamate the territories by stealth. But the main interest lies in the phrasing of the protests: Banda obviously regarded the link with Britain as a beneficent arrangement. While a subtle politician might have submitted a memorandum to the Colonial Secretary full of flattering words about Britain in order to divide the British and Southern Rhodesian Governments and gain his own ends, I believe that the sentiments Banda expressed were utterly genuine.

He began his memorandum by saying gently: "Though we have confidence in the impartiality of the Government of the United Kingdom on the subject of Federation, it would be political suicide for us, the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, to sit idle with folded arms and rely entirely on that assurance". And he gave as his first reasons for rejecting Federation that

"it would deprive the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia of direct political and cultural ties with the United Kingdom, and would mean discontinuation of the policy of deliberate tutelage for Africans, now pursued by the Government of the United Kingdom in these two territories. It would mean domination by Southern Rhodesia, instead of guardianship by the United Kingdom. . . . They will treat us like serfs, as they are now treating the Africans of Southern Rhodesia."

When he declared, "We must reject Federation", he was swift to add: "In rejecting it we shall not be showing any disloyalty to His Majesty the King . . . we shall not be showing any disloyalty to the Governments of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia". And when he said that "we the educated people"

must lead the fight against Federation, "under the banner of the two Congresses", he was careful to explain at some length that this was because most of the chiefs did not fully understand all its political implications, did not "possess the necessary knowledge to appreciate the far-reaching consequences and dangers of any union or association with Southern Rhodesia".

In 1949 the two Congresses were run by Godwin Lewanika on the Copperbelt and Charles Matinga, a farmer, in Nyasaland. Lewanika had only formed his Congress in 1948 out of miners' welfare societies, while the Nyasaland Congress had been formed in 1944 as a convention of many African associations concerned with African welfare and advancement.\* As early as 1938, a gathering of forty-one Nyasa Native Authorities and twenty-six Councillors had met at Lilongwe to protest against the possibility of amalgamation, and this had helped to persuade the Bledisloe Commission to advise against it. The Nyasaland Congress had no large political issues to worry about for its first five years, until Federation began to be pressed; then Matinga appealed to Banda for help. The first contribution of Banda and Nkumbula was the memorandum summarised above.

What was the motive behind the starting of Congress? It is interesting that, when the Federal Assembly debated just after Banda's return in July 1958 a motion "deploring the conduct of the African National Congress in Nyasaland in trying to inculcate in African children a hatred of the

\* By 1958 Congress had extended its ancestry, and claimed to find its historical origin and inspiration in the work of Joseph Booth, a radical-minded Australian Baptist minister who founded the Zambezi Industrial Mission in 1892 and was deported in 1904. Booth was the mentor of John Chilembwe who, after two years at a Virginia seminary, returned to establish the Providence Industrial Mission at Chiradzulu and led the short-lived and mismanaged "Chilembwe Rising" in 1915. (See *Independent African* by George Shepperson and Thomas Price, Edinburgh University Press, 1958.)

Federation", Rupert Bucquet, a level-headed Nyasa settler M.P., gave this version of the genesis of Congress:

There is a curious notion abroad that the Congress suddenly sprang into existence as an anti-Federation body. Nothing could be further from the truth. It came into existence long before Federation. It was organised as a subversive body on Indian Congress lines, and it was anti-Colonial Government, whatever lip-service they may pay to the Colonial Office now, and it was anti-European. . . . It continues so till this day.

This judgement contradicts a good many facts. The two Congress leaders, Lewanika and Matinga, have always been "moderates": indeed they now sit beside Mr. Bucquet on the UFP benches in the Federal Assembly. True, Matinga had been succeeded as Congress President before the Federation battle had become fierce, but his master-farmer successor, Ralph Chinyama, was considered one of the more restrained members of the Nyasaland Legislative Council elected in 1956. Again, Banda's strong views about the need to continue with a Colonial Office government and rely on white administrators have already been stated; and it is unlikely that he would have combined with a Congress which held such anti-British views as Bucquet claims, or that his memorandum, couched in strikingly pro-British terms, would have been welcomed by such a Congress.

In any case, the protest of the two Congresses against Federation was weak and unsuccessful. Nkumbula had returned to Northern Rhodesia, taken over the presidency of Congress from Lewanika and held a number of anti-Federation meetings in Lusaka.\* There was talk of taking

\* Two Europeans sympathetic to Congress sat beside Nkumbula at these meetings—Commander Tommy Fox-Pitt, a former District Commissioner, and Simon Zucas, who had organised a group of Rhodesian students at Cape Town University. Zucas was deported soon afterwards, and Fox-Pitt was declared a "prohibited immigrant" in 1958.

strike action in protest against Federation. Michael Scott tried to persuade the Northern Rhodesian Congress to campaign for partition of the federal area into white- and black-dominated regions, along the lines of the Gore-Browne scheme; instead the party settled down to a haphazard campaign against the colour bar in shops, offices and hotels.

In Nyasaland, Congress was not well organised either. The geography of the country made it difficult. Moreover, they were slow to believe that Britain would permit Federation. They trusted that a gentlemanly appeal to the protective instincts of the British Government would be sufficient, as it seemed to have been in 1938. Chinyama handed Jim Griffiths, then Colonial Secretary, a long and dignified memorandum when he toured Nyasaland in 1951 in which Congress told him that:

“What we need in Nyasaland is not federation but *hard work* and *sustained effort*. We should not ‘go out’ for help, but ‘dip the bucket where we are’. For these things we need education and co-operation between Government and people.”

Banda too had been fervent about the need for education. It is said that he paid for the education of more than forty Nyasaland Africans out of the money he earned as a London doctor. And he spent a great deal of the rest of his money in fighting Federation in London, publishing pamphlets and looking after delegations from Nyasaland.

But it was all too late, and the co-operation was not effective. In April 1953 the Nyasaland Congress voted publicly to wage non-violent resistance to Federation with strikes, boycotts and non-payment of taxes. The campaign was suppressed by the removal of Chief Gomani who had been made head of the “supreme council of action”. When the Federal constitution was brought into force by Order-in-Council in August 1953, strong Congress reaction came only after disturbances had broken out at Cholo over non-political grievances. The

trouble was caused by the *tangata* land system and the suspicion that two Africans had been murdered by white farmers. The disturbances spread from Cholo and assumed an anti-Federation nature. Before they were stopped, eleven Africans had been killed and seventy-two injured.

But meanwhile Dr. Banda had left London in August to set up practice in Ghana. He cut himself off from Congress, left unanswered letters which asked for his continued help, and immersed himself in work in Kumasi. This new discouragement led Congress officials to abandon their active campaign at their annual conference in January 1954, although they made it clear that they still opposed Federation.

What made Dr. Banda take this sudden course, and cut himself off from Nyasaland? The Devlin Report quotes him as saying that

“although his views about Federation were unaltered, he did not want to continue in active opposition to it, which if he remained in London would inevitably be the case. He wanted, he said, to give it a chance.”

This is a wrong interpretation of his motives, because it suggests that he was prepared to let his convictions be altered by events. It is an important error, for it suggests that Banda is a pragmatic politician like nearly everyone else; more, that there is something of the opportunist about him. The truth is very different. He was worried about the lack of opposition in Congress to Federation, which he construed as the result of shallow patriotism: most important of all, he was disgusted by the behaviour of Wellington Chirwa.

Chirwa had begun attacking Federation while still a student at Fort Hare College in South Africa; he had offered hospitality to Michael Scott on his anti-Federation tour, and in consequence had lost his Government teacher's job when Scott was deported. What Banda saw as an excellent record was completely spoilt in his eyes, however, before 1953 was out, for Chirwa accepted election to the Federal Assembly,

saying that the best place from which to attack Federation was its centre. Banda's attitude was entirely the opposite: Federation was an untouchable Evil, and Chirwa, who had failed to make a good living out of selling firewood, he suspected of having sold his principles instead for an M.P.'s salary. Many Nyasas agreed with Dr. Banda, although others—and many white liberals—thought that Chirwa had been a shrewd patriot in using the platform of the Federal Assembly from which to denounce Federation.

Dr. Banda did write to Congress leaders about the possibility of returning to Nyasaland in 1953, but he stressed that he merely hoped to come "for a short holiday". He realised that he could not have lived in Nyasaland then for any length of time without having to take over Congress leadership and wage a long resistance campaign—and he did not see himself as a leader, but simply as a catalyst.

Just as he saw Federation as Evil, so he also believed in the same simple terms that Good conquers Evil eventually. (He uses these terms more in an historical than a religious sense.) He was sure that Nyasas, given time, would come to reject Federation wholeheartedly without any prompting from him. He did not want to force Nyasas to adopt his own opinion. (In August 1941 he had written: "Throughout my life, entering the employ of anyone under force of pressure of any description, whether directly or indirectly exerted, has been objectionable to me", and he was similarly opposed to forcing others to do his will.) He decided instead that he would wait until Nyasas thought as he did.

To the British Government he gave the "chance" to honour the pledge to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland of "special protection . . . to enjoy separate Governments for so long as their respective peoples so desire", which had been written into the Preamble to the Federal Constitution. He paid not the slightest attention to the long battle over the Federal Constitution Amendment and Electoral Bills: he was not

interested in anything to do with the Federal structure, for in his opinion it was all evil and would surely collapse. But Banda became vitally concerned when Welensky made it clear, after the London Joint Agreement in April 1957, that he would press for Dominion status as early as 1960 and, then added that, once it had been gained, he thought that Nyasaland Ministers might well be appointed by the Governor-General, possibly on Federal Ministers' advice.

The failure of the British Government to condemn such a plan immediately made Banda feel certain that Britain would not honour her pledge unless there were well-organised protests from the Nyasas. He suspected that the Conservative Government might even have already agreed in principle to letting African affairs and the civil service come under Federal control. The way in which the Nyasaland Government had dithered about whether or not to allow the federalising of non-African agriculture had sounded an early warning, but Welensky's "thinking aloud" about 1960 was decisive. Banda did not see himself even then as a political leader; he merely thought that the need for a catalyst was growing.

Banda played no part in politics in Ghana. He paid a courtesy call on Dr. Nkrumah when he arrived in Accra, and then headed north to begin work among the poverty-stricken Zongo people in Kumasi. His lack of interest in Ghanaian politics cannot be explained away as revulsion after a bitter struggle lost in London, or as wariness about involving himself in a tricky situation, because he lived in Kumasi, the centre of the United Party opposition camp. Had he begun to plan a political career for himself, he would not have missed this unprecedented opportunity to study a country evolving into independence and tackling the administrative problems of a transfer of power. He would have read books on administration and economics, for he is a very thorough-minded person.

Yet he showed no interest in any of these matters, not even in the coming of independence to Ghana. Nkrumah telephoned him to invite him to the Accra independence celebrations.

"I'll send a car," he said persuasively.

"If you do, I won't get into it," said Banda. "I'm too busy with my work."

To journalists who came to talk politics with him in Kumasi, he spoke out against both Communism and Fascism. "Federation is a form of Fascism," he said, "Nyasaland may become a second Czechoslovakia if the British Government under pressure from Welensky fails to honour the Preamble." Again, "Communism is evil. I do not want it in Africa. You can keep it in Europe." He went on to draw this parallel between Britain and Nyasaland:

"The British people have decided that they prefer to accept a lower standard of living and even annihilation by atomic bombs, rather than submit to the political slavery which would result from Russian occupation. I know that Federation, as envisaged by Welensky, means political slavery for my people, and we too will choose poverty and death rather than submit to this."

The Devlin Report suggests that Banda returned mainly at the persuasion of Henry Chipembere, a young District Assistant who resigned from Government service when he topped the poll for the five Africans elected to the Legislative Council by the African Provincial Councils in 1956. Chipembere was then only twenty-six. The Report says that the "most urgent" of all the letters asking him to return "came from Mr. Chipembere who was in close correspondence with him from November 1956 onwards." Chipembere wanted Banda to come because he was disappointed in the Congress President, then T. D. T. Banda, for being unable to force Chirwa and his colleague Clement Kumbikano to withdraw from the Federal Assembly in protest against Federation. Both Bandas (they are not related) agreed with Chipembere eventually, and a

memorandum written by Dr. Banda had a decisive effect at the Congress annual conference in August 1957, when Chirwa and Kumbikano were expelled from Congress.

Chipembere was still not happy with the unintellectual T. D. T. Banda as Congress leader. He wanted someone who could be built up into a saviour-figure, for (as he wrote to Dr. Banda) "human nature is such that it needs a hero to be hero-worshipped if the political struggle is to succeed". He told Dr. Banda that his reputation would have to be built up among the masses. That job fell to Kanyama Chiume, the other young leader in the Legislative Council, a restless, nervous man who is usually stabbing at typewriters or rummaging in dispatch-cases as he talks to friends. Chiume had been a pupil of Julius Nyerere, the Tanganyika leader, and had gone on to a career at Makerere College, reading science and medicine, getting a diploma in education and becoming president of the political society. When Chiume was elected to the Congress executive, he took the title of Congress Publicity Secretary, which would not normally suggest an important role except that in this case the "selling" of Dr. Banda as a political messiah was all-important.

Certainly the influence of Chipembere on Banda was considerable. But it would be a big mistake to deduce from this, as the Devlin Report comes near to doing, that Banda was brought back as the Congress figurehead, an eloquent puppet to be manipulated by Chipembere and Chiume who thought themselves too young to take charge openly without being challenged. Banda reckoned that he had been let down too often by bright young men to put his whole trust in the judgements and plans of two more. He had his own reasons, already described, for returning, and he was also urged to come back by two white men with yet another motive.

One of these was Andrew Doig, who had gone to the Federal Assembly as nominated Member for African Interests. Doig had hoped that Moffat and Dr. Scott and he could help, from

the centre, to stop Federation provoking the trouble that he feared. Disillusioned when the Electoral and Constitution Amendment Bills were passed, he resigned and withdrew to the Church of Scotland mission in Blantyre. But he was further worried that Congress was falling into the hands of extremists, as Chipembere and Chiume assumed increasing control. Doig wanted Banda to return, to save Congress from extremism and Nyasaland from the direst trouble.

The same view was held by the other white man, Major Peter Moxon, a businessman-farmer. Moxon, a character in his own right—he once paid his income-tax by scribbling the amount on a pig's back and sending the live "cheque" to the tax-collector—knows more about Nyasa views than almost any other settler. He is married to an African wife, which helps to give him this special knowledge, though he is ostracised in some European circles. His brother Jimmy, a jovial Dimbleby-like figure, was Dr. Nkrumah's very competent Chief Information Officer, and when Peter visited him in Accra late in 1957, he also went to see Dr. Banda in Kumasi and asked him to return. This visit was a decisive factor.

There were three motives, then, in the minds of those responsible for Dr. Banda's return. Doig and Moxon hoped that Banda could avert extremism and the consequent chaos. Chiume and Chipembere wanted him as a figurehead or rallying-point in their struggle. Banda saw himself as the stumbling-block to check the Federal Government on the course it seemed determined to follow. Whether this meant that he was going to behave in an extremist or in a moderate manner is another question. The Devlin Report—after saying that, even before he returned, "already a clash between Government and Congress was highly probable, already the differences between them had got almost beyond discussion"—goes on to offer evidence that he was willing to compromise in his demands. Banda himself made no bones about being an extremist. In his famous speech at Highfield he made an

interesting historical generalisation: "Moderates have never achieved anything. It took extremists like Oliver Cromwell and Mrs. Pankhurst to get things done."\* But this statement does not mean that his extremism can be equated to that of the regicide. The Devlin Commission not only disbelieved the "murder plot" which involved assassinating the Governor; it concluded that Banda was never given details of the forest conference on January 23rd when "real action" was decided upon. Despite his quick temper and his power to sway crowds, I do not believe that Banda is a man to plan hot-blooded violence, or to use his oratorical gifts to stir up a crowd to that purpose.

One last question should be asked about Banda's character. How can one account for the egotistical boasts, the exaggerated phrases which filled his speeches, except as evidence that his head was turned by the adulation of the crowd? I think one can—and should—account for them differently.

The exaggerations are not so important as the egotism. It was foolish of the *Central African Examiner* to term as "a paranoiac-seeming outburst" Banda's remark to the Beadle Tribunal that "all this fuss about the three Congresses is simply because politicians in Southern Rhodesia were terrified . . . that is why they fear me: they think I infect my people with the spirit of nationalism." Again, there is unreality in the to-and-fro dispute between the Governor and the Devlin Commission over the letter Banda wrote to a Congress leader saying, "I have the whole of Blantyre and Zomba on fire. Very soon I hope to have the whole of Nyasaland on fire." The Commission put the exaggeration in proper perspective by saying that the expression "on fire"

\* A highly arguable point, which Roger Fulford in his *Votes for Women* has, for one, disputed. An ironic comment on Dr. Banda's choice of extremist heroes is the fact that the third prominent statue guarding the Houses of Parliament (besides Cromwell and Mrs. Pankhurst) is that of Queen Boadicea who, the inscription relates, "died leading the British against the Roman invader".

was "repeatedly used by Dr. Banda . . . and clearly means no more than that he has kindled great enthusiasm". They did not add that Banda had once written of the Governor's wife that "Lady Armitage set Nyasaland on fire" after she had made a good impression by showing friendly informality on an important occasion.

But what of his many egotistical remarks, thrown at all sorts of audiences—proudly to the Accra Conference in December 1958, defiantly in Highfield, privately in letters to friends? These remarks always centred on the theme "Wherever I go, people worship me. . . . Thousands cheered me when I spoke. . . . They carried me miles in a palanquin while I slept. . . ." Is he just a demagogue suffering from raging megalomania which the response of the crowd exposed? I do not believe so at all. There are three reasons for my view.

Banda was very hesitant about returning to Nyasaland, right up to the moment he caught the Viscount. To friends in London he said, "I shall soon be back, if I find that the people do not want me." This hesitancy and uncertainty about whether he was taking the right course, and whether his people would accept him after forty years away, did not leave him as soon as he reached Nyasaland. He required constant reassurance. The crowds were reassuring, up to a point. But he had to put it into his own words, as a schoolboy might mutter "I'm doing all right" between his teeth when a boxing match was in the balance.

Secondly, Banda has a way of dramatising himself as the symbol of Nyasa independence. It was, after all, the very first phrase Chiume used about him at the airport, and it fits in neatly with Banda's old idea of himself as a catalyst. He gets outside himself, so to speak, and looks objectively at the figure of Dr. Banda, a twentieth-century statue of liberty. "It is no good their killing Banda", he has often said of himself. "Two other Bandas will spring up in his place." Nothing

could more clearly illustrate his view of himself as a symbol of abstract, ultimate independence, rather than of present, personal triumph.

Lastly, he dislikes this messiah cult, though he accepts it as a tactical necessity. A letter he wrote about the crowd's adulation ended abruptly: "It makes me wonder about human nature, really." This significant comment surely implies a contempt for himself in this role, and for people who behave like sheep.

Few men are free of vanity or impervious to adulation. It is a mistake to see in Dr. Banda's public show of arrogance and egotism evidence of megalomania. He is a fanatic, certainly, with his eyes on a single objective—the breaking up of Federation. Fanaticism, the self-obliterating dedication to a cause, is a formidable weapon to counter. Some leaders of the Zambia, Southern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Congresses possess this weapon, and a prison sentence will not break it.

## From Burombo to Nyandoro

The return of Dr. Banda "speeded the tempo, but it did not decisively alter the character of the events thereafter". This judgement, by the Devlin Commission on Nyasaland, can be applied to the position of Congress in all three territories in Central Africa. By July 1958 a clash between Congress and each Government had become probable. Banda provided a rallying-point which the Congresses had never before possessed. The Congresses had made only the first tentative moves to combine in their demands by the time the Emergencies were declared and the police swooped on them. But the Southern Rhodesian Government, always fearful that its own Africans would be contaminated by Nyasa politicians, saw in Dr. Banda the incarnation of its fears and jumped to the conclusion that the Congresses had achieved close collusion within a few months of his return. It hastened to repress the Southern Rhodesian Congress in order to scotch what it saw as a Federation-wide plan for Congress-inspired violence. It never isolated, or attempted to redress, the grievances which the Southern Rhodesian Congress was representing (or, as the Government would say, exploiting). All the separate problems of the territories became compounded, and the clash, when it came, was three times as intense. The British Government were in a cul-de-sac as far as Nyasaland policy was concerned, losing, for at least a year, all room to manoeuvre. The Federal Government similarly declared that it would never retreat from its present position on Federation, and pretended not to see how exposed that position had

become. Legislators in Southern Rhodesia, wildly scenting a Communist plot, rushed laws through Parliament which are among the most brutal in the world. It is the old story of folly being born of ignorant fear.

The eight months between Banda's return and the Emergencies were crowded with exciting events. Here we need only pick out those which directly contributed to racial tensions, deepened suspicions, and pushed each side into ill-considered action. We need to see, in fact, what caused the elephants of racialism to charge each other.

In Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia there was the struggle by Africans to have new constitutions enacted which would give them adequate representation at the 1960 talks. In Northern Rhodesia pathetic mistakes were made over the evacuation of Tonga tribesmen from the bed of the future Lake Kariba; there were the rivalry between the two local Congresses, and the friction caused by the territorial elections. In Southern Rhodesia Congress began to challenge the Government's plans for land reorganisation. And there was evidence of growing co-operation between the Congresses, noticeable at the Accra Conference and in Banda's speech at Highfield, which—however superficial it really was—was enough to convince the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments that they would have to act swiftly.

A tragic but central reason for the precipitancy of the Central African crisis was the fact that both sides became convinced that time was against them. The Nyasaland Government, in the well-worn phrase, had "to act or abdicate" on 3rd March 1959. Months before, however, the Congresses had also concluded that they themselves had to act or abdicate from their campaign to achieve freedom and self-government for their peoples. This pressure on African nationalists for swift action was appreciated by very few Europeans. Soon after Banda's arrest, I listened, appalled, to a senior director of the British South Africa Company giving

his version of "Why it all happened", to a group of English editors. It was all very simple, he said; the Accra Conference had made the nationalists in Central Africa believe that "the tide was running strongly their way, so they might as well jump in quick". His solution was equally simple: "There's nothing an African respects quite so much as a show of force." He said this at a dinner in the plush surroundings of the Savoy Hotel's Mikado Room, and the unreality of his views was truly Gilbertian. Unfortunately, there are only too many whites in Rhodesia who think like that director. They do not realise that the Congress leaders were protesting because they believed that the tide was running faster than ever against their people's interests.

Now we must study in some detail the grievances voiced by the different Congresses starting with Southern Rhodesia.

Although the Southern Rhodesian Congress, in its present form, dates back only to September 1957, there is a longer tradition of African political organisation there than in either of the two territories. Soon after the first world war two organisations were started: chiefs and country people formed the Southern Rhodesia Native Association, while the townsmen combined in the more militant Industrial and Commercial Union. Out of them grew the Bantu Congress, which made the first organised protests against such social conventions as elbowing Africans off city pavements. The Bantu Congress would send delegations to the Native Affairs Department. Its leaders were usually teachers or ministers: the Rev. T. D. Samkange was president for a long time, while Canon Chipunza was a member of the executive.

It was hardly an effective body. When the Government brought in the Subversive Activities Bill in 1949, the Congress accepted the Bill in principle, while opposing it in practice. Stanlake Samkange, a son of the former president, was chiefly responsible for Congress taking this equivocal line; and Enoch

Dumbutshena, a teacher with two degrees from South African universities, resigned the presidency in disgust at the feebleness of this protest against government repression.

The weakness of Congress probably encouraged the growth of other African organisations. The African Voice Association, led by B. B. Burombo, was respected for its single-minded opposition to the Government's land policies. Burombo fought against the removal of Africans from Crown land in "unspecified areas", and against the de-stocking of cattle. He was the first man to send Africans to the courts to contest the Government's removal orders. In 1948 he went further and organised a country-wide strike against the working conditions facing Africans in Southern Rhodesia. His was the example which the younger Congress leaders, Nyandoro and Chikerema, followed ten years later when they fought the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act in the courts.\*

The other organisations were used mainly as vehicles for the individual ambitions of various Africans. The Southern Rhodesia Native Association was revived by Isaac Samuriwo, and the Industrial and Commercial Union existed as the private band of Charles Mzingeli, the veteran trade unionist. Congress itself was led by Joshua Nkomo, the former organising secretary of the railway union. There was a brief attempt, in the months before Federation, to co-ordinate the different African organisations of Southern Rhodesia at the All-African Peoples Convention, but the attempt broke down because it lacked a unified command and its various leaders quarrelled over such matters as the size of contributions to a central fund. (The only historical significance of the Convention episode is that it provided a lesson on disunity for the

\* When Burombo died in hospital in 1958, Nyandoro spoke at his funeral. Carried away by the occasion, Nyandoro said that Burombo had been killed by Europeans in the hospital, since no details of a post-mortem had been published. For this he was fined £35 and given a suspended two months' sentence.

City Youth League leaders: they were careful to destroy the power of other organisations and absorb their members, rather than combine with them as equally powerful organisations.) Nkomo attended the 1952 London talks with the backing of what was called the Committee of Bulawayo Organisations. When Federation came into force, Congress lost momentum, and only Nkomo's own Bulawayo branch lingered on.

In 1955, however, the Congress spirit was revived in Salisbury by the formation of the City Youth League. There was an emphasis on youth and education, embodied in its two leaders, Robert Chikerema and George Nyandoro. Though they both come from chiefly families, their followers respected them for their quick intelligence rather than the quality of slow wisdom traditionally expected from their leaders. Robert's father was the first African teacher at Kutama Mission, and he sent his son to a Catholic secondary school in Natal and then to Cape Town University. Robert did not graduate, but became involved in politics. He organised Cape Town students to protest against Federation, proving himself a calm leader. His resourcefulness is illustrated by the way he avoided the attentions of the South African police when they wanted to check on his connections with suspected Communists: he found the safest hiding-place was the Strangers' Gallery of the Cape Town parliament, and he became the most earnest listener to debates to be found there. When he returned to Rhodesia, he lost his first factory job when he organised a strike and took to selling insurance—the resort of many out-of-work members of the African intelligentsia—until he formed the City Youth League and began editing its paper *Chapupu*.

Nyandoro, by contrast, left school after only seven years, but used up some of his unquenchable energy by teaching himself law and book-keeping. In 1957 he was offered an £80-a-month book-keeping post with an airways firm on the

condition that he forswore politics. Such a move was unthinkable to a man who had inherited all the rebelliousness of his grandfather, who had died leading the Mashona in revolt in 1896.

George speaks fluently with a deep musical voice; he finds merriment in the most unlikely subjects. He often says outrageous things because of the bursting vitality of his personality: dull facts have to be enlivened, caricatures made more vivid. In the restricted environment created by whites in Southern Rhodesia, it was inevitable that a man of George's dynamism should always be in trouble with the Public Orders Act.

The story of his visit to Ghana well illustrates his character. Invited to attend the 1958 Independence Anniversary celebrations, he was highly amused at being allotted a chauffeur-driven car with a "Prime Minister's Guest" label on it. One day, after the celebrations, Tom Mboya was lecturing a quiet Ghanaian audience about the iniquitous colour bar in East and Central Africa when George spotted me, the only white man there, and came bounding over. The meeting was not lively enough for him. When Mboya next mentioned "Mau Mau", George shouted decisively: "That was a good thing." The Ghanaians, surprised at this blood-thirstiness, wavered a little before demonstrating African solidarity with applause. George threw in more interjections to shock the audience and, when the meeting ended, had a larger crowd around him than Mboya. Cheerily, he excused himself to me: "Mau Mau was a good thing because there was no discrimination. They killed both the black and the white."

But no political opponent could be expected to appreciate George's humour. He epitomises—and surpasses—all that a white reactionary would detest in a "cheeky native".

The growth of the City Youth League in Salisbury encouraged Chikerema and Nyandoro to make their plans

country-wide; they therefore resuscitated the old Southern Rhodesian Congress in 1957. The choice of Nkomo as President-General suggested that, though the impetus and energy might come from the young lieutenants, an older leader should act as a restraining influence.

The date chosen for the resuscitation ceremony was September 12th, celebrated as Occupation Day by the Europeans—the anniversary of the day in 1890 when Lieutenant Tyndale-Biscoe raised the Union Jack over the Pioneers' Camp on the site of the future Salisbury. Africans in Southern Rhodesia resent the way Europeans commemorate their past feats and their heroes with statues, street-names and public holidays, and almost entirely ignore African deeds. There is a Lobengula Road and Mzilikazi township in Bulawayo, but against them must be put the Speke and Baker, Selous, Rhodes and Jameson Avenues (named after white explorers and adventurers) and the generous public holidays—Rhodes and Founder's, and Occupation Day. This may seem a small matter to Europeans, but to an African it is part of a wider plan to degrade his race. "This is the most cunning idea of all," Nkomo once told me. "Our children are taught *English* history. Nothing is done to honour their own forefathers. Their roots in the past are cut off. They are told that they have no culture, no civilisation." He and other Africans see Occupation Day as the most hated symbol of white domination, for, in his own words, "from that day minority rule commenced".

There was no resentment, however, in the Principles of Congress, published in September 1957. These expressed, as the single aim of Congress, "the National Unity of all inhabitants of the country in true partnership, regardless of race, colour and creed". Congress, according to the Principles, "stands for a completely integrated society, equality of opportunity in every sphere, and the social economic and political advancement of all". It affirmed "complete loyalty

to the Crown as the symbol of national unity" and it recognised "the rights of all who are citizens of the country, whether African, European, Coloured or Asian, to retain permanently the fullest citizenship". The "three outstanding needs in Southern and Eastern Africa" were listed as the raising of the standards of living, the attraction of "skills, techniques and capital from overseas" and the provision for "full participation of African people in government".

Such a statement of principles, which abhorred racialism and supported further white immigration, was one which could attract membership from all races. About a dozen Europeans, besides Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock, were among the first members. A more explicit programme was also issued, calling for "universal adult suffrage now" (which was interpreted as "with the least possible delay"), racial integration of schools and hospitals, and the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.

What I remember of the four hours of speeches during the inauguration of Congress in the crowded, airless hall in Harare expresses the same moderate approach. A placard-waving procession marched around the township singing peacefully. An Indian made an interminable speech of fraternal greetings. Guy spoke words of Christian advice. And, as usual, George Nyandoro stole the occasion for himself by quick-witted interpretations into Shona.

Nevertheless, relations with the Government were bad from the start. When Guy spoke to the Salisbury National Affairs Association about Congress three months later, he described the unhappy situation thus:

"Congress has been suspect from the start. Practical difficulties are put in the way of Congress getting an office, holding meetings, of making collections and raising funds. So Congress is poor. It is hard for many people to join. Employers warn employees. Police interview prospective officials. I find myself that there are considerable deterrents

to a European joining. The CID display a lively interest, take voluminous notes and sometimes go further. Government has gone out of its way in the territories from time to time to threaten Congress, or discredit it or its leaders.

"These disabilities, under which other organisations do not suffer, make organisation difficult, but increase the interest and strength of members. The forbidden fruit is sweeter, and there must be something pretty good about it. In dealing with Congress, it is not good tactics for Government or anyone else to threaten freedom, when it is essentially freedom which is being sought. There is bound to be a movement of the unenfranchised, the underprivileged in any country. When frustrations and tensions rise to a certain pitch, the people will express themselves in some way or another. Strikes and boycotts may be wrong, but they happen when aspirations are too greatly thwarted. It is better by far for these expressions to come through an organised body with recognised leaders with whom authorities can deal. If existing organisations and leaders are discredited, either others more extreme take their place or there is an anarchic mob. Perhaps the greatest danger to the peace in Central Africa is the attempt to discredit African leaders which has gone on over the last few years. This is not the way to oppose Congress. Nor is this the way for Congress to copy, whatever its exasperations. The way of moral, as of physical, violence is a weakness and must be avoided. Opponents are to be respected. Thank God He made a wide variety of us!"

That same month Garfield Todd had made a surprising speech in Bulawayo, complaining of the "erosion of the peoples" which had been begun by Congress and warning that he intended to introduce in February 1958 restrictive legislation which he had been preparing for three months, unless Congress leaders, "particularly Mr. Clutton-Brock and Mr. Nyandoro", co-operated with the Government in maintaining racial harmony.

Guy immediately retorted that Todd had been "gravely misinformed" about his role in Congress, and that he had

always acted as a moderating influence. He told the National Affairs Association:

"We have a Prime Minister who is a fine man but subject to considerable pressures. I hope the pressures to discredit and suppress the Congresses before 1960 will not prove too great for him."

He suggested that the Government "should not be obsessed with preventing disturbance but with creating positive goodwill, should not be obsessed with economic development but with the development of a sense of community among people. If capital is put into improving human relations, improved human relations will attract capital to this country." Later, he put the same thought more strikingly.

"The mass import of electric washing machines is no substitute for the example of Christ when He washed the fishermen's feet and said: 'A new commandment I leave with you, that ye love one another'."

Guy ended his memorable speech with these questions:

"In this lovely and gay country have we really got to drool our way through all the worst oppressions of the nineteenth century and the worst excesses of the twentieth? When new aspirations and new initiative come through African people, can they not have a chance? The way is very much open for a new start. I believe a new spirit is just around the corner both for individuals and for our community as a whole.

"Before it gets too dark to see the way, can we not give ourselves a shove around this corner?"

His questions were soon answered in the most unpleasant way.

The Southern Rhodesian Congress organised about fifty branches in its first year. It drew equal support from town and countryside—from the towns because of the younger educated groups there, and from the countryside because

most of its energies were put into fighting cases for farmers who were facing de-stocking under the Land Husbandry Act.

In their skirmishes with the law, Congress leaders came away with a large share of the honours. Robert Chikerema was fined £100 for slandering Sir Patrick Fletcher but many people were shocked by the disclosure that the African police witnesses had made no notes of Chikerema's speech until weeks later, when a report was suddenly needed. The acquittal of Daniel Madzimbamuto, chairman of the important Highfield branch, on a charge of illegal assembly, and of Nyandoro, on four counts under the Public Order Act, cheered Africans. Liberal interpretations were being placed on the law: Nyandoro was charged with likening Africans to an elephant and Europeans to its puny rider, and the judge said that, if those were Nyandoro's political opinions, he was entitled to hold them. Most spectacularly of all, the acquittal of the Sipolilo farmers, who were charged with refusing to apply for grazing permits, added to the prestige of Congress. Congress had challenged the Southern Rhodesia Government on the controversial Native Land Husbandry Act, and won on a technicality.

Was Congress engaged in other, more clandestine activities during 1958? A study of the Beadle Tribunal's remarks about this belongs properly to a later part of this book, and the question of how much collusion existed between the different Congresses of Central Africa I shall discuss in the next chapter. At their first anniversary conference in September 1958, the Congress members spent most of their time debating the land question and the setting up of a Congress National Educational Trust to provide university scholarships. They made a vague declaration of war on "all forms of social colour bar"; but they framed no definite plans about how to prosecute such a war. Just before the three hundred Southern Rhodesian Congress officials were arrested, a good many complaints were being voiced by Africans that Congress had done nothing on

this score. This is an important negative factor. Government spokesmen justified the Congress arrests in Southern Rhodesia by saying that Congress would have caused widespread trouble in the Colony as soon as troops and police were transferred to the northern territories. Africans countered this by arguing that Congress had failed to carry out its announced intention of waging war on the colour bar, and was therefore demonstrably in no organisational shape to tackle the much more ambitious task of countrywide disturbances.

Europeans fears widely exaggerated Congress's influence. One example from early in February 1959 demonstrates this. Rumours swept Salisbury of an African general strike on the coming Thursday. Ludicrously, Europeans began asking their bemused cooks if the rumour was true. When the Thursday arrived, no strike came. There were broad smiles at Congress headquarters, and Robert Chikerema said flippantly: "If we ever did organise a general strike, we wouldn't be so foolish as to inform all the whites first." The *Citizen* chose to consider this remark in a very sinister light.

African nationalists in Northern Rhodesia prided themselves on their organisational abilities and efficiency. The Congress headquarters in Lusaka's Chilenje suburb had an impressively brisk atmosphere: rooms clearly labelled "Action Group", "Women's League", suggested well-defined tasks. Boycotts of shops and beer-halls were efficiently organised. Annual conferences were precision-run.

They tended to be scornful of the Southern Rhodesian Congress, whose headquarters was a tiny, crowded room behind a general store. An African reporter, down in Bulawayo to cover the second annual conference of the Southern Rhodesian Congress, was appalled at the slapdash arrangements and exclaimed to a stand-in steward:

"Man, those Congress boys up north would eat you!"

Nevertheless, 1958 saw a waning of the power of the Northern Rhodesian Congress and it is now unlikely that it will ever recover. The breakaway of the radical wing to form the Zambia Congress, and the Governor's proscription of Zambia in March 1959, were the most spectacular events in this process.

The main reason for the decline in Congress's power was the limitation of the areas open to Congress protest activities. This is not to suggest that, if the Governments corral Congress organisers, protests at unsatisfactory conditions will subside and "the ordinary villager" will be contented. Areas of protest were limited by the Northern Rhodesian Government banning Congress, by removing reasons for protest, or because other Africans turned against Congress of their own accord. They acted more subtly than any other Government in Central Africa, and used a variety of tactics to meet Congress's challenge.

The following are the more important examples of their varied tactics. In the Gwembe Valley, during the difficult operation of re-settling 29,000 Tonga tribesmen on higher land away from Lake Kariba, they sealed off the whole area, banning any visitors thought to be Congress officials. Further north, in the Mazabuka-Namwala district, where Congress was running a ham-fisted campaign against cattle inoculation, the Government discredited Congress by withdrawing the inoculation teams and letting the effects of Congress policy become apparent in the shape of thousands of dead cattle. On the Copperbelt Lawrence Katilungu had learnt, after the 1956 Emergency, to keep trade union matters divorced from politics, and the government rewarded his responsible attitude by encouraging the mining companies to give his union new privileges. Finally, Sir Arthur Benson brought into effect a new constitution and in spite of its complexities, he managed to gain the support of many Africans. This provoked Zambia's split from the Northern

Rhodesian Congress and when he later proscribed Zambia and "rusticated" forty-five of its leaders, Sir Arthur was able to claim with some justification that he was doing more to "eradicate legitimate grievances among Africans" than Zambia was. He could even present himself as the guardian of their newly-won right to vote in the territorial elections, which Zambia was trying to destroy by demanding a boycott of the elections.

The use of such varied and sophisticated tactics is not often associated with Colonial Office administration; the tradition has been one of more straightforward behaviour. But these tactics were entirely legitimate, and far more realistic than those of the Nyasaland Government. Past necessities of confronting recurring Congress ferment and growing pressure from the settler group, since Welensky's early days, had made the Northern Rhodesian Government into an inventive group of administrators, who were equal to both wings of the opposition. It is a simple matter to admire the light way in which the Northern Rhodesian Government walked the political tightrope during those years.

There were a few awkward moments, however. On 10th September 1958, five hundred Tonga villagers, with spears, charged a police riot squad and nine were killed when the police were forced to fire. Gwembe made its unhappy début in the world's headlines. Readers everywhere learnt how the Tonga of the Valley were so primitive that they stuck porcupine quills through their noses and knocked out their women's front teeth in order to make them less attractive to would-be kidnappers. The story of the painstaking efforts and the large sums of money spent preparing the obstinate and suspicious tribesmen for the move was not told so fully. The Northern Rhodesian Government should certainly blame itself in part for this, because the Gwembe valley remained a sealed area for months; I was the first journalist to be allowed to tour the resettlement districts—four months after the

shootings. I was then able to see how well the two million pounds allocated to the operation was being spent, and the opportunities the Batonga were being offered to better their appalling health standards, to gain education for their children, and to win wealth for themselves through proper agriculture and fishing facilities.

Congress had strengthened the tribesmen's natural opposition to the evacuation by playing on their superstitions. They told them that the Government's story of their villages being submerged by floods was a trick to deprive them of their land; the floods would subside, they said, as they had subsided every other year. This short-sighted Congress line was effective during 1958, although utterly discredited now among the Batonga who look out across the ever-growing Lake Kariba. Congress also made some capital for itself when one hundred people died of bacillary dysentery in the Lusitu resettlement area in January 1959. Energetic Government action stopped the epidemic, and the villagers are now much less reluctant to accept medical treatment. The Gwembe story however tragic provides an example of how a government should match Congress action: to show up ridiculous falsehoods as harmful and at the same time treat its legitimate complaints seriously.

There is an interesting contrast between the ways in which the Northern Rhodesian and the Southern Rhodesian Governments tackled the evacuation problem. About 20,000 villagers were resettled in Southern Rhodesia, but at a greater distance from their original homes than most of those on the northern bank. There were no known incidents of protest at their removal, although they were offered no compensation other than free supplies of basic food for two years. The Northern Rhodesian Government has paid out £330,000 in individual compensation to villagers. Some deduce from this that the firm hand of the Southern Rhodesian administration should have been imitated in the north; others

(in Northern Rhodesia) say that it illustrates the difficulties facing a Government which sees itself as a trustee obliged to use persuasion, rather than as a conqueror issuing orders.

The Northern Rhodesian Government looks on the cold war with Congress as a kind of political game of chess (white moves, black attacks . . .), in which there is rarely hope of a checkmate because both sides keep slipping new pieces on to the board. But the Government could claim a checkmate in the cattle inoculation battles at Namwala and Mazabuka.

Those who think the withdrawal of veterinary services from whole districts was a hard-hearted or irresponsible action should realise that it was only agreed on as a last resort. For months Government officials had tried to counter the Congress story that the inoculations were poisonous with more orthodox methods; but they could not persuade the men determined to boycott the inoculations, men who had so quickly forgotten how the veterinary officers had helped increase their herds spectacularly in recent years. Final warnings of the consequences were given in speeches by district officers and in leaflets distributed to every farmer; then the inoculating teams were withdrawn.

Within four months the battle was won, and the lesson taught. A typically pathetic letter came from twenty Mbeza headmen to the District Commissioner at Namwala. It said:

"All Mbeza headmen had written this letter of apology. They will not stop their cattle from being inoculated any more. They are happy that this mistake was made by them and is corrected. A special lesson for them all to learn. Seeing is believing. Inoculating kraals are already made. Stay well."

This lesson cost Ba-Ila and Batonga farmers £75,000, and a total of 6200 cattle died.

The Northern Rhodesian Information Department, never slow to take a trick, drove the lesson home. They made tape-

recordings of statements from farmers; they stuck up hundreds of posters of farmers photographed among whitening cattle bones; they published letters written by headmen before and after the inoculation struggle. Their crowning blow was reserved for the President-General of Congress himself. Under a photograph of him in the provincial newspaper *Intanda*, they printed the deadpan caption:

“One well-known resident of Namwala who was not deceived by the rumours was Mr. Harry Nkumbula, whose home is at Namwala. While the rumours were at their height, Mr. Nkumbula’s father Loyone was having the family herd inoculated by veterinary assistant J. Moono. So not one of the Nkumbula cattle died.”

Support wavered for Nkumbula. He had few tangible results to show for his years of leadership. He was suspected of planning “protest flights” to London in order to enjoy the bright lights as well as lobby the Colonial Secretary. His attitude to the new Constitution was unclear and equivocal.

It is not surprising that the leaders of the break-away Zambia Congress were mainly men renowned for their ascetic fanaticism. The Zambia president, Kenneth Kaunda, and the treasurer, Simon Kapwepwe, were listed approvingly in *African Life* as “high morals, non-smoker, non-drinker”. They affected Indian-style dress, a souvenir of their student days spent in India and evidence of their attachment to Gandhian principles. Kaunda profited by a legend of how “in 1952 he faced a lion for thirty minutes until the lion, outstared, wagged his tail and loped into the bush”. Zambia’s secretary-general, Munukayumbwa Sipalo, who had also been educated in India, peppered his Statement of Policy with Latin tags:

“It is thus imperative that every person with kinky hair, flat nose and dark skin must come into *one* big whole to work for the redemption of the entire MOTHERLAND. ZAMBIA says:

UT UNUM OMNES SINT

(That all may be one)

FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT NOW."

On the door of their headquarters used to hang the notice:

"Zambia African National Congress. Culture, Simplicity, Freedom, Sacrifice, Immediate Self-Government. Please join."

It would be wrong to dismiss the Zambia leaders as cranks. Their capacity for hard work in the most discouraging circumstances was well illustrated by an action of Kapwepwe's, when he returned from India on the day, in January 1955, when Kaunda and Nkumbula were jailed for possessing subversive literature. Sikota Wina, editor of *African Life*, told the story dramatically:

"He hired a taxi and rushed to Congress headquarters. Kapwepwe found the Congress offices empty and the morale among members near rock-bottom. He opened the door marked 'President', settled in the chair still warm from Nkumbula's occupation, and sent urgent telegrams to all Congress branches: 'THIS IS THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL FREEDOM'."

Sipalo, who was once Nkumbula's private secretary, wrote a colourful policy statement for Zambia which explained that

"we don't hate white men but we hate their systems and institutions. . . . The British have always attempted to perpetually colonise people in the same way. . . . We have been patiently sizzling in socio-political oppression too long. . . ."

This attitude to the British colonial system is in striking contrast to the one held by Dr. Banda and many Nyasaland Congress leaders. While Banda wanted to prolong the British protection in Nyasaland, Sipalo attacked

"the colonial propaganda that Africans in this country are 'unripe, unprepared' et hoc genus omne. . . . Zambia can parade thousands of Africans who can run this country

to the satisfaction, material progress and personal security of everybody. After all, this country was never a NO-MAN'S-LAND; African people were found here ruling themselves and in the same way they can do it NOW!"

Sipalo promised that, after independence, "all immigrant races shall have full citizenship rights and all their economic interest shall be safeguarded severally and legally". He posed the important questions: "Who will run the industry and commerce, who will manage the railways, who will manage the administration, who will operate the mines?" And he answered confidently:

"The very people who now run the services will be just too ready to do so even when the Government is in our hands. All that is required is to assure them of a good wage, time-honoured contracts and personal security. [But if they decide to leave] well, there are many countries who would be just too willing to send us any personnel we ask for."

As for the chiefs, Zambia would "create a Council for them to continue the banner of African virility, cultural cohesion and national pride".

Zambia's main quarrel with the Government and with Nkumbula came over the new constitution. While they were still working together, Kaunda and Nkumbula had made proposals in February 1958 demanding universal adult suffrage to elect Africans to half the seats (twenty-one) in the Legislative Council, leaving the other half to seven Officials and fourteen Elected Europeans. The Executive Council, they said, should contain three Africans, three elected Europeans and three Officials, with the Governor remaining as president. Kaunda described in *Africa South* the reception the proposals received:

"I must confess that I thought our proposals so moderate, it seemed to me difficult for the Government to dismiss them. But it didn't take me long to discover how wrong I was.

"I remember Governor Benson asking me—'Mr. Kaunda, don't you think Europeans could paralyse government if we accepted your proposals?' In reply, I said, 'Are you implying, Your Excellency, that for our demands to be met we have got to be in a position to paralyse government?' My question was never answered. . . ."

The Congress proposals were a total departure from the constitution then in operation; only four Africans sat in Legislative Council and none in Executive Council, while the elected Europeans were just short of a majority in the Legislative Council (twelve in twenty-six) and already had three representatives on the Executive Council. The United Federal Party was now demanding a constitution which would, in effect, give elected Europeans a majority in both Legislative and Executive Councils, with a Chief Minister presiding there instead of the Governor. Their slogan called for "Responsible Government by Responsible People".

Understandably, Benson's constitution pleased neither the UFP nor Congress. He refused to take a quick decision about a new constitution; he had been having talks about constitutional proposals for eighteen months before he published his scheme. His aim seems to have been to keep the balance of power in the hands of officials, although at one point the UFP believed that he had miscalculated and that they could get a clear majority in both Councils. Besides six Officials and two Unofficials nominated by the Governor, there were to be twenty-two other members in the Legislative Council. Of these, fourteen were bound to be Europeans and eight to be Africans according to the franchise qualifications, which were the same as for the Federal franchise—but with the important difference that both "ordinary" and "special" voters voted on a common roll for all twenty-two members. The peculiarity of Benson's system was that he adopted the Tredgold scheme which devalued "special" votes to one-third of the value of all votes cast in any constituency, and he

applied it to the fourteen constituencies where he wanted Europeans elected.

Benson also proposed that the value of "ordinary" votes should be reduced to one-third of all those cast in the eight "African" constituencies, in an effort to make the system seem fairer to Africans. But he dropped the idea because it enraged many Europeans, and was ridiculed by the observation that the vote of the Paramount Chief of Barotseland would have only one-third the value of his herd-boy's vote.

Lennox-Boyd's revised proposals in September 1958 provoked an even greater outburst from Europeans. In these he planned an Executive Council of ten Ministers (plus the Governor as President), of which six would be Unofficials and "that for the present it should be an Instruction to the Governor that two of these should be Africans and four Europeans". By making it an "Administrative Instruction" Lennox-Boyd avoided having to write such a controversial provision into the Order-in-Council, and consequently the Colonial Secretary could in theory reduce the number of African Ministers at any time if their performance was disappointing. This destroyed Welensky's argument that racial representation was being "entrenched" in the Executive Council. The Europeans were understandably annoyed about the way Lennox-Boyd decided to create two African Ministers without consulting any elected member and without discussing it at the July talks in London. He may have decided on two in order to "split the difference" between the UFP's proposal of one and the demand by Congress and the Labour Party for three; he explained his decision unconvincingly by stating that a single African would feel insecure with no colleague to consult.

Welensky seemed almost happy to cease being Federal Prime Minister and revert to his old role of opposition leader in Northern Rhodesia. The Northern Rhodesian section of his party fought the Federal Elections in November 1958 on this

issue, and he pledged himself (if elected) to fly to London immediately after the elections to have the proposals altered. He did fly to London, but was unable to persuade Lennox-Boyd to change a single clause. In the Rhodesias the failure of his mission was covered up by a lot of talk about the good impression he made on British television.

The firmness of Benson and Lennox-Boyd helped to reassure many Africans, and the imaginative (and, for government officials, unusual) publicity methods of the territorial information department succeeded in persuading 7617 Africans to register as voters in an electorate of 30,234. Titus Mukupo, a quartet singer who had become Nkumbula's Secretary-General when the Zambia leaders finally left Congress, committed the Northern Rhodesian Congress to supporting the new constitution while Nkumbula was still at the Accra Conference. His action was decisive in getting Africans on the rolls. Zambia proclaimed a boycott of the elections, which Benson saw as a threat to public order, since he reckoned that Zambia's attempts to keep 7617 Africans from the polls would lead to rioting. He prepared to safeguard the elections by arresting the Zambia leaders and proscribing their organisation. Since the elections were not held until 20th March 1959, a month after disturbances had begun in Nyasaland and the Emergency had been declared in Southern Rhodesia, his preparedness was doubly wise.

His plans were threatened just as dangerously from the other wing. The United Federal Party began by believing that it could win all fourteen European seats and the two African urban seats where European voters were preponderant, and thus dominate the Legislative Council. But even this would not assure the party control of the Executive Council, since the Governor could use the two nominated members to swing the balance his way, having given the four European seats on the Executive Council to the UFP. The UFP leader in Northern Rhodesia, John Roberts, therefore

gave the Governor an ultimatum that his party would not co-operate in the government or make the constitution workable unless the Governor accepted the United Federal Party's recommendations for the six Unofficial members of Executive Council and the two further members to be nominated to the Legislative Council. Roberts made this demand after Greenfield, the Federal Minister of Law, had been to Northern Rhodesia to advise him. Welensky rightly saw this as the last chance for his party to win full power in the territorial field of Northern Rhodesia, but these forceful, bullying tactics were a monstrous offence to the spirit of the constitution. The two nominated seats were never intended as a bonus to the majority party, but as a means of introducing specialised talent.

In the event, Benson just succeeded in his intentions. The UFP won eleven European seats and two African urban seats (through a preponderantly white vote in those constituencies). Only about one African voter in nineteen chose to vote for a UFP candidate; about four hundred Africans in all voted for the UFP. The Dominion Party received more African votes and Sir John Moffat and Harry Franklin were elected for the Central Africa Party mainly on African votes. Under these circumstances, Benson was fully justified in nominating one African of his choice to the Executive Council, while giving the other African and the four European seats on the Executive Council to the UFP. This allowed the UFP half the Executive Council seats, with the knowledge that the Governor could use a casting vote and that its own African member would temper its policies to some extent. The UFP accepted this arrangement. Welensky was too occupied in Nyasaland to precipitate a crisis in Northern Rhodesia.

The UFP lost its final chance of becoming the effective territorial government in Northern Rhodesia. The new constitution is planned to last for at least ten years, and

Benson's provisions make it possible for African members to assume increasing control of Legislative Council without any revision of the constitution. Whether this will happen fast enough for African aspirations is uncertain; what is certain is that now the white settlers will never be in a position to control the Northern Rhodesian Government as they do the Southern Rhodesian Government. To that extent Benson succeeded in quietening African fears of white domination.

## The Storm Mounts

Trouble in Nyasaland was a long time coming. If anything was predictable in a generally unpredictable continent in 1958 and early 1959, it was that there would be disturbances in Nyasaland. Nor is there any doubt as to the cause of the disturbances. Dingle Foot, who represented Dr. Banda before the Devlin Commission, gave the reason in the Commons debate of 22nd July 1959 when he said:

“The present troubles stem directly from the imposition of Federation in 1953, but a great deal has happened since then. . . . There was, above all, the delay in announcing the new Constitution for Nyasaland. It is abundantly clear that the responsibility lies with the Colonial Office and with the Protectorate Government.”

He went on to make a summary of the main facts in these three paragraphs:

“The question of a new constitution was first raised with the Governor by a delegation of Congress leaders in September 1957. The Governor told them that he was going on leave in the following April and that he would consult the Government when he got home. There were further deputations in November 1957 and in March 1958. Then, in the summer of 1958, a deputation led by Dr. Banda came to this country and saw the Colonial Secretary. The delegation was given the impression that an announcement would be made when the Governor returned to Nyasaland in August. The Governor went back on 7th August. No announcement was made and on 30th October Dr. Banda had an interview at Government House,

When Lennox-Boyd, therefore, publicly advised the Governor in 1957 that "there should be an eager, indeed an adventurous, searching after some better form of constitutional arrangement", both Congress and Indian politicians were cheered. Congress was swift to submit proposals, and the Nyasaland Government replied urbanely that "the approach is not felt to be untimely and is welcome". The proposals themselves were not quite so welcome, however. Congress wanted the Legislative Council increased from twenty-three to forty; the six non-African elective seats were to be reserved as such, two only of the twelve Government "ex officio" seats were to be retained, and the other thirty-two were to be African seats, with universal African suffrage. Furthermore, the majority party leader in the Legislative Council would elect at least five Ministers to the Executive Council. In one stride, Congress wanted the legislature to become African-run. They pointed out that non-Africans would still be over-represented, on a straight counting of heads in the population.

African confidence that the Nyasaland Government, if pressed, would produce a constitution in good time prevailed until about August 1958. After his meeting with Lennox-Boyd in June; Dr. Banda told London pressmen that he accepted the fact that constitutional changes could hardly be decided on before Sir Robert Armitage produced his own proposals in August. Banda's delegation had stuck to the Congress demand of the previous year for thirty-two seats in a Legislative Council of forty—"a fair share of the govern-

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getting recognised as an Indian or Pakistani subject; that applicants for a vote have to read, write and understand the English language (which disqualifies probably nine out of ten Nyasaland Asians); and that married women cannot qualify by virtue of their husband's qualifications if they were married under a system which permits polygamy (which cuts out all Moslem and Hindu women from voting, unless they qualify independently of their husbands). In the Federal sphere, the first disability on British Protected Persons was raised in 1957 and the third one modified, but even so only 371 Asians were able to register in Nyasaland for the 1958 Federal Elections. All three disabilities still apply at territorial level.

ment". They were not worried that neither the Indians nor the white settlers had responded to Sir Robert's invitation for "interested parties" to submit proposals. The Indians were expected to hold their cards for as long as possible. The settlers said that they saw no necessity for altering the constitution before the 1960 Conference.

When Sir Robert made no announcement on his return in August, the Africans' confidence began to fade. The initiative was taken from them that same month by Major Peter Moxon, who had been partially responsible for Banda's return. Moxon, contesting a territorial by-election, campaigned for drastic electoral reform, and called the present system "actively harmful" because the communal rolls plan "leads inevitably to a fruitless and embittering tug-of-war" between the races. He proposed that six Europeans, six Africans, two Indians and one Coloured should be elected on a "reasonably broad" franchise by a system of racial cross-voting on a common roll which would encourage moderate candidates—an adaptation of what was then the Tanganyika system. For good measure, he added that "to federalise non-African agriculture at the present juncture would be to reap an additional harvest of bitterness and suspicion that would . . . be in no way counter-balanced by the possible benefits to agriculture of such a move".

Although the constituency included a number of Zomba civil servants, Moxon was defeated by ninety-one votes to eighty-one by a Mr. Kayes, whose calibre can be gauged from this description in the *Central African Examiner*:

"Mr. Kayes, a well-known transport contractor, does not intend making any proposals on constitutional reform or any other political matter. He declared early on that he had no plans for an election campaign, and would not hold any public meetings, for he was confident of election on the simple grounds that 'Everyone knows me'."

Moxon's defeat by such a man was a big disappointment to

the Congress leaders. They were further irritated by Sattar Sacranie, an eloquent barrister, who holds the Indian block vote as leader of the Nyasaland Asian Convention. Sacranie flew to London with a memorandum for Lennox-Boyd, in which he optimistically proposed parity representation between the three races—an exact copy of the Tanganyika system. It hardly seemed as appropriate to Nyasaland as Tanganyika, which has ten times the number of Asians as Nyasaland. But it was not the unrealistic nature of his proposals which annoyed the Congress leaders so much as the secretive way in which Sacranie left for London without paying them the courtesy of showing Dr. Banda his proposals first. Banda made two fierce statements, reminding the Asians that Nyasaland Africans outnumbered them by more than two hundred to one, and suggesting that they would be wise to keep quiet in politics.

When Dr. Banda first met the Governor, on October 30th, he had shown willingness to compromise over his demands for seats and the franchise qualifications. Dingle Foot is a little unfair in blaming the delay up to that point on the Governor. John Ingham, the Secretary for African Affairs, who had shown his liberal views while working on the East Africa Royal Commission, had repeatedly invited Banda to come to Zomba for discussions. Banda had replied that he must first tour the country, and that he would not be ready to meet the Governor until October. But the Governor must be blamed for not pressing for another talk in October, and for allowing a further three months to pass (during which time Banda was away at the Accra Conference for less than three weeks); and it was futile and dangerous for the European Unofficials to avoid any meeting with Banda for six months. Alan Dixon, the sisal businessman who sat as the Unofficials' representative on the Executive Council, finally met Dr. Banda on January 24th, although in October Banda had said that he was "waiting to be approached".

The Governor set a closing date, in mid-February, for constitutional proposals, and the last published entry was that of the Nyasaland Association, led by the solicitor-politician Michael Blackwood. These proposals were hailed by a commentator in the *Central African Examiner* as "easily the most thoughtful . . . the first genuinely constructive and practical proposals to be made public. . . . Because it is self-adjusting, it eliminates the need for the repeated turn-overs of the apple-cart that 'constitutional reviews' involve."

Africans saw no such merits in Blackwood's plan, however. For it smacked strongly to them of the federal system, having the same qualifications and the same dual rolls. The upper roll (which, the *Examiner* explained, would clearly be largely European) had a hand in electing eight representatives in conjunction with the lower ("overwhelmingly African") roll, but the lower roll had no say in electing six others who were the sole choice of the top roll. The "self-adjusting" device would allow the twelve nominated seats to become elected by top roll voters in stages, the stages being regulated by the number of Africans who had meanwhile attained the top roll. By the time Africans numbered half the top roll, Blackwood suggested the top roll should be electing eighteen members of the Legislative Council and the remaining eight would still be elected by top and bottom rolls voting together.

It is hard to conceive of a system which would more easily arouse suspicions among Africans. It made it appear that it would take fifteen years (or four elections) for Africans to gain a clear majority over nominated and European Unofficial members. There was the more sinister possibility that the European Unofficials might gain, at one intermediate stage, a clear majority themselves—a fantastic situation in a country where the white settlers number less than one in five hundred.

"These franchise proposals were the last straw", I was told later by one of the best-informed white men in Nyasaland. "They confirmed all the African suspicions of Federal

Government plans to dominate Nyasaland." There are strong grounds for this belief. The European Unofficials in Nyasaland, led by Blackwood and Dixon, had for years been wary of identification with the Rhodesian territorial or federal parties, although the white Federal M.P.s from Nyasaland were all members of the United Federal Party. Territorial elections and by-elections in Nyasaland had been fought by individuals with no party labels, and no policy commitments of a party kind. But when the six Unofficial Members joined the UFP and produced this franchise scheme as their first big territorial policy statement, Africans saw the shadow of the Federal Government's pattern of rule falling over their country.

These franchise proposals were a major factor in provoking Africans to riot. Were they intended to be a provocation? The view that "we're inevitably going to have trouble, so let's have it at a time of our own choosing" was quite common only heard among a group of Nyasaland settlers. I have notes of Blackwood suggesting to me that the best time of year, "others think" (he was very careful never to commit himself), for pressing through the federalising of non-African agriculture was in January and February "when the African is busy hoeing and won't leave his land to make trouble". This he said late in 1957, but the whole subject of federalising agriculture was "frozen" for a year by the Governor on grounds of "financial stringency".

Late in 1958 the demand to federalise was raised afresh, and the *Nyasaland Times* led the cry against further delay. Blackwood again, in December 1958, spoke to me about how "others" might be pressing the Federal Government to have a "showdown with Congress during the rainy season". The Federal Government, after winning all the ten Nyasaland seats at the federal elections in November, did begin pressing the Nyasaland Government to hand over non-African agriculture, and this provoked a fear-inspired motion from

N. D. Kwenje in the Legislative Council on December 3rd that "the Nyasaland Government does not hand to the Federal Government any Department, or part thereof, for administration until 1960 at the review when things will be put in black and white". The fact that the Nyasaland Government officials had to vote against such a motion obviously did not quieten African fears, especially as the officials devoted most of their speeches to praising the benefits of Federation. All the same, there were no further public moves to federalise non-African agriculture. Instead, the Nyasaland Association's constitutional proposals became a more immediate provocation to African violence. Whether it was deliberate provocation will perhaps never be known. But it served the purposes of those acquaintances of Michael Blackwood who were keen to dictate the time of "a showdown". It is hard to see how Blackwood could fail to realise how provocative these proposals were.

Dingle Foot's view, that the delay in concluding the constitutional talks was the cause of the disturbances, is not shared by the Devlin Commission. The Commission first points out the inconsistencies between statements of the Governor and the Colonial Secretary about the need for (and prospects of) an early conclusion to the talks, and then sums up:

"However this may be, we do not think that the delay was a factor of any great weight in the deliberations of Congress. . . . The truth, we think, is that the Congress leaders, certainly the extremists, had practically given up hope that anything satisfactory to them would come out of any more constitutional talks; if they had believed that it would, we cannot think that just before the talks were coming to maturity, they would have abandoned the way of peaceful negotiation."

The views of Devlin and Dingle Foot are by no means irreconcilable. Congress had given up hope of peaceful

negotiation precisely because the long delays in concluding the talks had allowed their opponents to organise under the UFP banner and to propose a scheme which could not have been more unsatisfactory. The Governor had given them small grounds for thinking that his own proposals would be closer to the Congress plan than to the Blackwood scheme. If anything, his Government's behaviour had made Nyasas believe that he would pay more regard to Blackwood than to them. Congress believed that delay had made the fulfilment of their wishes less likely than ever.

It is easy to give the impression, when showing how African suspicions arose, that all the faults, the provocation, the sinister motives were to be found on one side. Such an impression would be ridiculous and harmful. Geoffrey Taylor, writing in the *Guardian*, puts the situation in the correct perspective. He avoids describing Congressmen in the Rhodesian phrase of "self-seeking agitators", but explains that:

"Congress did not help the Government to be reasonable. It produced, in addition to men of real capability at the top, a stratum of bums and wide boys with whom it would be difficult to come to terms in any society.

"Congress itself did not differentiate between the two. It needed local organisers, and the local organiser had to be someone who was literate and someone who was still in the village; that is, someone who had not got a job in the town. As often as not, he would turn out to be a man with only half a schooling who, because of the schooling he had had, was unable or unwilling to be a peasant farmer under a restrictive communal land tenure system and who vented his frustration in general bloody-mindedness and in persuading others not to co-operate with the Government, even in schemes which were manifestly for their benefit."

It required the utmost patience on the part of white officials and settlers to put up with this sort of thing. The Nyasaland

Government, whatever its other failings, had shown patience: D. W. Chijozi acknowledged this during the December 3rd debate, when he said: "The Government, as usual, has shown patience and has tried to please everybody. . . ." It must have been particularly trying when Congressmen called on villagers to disobey agricultural regulations designed to prevent soil erosion and the spread of disease; and Government patience gave out in this matter before the Emergency. Congress made capital out of those unpopular regulations which required hard work by farmers. The harried Government took the fierce line of enforcing regulations by fines and sometimes imprisonment, rather than by persuasion and education. Sir Robert deserves some rational sympathy with the case he put in his State of Emergency dispatch:

"The Congress policy of indirectly encouraging disregard of the laws, particularly in the rural areas, confronted the Government with a dilemma. Either widespread police action could be taken to apprehend large numbers of petty offenders, thus exacerbating local irritations and driving the ordinary village people into the Congress camp, or else the offences could be ignored, thus demonstrating the omnipotence of Dr. Banda and his colleagues. In the event, the law was enforced to the extent that police were available for the purpose."

The Devlin Commission quoted a Congressman, a "shrewd observer", as saying that the "policy of nagging the Government (over the agricultural rules) was due to the lack of other channels through which Congress as an opposition party could make itself felt". A combination of Congress frustration and the "bloodymindedness of the half-schooled organiser" produced petty law-breaking to which the Government reacted sternly; in turn Dr. Banda fiercely condemned Government methods of enforcement, and bitter feeling grew up between rulers and ruled at all levels. Most of the clashes before the February-March disturbances were due to disputes about agricultural rules.

What else could Sir Robert have done? Did he have either to use his police, or abdicate power to Congress? Obviously he had no chance of winning a dramatic cold war victory, like the cattle inoculation battle in Northern Rhodesia: the Nyasaland disputes were over unspectacular matters like failing to contour-ridge or hoe before the rains, or persisting in cultivation along the banks of streams. Dr. Banda was unassailable, personally, for he was careful not to attack agricultural legislation as such, and only to condemn police enforcement of the regulations. The way for Government to avoid the clashes would have been to treat these matters as non-political, to find ways to ridicule the local Congress organiser as an individual, as a "wide boy" perhaps, and to encourage better farming methods through the example of other African farmers, in the way that Clutton-Brock and John Mutasa worked at St. Faith's. This had been attempted in some areas in Nyasaland: Chief Kuntaja, well known as a Congress supporter, was of great help to Government in popularising farming improvements. But Kuntaja is an exceptional chief, and this indirect, non-political method required both a subtle approach by district officers and agricultural officers and months of patient work unaffected by Congress irritations. Few district officers, trained in a tradition of paternalism, possess such subtlety, and the tensions which were building up throughout 1958 discouraged such dispassionate patience.

The patience of the Nyasaland Administration towards Congress was wearing thin, but settler politicians and press had shown little enough from the start. Their attitude at the time of Banda's return was one of scoffing at "all this Messiah talk. What does he know of the real problems of the country?" It quickly deepened into sharp annoyance, and Banda was blamed for any hooliganism which seemed to have any connection with his meetings. The most celebrated of these

occasions became known as the Blantyre Clocktower Incident. After Banda had addressed a meeting on October 26th, people in the large crowd waiting by the Clocktower for buses threw stones at about a dozen cars and injured two women.

Instead of making light of the incident and saying clearly, as the Devlin Report does, that "the offences were committed by hooligans . . . and had no political character", press and politicians attacked the Government for inaction. A lurid editorial in the *Nyasaland Times* described the incident as "a raw display of racial hatred without parallel in this country" and demanded to know why the Riot Act had not been read during "two hours of threatening violence when no European or Asian was safe to walk the streets". The effect of this sensational language was spoilt by a photograph which appeared in *The Times* (of London) showing in the background a far-from-threatening mob and in the foreground its own correspondent, grinning happily. *The Times'* correspondent was Alan Cooper, then editor of the *Nyasaland Times*. Despite this, and despite the Nyasaland Government's criticism of the report as irresponsible, Cooper returned to the attack on the subject of "this dreadful afternoon". He said, "If women of any race cannot travel around Nyasaland without harm, then we will descend to savagery. The despicable act of injuring those women deserved swift retaliation, without second thought".

This alarmism sent a stream of settlers off to demand pistol permits from the District Commissioner. But the deepest immediate effect was on the Asian community, already upset by Banda's attack on Sacranie for flying off to see Lennox-Boyd. To be told by Banda that "they would be wise to keep quiet in politics" and then to have some of their cars stoned after a Banda meeting was enough to throw them into confusion. Sacranie was unable to get his Asian Convention's worried executive to agree to a directive to be given Asian voters for the imminent Federal elections. The UFP tac-

ticians, hearing of the confusion, played on the fears aroused by the Clocktower scenes of "mob law", and told the Asians that their only security lay in continued Federation. In the elections the UFP scooped virtually every Asian vote. This alarmist approach may have helped a single party in its immediate political ends, but it harmed a whole country's prospects for peace.

An incident which alarmed the Nyasas themselves was an air-lift exercise in September for five hundred men of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Rhodesia Regiment, who flew from Southern Rhodesia to Nyasaland. These five hundred men spent three weeks scouring most parts of Nyasaland on an Internal Security exercise hunting "bandits". Welensky, as Federal Minister of Defence, disingenuously explained that the airlift was "to add interest to their training" by taking them out of their own territory. Wellington Chirwa did not accept this explanation, and said that the troops had been sent to intimidate the Africans there. Welensky blandly replied that no law-abiding community need fear the forces of law and order. This "showing the flag" may have reassured some Europeans in Nyasaland—but to what purpose? It acted more like a red rag to the African bull.

What collusion was there between the different Congresses? Dr. Alexander, supporting the confirmation of the Emergency Regulations, assured the Southern Rhodesian Assembly on 26th February 1959:

"This idea of nationalism which is spreading throughout the whole of Africa is really doing so according to a definite master plan, and I am perfectly certain that there is a master mind directing all these various national movements."

A week later the world stared at headlines of the "Nyasaland Massacre Plot", but Dr. Alexander's eyes were fixed firmly on Accra, where Egyptian and Russian delegates

(including the popular Professor Ivan Potekhin) had been prominent at the December conference attended by most of the nationalist leaders of Africa. The Accra Conference had been so skimpily covered in the Rhodesian press that anyone might have been excused for thinking that it was no more important than a Rhodesia-South Africa bowls tournament. But Dr. Alexander had detected "a master mind" at work there, co-ordinating the national movements in Central Africa.

Of course, to a very limited extent he was correct. Before Accra the links between the Congresses were very weak. Nkumbula and Banda had co-operated to write a pamphlet against Federation in 1949, but it was their presence in London which had brought them together as much as anything: their Congresses never combined in opposition to the threat of Federation. In the final paragraph of their memorandum, they had written: "We are in favour of the immediate union of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Some tribes are split by the boundary lines and an organic union . . . is therefore long overdue"; but this idea was never an inspiration for any detailed policy. Titus Mukupo came down from Lusaka to speak at the inauguration of the Southern Rhodesian Congress in September 1957, but his fraternal greetings were those of a very distant brother.

There are various reasons for this lack of collusion. A minor one is the number of different languages spoken in Central Africa. In East Africa Swahili unites all the tribes; in Central Africa English is the only—and still inadequate—*lingua franca*. Again, the geographical separation of the territories encouraged separatism in Congress policies: only a Nyasa had a chance to become acknowledged as a leader in all territories because the wandering Nyasas had spread through all Central Africa—and there had been no Nyasaland Congress leader with universal appeal before Dr. Banda. A more important reason than any of these lay in the basically different aims which each Congress possessed. While

Northern Rhodesian Congressmen wanted full independence for their country, the aim of the Nyasa leaders was to break out of the Federation but still remain under British protection. The Southern Rhodesian leaders (though they thought it unwise to speak too often about their hopes to Africans in the north) really wanted Federation to continue, because they saw in it the only chance of making their country more democratic. These differences have never been fully resolved, despite the "joint communiqué" which the four Congress presidents issued at Accra to the effect that they would "join in a broad, united front against Federation". Most of the Southern Rhodesian detainees have turned against Federation in prison, reckoning that the small amount of liberalism it had brought their country was heavily outweighed by the troubles it had brought with it in the north. But many other Southern Rhodesian Africans place the welfare of their own people foremost, and fear that the ending of Federation would make their position more miserable.

This difference of view was clearly expressed when Nkumbula, T. D. T. Banda and Nkomo had a first "summit conference" of Congress presidents in Lusaka in November 1957. They published a joint statement listing a score of criticisms of Federation and pledging themselves "to train and prepare Africans of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for self-government and independence when they are ready for it". Southern Rhodesia was again excepted when the Federal elections were discussed: the two Northern leaders agreed that their Congresses should boycott the elections, but they could not prevail on Nkomo. Nkomo hoped that his Africans, by enrolling, would have a large part in the election of five Federal M.P.s—the four African M.P.s and the member for Salisbury. They went their separate ways: the Congresses in the north enforced an effective boycott, and the Southern Rhodesian Congress began (not very enthusiastically) to encourage Africans to enrol.

A section of the Southern Rhodesian Africans wanted to boycott the Federal elections and collaborate with the north. During the closed sessions of the Congress's annual conference in Bulawayo in September 1958 much time was spent in discussing an election boycott, and Nkomo was attacked for his decision. But a move to replace President Nkomo by Chikerema was dropped because it was thought unwise to show a split at such a time.

Contact—but hardly collusion—had existed between individual leaders in the different Congresses for a long time. George Nyandoro, for instance, was on close terms with Dunduzu Chisiza, whom Chipembere and Chiume first brought into the Nyasaland Congress hierarchy as an organising secretary and who ended up as Banda's Secretary-General. Chisiza, a pleasant bearded man with deep and intense views, had been a policeman in Tanganyika before going to work at the Indian Commission offices in Salisbury. From there he was deported back to Nyasaland by Garfield Todd because of his political activities. He spent a year in 1957-8 studying the economics of under-developed countries at Fircroft College, Birmingham, and went on one of the Aldermaston nuclear disarmament marches in March 1958. During this time he wrote a letter to Nyandoro which, the Beadle Tribunal reports without amusement, was signed with the nom-de-plume "Grace Kelly".

Contact between the two men continued. Nyandoro went to Nyasaland in January 1959 as Chisiza's guest and attended the famous forest conference when the "assassination plot" was supposedly hatched. When he returned, I asked him what had happened. "I'll tell you some day," said George, "but now they are secrets locked in a little black box." And he tapped his head. After the arrests, when the detainees at Khami prison were being questioned by CID teams, the most frequent questions asked were: "Have you ever been to Nyasaland? Why did Nyandoro go there in January?" They

were trying to prove the theory that there was close collusion between the Congresses, and that Nyandoro had gone to agree on final preparations for joint action. They were unwilling to accept the detainees' story that Nyandoro had gone not as the representative of Congress, but as a private individual who had told only a few friends of his plans.

The electric effect which Dr. Banda had on Salisbury Africans on his return from the Accra Conference shows, by negative proof, how little contact there had previously been. He had played only a small role at Accra, going at the last moment in response to an urgent invitation from the Ghanaian Foreign Secretary, Kojo Botsio, and leaving the main conference work in the hands of Kanyama Chiume. He told them he did not want a position on the seventeen-man permanent steering committee, because he was too busy with the problems of Nyasaland and with his medical practice there to travel as much as the job would require. But when he flew back to Central Africa, he became the focal point of the whole fermenting situation.

He was angry with all three governments. The Nyasaland Government cancelled his weekend flight back to Blantyre, so that he would have to arrive on a work-day and would not draw a large welcoming crowd. The Federal Government had taken the opportunity at Salisbury Airport to frisk him and question him like a criminal-suspect for an hour. The Southern Rhodesian Government, learning that Banda intended to fill in time during his enforced stay in Salisbury by addressing a meeting in Highfield township, tried to insist that it be held in a small hall. When Banda arrived, looking incongruously dapper in that throng with a smart suit, a lavender waistcoat and a Homburg hat, he was a very angry man indeed.

His Highfield speech has been widely quoted. "To Hell with Federation. . . . If I die, my ghost will fight it from the grave . . . let us fill their prisons with our thousands, singing

Hallelujah" was a more virile rallying-call than the Mashona and Matabele had heard in sixty years. But some whites interpreted it as the speech of a worried man who felt that power was slipping from his grasp and that he must do something dramatic to hold his position at all. It is clear now that, on the contrary, Banda was speaking with confidence and knew that he had succeeded in his first object—to organise the Nyasaland Congress firmly behind him. He was ready to challenge the Federal Government frontally. His attack on African "moderates" ("for tea and whisky in white men's houses they have betrayed their country. . . .") was not an expression of latent racialism. In his view there would be time for public friendships with whites again when whites in Central Africa generally had acknowledged the black man's rights to a position of human dignity.

It was difficult for a white spectator at Banda's meeting to gauge the African response to his words. At times it seemed that the clapping and cheering was the kind which people accord to a dramatic performance, which did not touch their real lives. My own Nyasa cook, Dennis Wiseman, who had been full of news about Dr. Banda for weeks before, listened to him for only ten minutes and then edged out of the crowd, whispering, "Now I must go to church". But the effect was far deeper than it seemed. Dennis spent the evening waiting outside a house for a glimpse of Banda, and the following week one thousand Salisbury women packed a hall and formed a Women's League. (Banda, a middle-aged bachelor, has a great attraction for African women, in the same way perhaps as Cary Grant or Gary Cooper has to Americans.) For the first time, the Nyasaland Congress branch at Salisbury's Mabvuku township invited a Southern Rhodesian Congress leader (Robert Chikerema) to address them, and members of all Congresses went to the meeting—something which had never happened before.

In Northern Rhodesia, the same emotion towards unity was

evident, although Banda was banned from the territory. Nkumbula's prestige had been waning for months. His speech at Accra had betrayed his own sense of impotence: he had demanded independence and self-government for Northern Rhodesia "in our life's time" but added that the means for achieving that would be the job of the permanent secretariat to be set up by the Accra Conference. Consequently, the connections between the Nyasaland Congress branches in Northern Rhodesia and Zambia grew firmer, while Nkumbula was spurned by them.

When the disturbances in Nyasaland had already begun, I attended a meeting of the Nyasaland Congress's Lusaka branch held on an open space near Chibolya township. I was the only white man there, but Kapwepwe and Sipalo, the Zambia leaders, arrived with a truck-load of supporters. In their honour there was a public burning of Northern Rhodesia Congress cards, on which a picture of Nkumbula bore the caption "One man, one vote". But the meeting showed none of the violence suggested later by the Ridley Report. Rhetorically someone cried: "You can ban Banda, but you can't ban the truth." A Nyasa carefully explained that his people supported Zambia "not because we espouse violence, but because we espouse truth". One speaker, who said "We are moved by anger", was swiftly corrected by another "—No, by nationalism". Walking away from the meeting, a man who said he was "a missionary—but I'm resting from praying", assured me that none of them hated Europeans, but they believed in "a country for each man and God for all", a slogan which he attributed to Canning.

The first movements towards proper co-operation between the Congresses were evident after Accra; but they were only movements and not thorough-going plans. Paul Mushonga, vice-treasurer-general of the Southern Rhodesian Congress, came back from Accra with directions that his colleagues should speak out against Federation in concert with the other

Congresses. This they did, but there were still Congressmen left unconvinced that this was the best course for Southern Rhodesia. No close collusion had been planned between the Congress leaders, but it is possible that the sense of solidarity had been sufficiently roused for a spontaneous movement to have taken place in Southern Rhodesia in protest against events in Nyasaland. This was why Sir Edgar Whitehead changed his plans. Instead of arresting a few score Congressmen who had been agitating for reform of the agricultural laws, he spread his net far wider and scooped into prison 495 men who he thought might lead such a protest movement. A few examples of how this hasty change of plan produced wild inequities and needless suffering I shall give in the next chapter.

The main issue of the Federal Elections in November 1958 was not calculated to steady the fears of Africans about their own future. Both the United Federal Party and the Dominion Party made it clear that the most important object for the country was to achieve dominion status (or complete independence, or full membership of the Commonwealth—the aim was expressed in various phrases). They vied with each other to show how quickly they could achieve it. The subject of race relations was pushed aside, partly because (as candidates would point out) "African affairs are mainly a territorial responsibility", and partly (as candidates refrained from pointing out) because only two Southern Rhodesian voters in one hundred were Africans, while in the north Africans were boycotting the elections. The United Federal Party accordingly set out to show its rightist colours and to attract the non-liberal vote.

How did the UFP suggest that it would win Dominion Status? In the past both Malvern and Welensky had talked rebellion and hinted at "Boston tea-parties", although during the Federal Election Welensky strongly denied that he had

ever used such a phrase, and made the Dominion Party look irresponsible for talking in such terms. Yet, in August 1956 Malvern had made one of his famous oblique warnings:

"You cannot make people do things unless they wish to, except by force. One of the curious things about our Constitution is that we have complete control of our defence forces. I can only hope we shall not have to use them as the North American colonies had to use theirs. Because we are dealing with a stupid Government in the United Kingdom."

Welensky had added a little more substance to these murmurs by May 1958. If the 1960 talks failed to result in Dominion Status for Central Africa, he said,

"then I personally would not be prepared to accept that Rhodesians have less guts than the American colonists."

By November he had moderated his language again, and his party's proposals for achieving independence became vaguer—which made them appear more statesmanlike. The UFP's official policy for the 1960 Conference, syndicated in all candidates' election addresses, was this:

"The UFP believes that the time has come to insist on the U.K. handing over full responsibility to the elected leaders on the spot. Interference from outside, whether well-meaning or mischievous, must cease. Thus we look on the 1960 Conference as vital to our future. Skill and experience in negotiating with the Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office are essential. The UFP has confidence in the justice of its claim and we believe we can succeed."

But Mr. Leslie Cullinan added some gloss for the voters of Gatooma which showed the reason why he, at any rate, desired Dominion Status:

"We are determined that the affairs of the Federation be governed from within, and not directed by people overseas who do not know our problems, and who apparently have very little regard for the welfare of the European."

(But the voters of Gatooma preferred to put their trust in the Dominion Party candidate, the Gaelic-singing Duke of Montrose who is often to be heard on a platform stressing the need to guard against "the mongrelisation of the races".)

Welensky was able to pour scorn on the Dominion Party's plan for gaining Dominion Status. In August they gave notice that they thought a Declaration of Independence might be necessary. "An unsympathetic administration in Britain" in 1960 might well take "an uncompromising attitude towards our just aspirations"; in that event:

"the whole question will be referred to the Federal electorate in a referendum and, provided the necessary mandate is so obtained, a Declaration of Independence within the British Commonwealth will be made. Such a declaration would exclude Nyasaland and Barotseland unless it could be demonstrated that they wished to be included within the scope of the declaration. . . ."

During the campaign Welensky was able to provoke the Dominion Party into saying that it would disregard the rulings of courts about the Federal Constitution if they interfered with such a declaration. Making great play with the British regard for the sanctity of law, Welensky scored heavily. The Dominion Party offered itself for more punishment by promising (in its official journal the *Rhodesian*) that it would declare independence immediately over the issue of the Northern Rhodesian constitution unless Lennox-Boyd acceded to its demands.

While Welensky may have seemed more responsible and practical in the eyes of European voters, both parties seemed menacing in the eyes of non-voting Africans. Mr. Guillaume van Eeden, the Dominion Party leader in Northern Rhodesia, might tell his farmer-voters that:

"if we have another period of Federal Party administration, there will be a further debasement of franchise standards, with the result that the African will gain control. . . . A

continuance of Federal Party rule will result in racial integration in schools, hospitals and other institutions."

Africans, however, did not see the future this way. They noted instead, in the UFP's policy pamphlet "Action and Achievement", that the UFP pledged itself to "press strongly" for the federalising of non-African agriculture in Nyasaland and "for the establishing of a Federal Police Force on a basis similar to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police". Both these proposals filled Africans with alarm. What substance would there be in territorial self-government for Nyasaland if the white-run Federal Government controlled the territory's revenue, its main products and the police?

If anything, Winston Field and his policies were more acceptable to Nyasa Africans than Welensky was. Field visited Nyasaland twice during the election days and had a cordial talk with Dr. Banda. Banda felt that they were talking the same language when Field used one of his favourite phrases about "the Africans' fear of the unknown". Field's willingness to treat Nyasaland as a separate case from the Rhodesias, to agree (long before Welensky did) that Nyasaland should ultimately enjoy territorial self-government, appealed to Banda. But it did not appeal to Nyasaland's white electorate. They voted on the single issue of closer ties with the Rhodesias, and gave every seat—six European and two African—to the UFP.

The UFP's claim to be "the party of partnership" wore very thin during the election campaign. Mr. Harry S. Hopkins, a war-time destroyer captain, won a Bulawayo seat with the assurance that the UFP would provide:

"jobs for ALL with European standards safeguarded and with the African complimentary (sic) to—not competitive with—Europeans."

Even the Freudian slip which the printer (or the candidate?) made on the word "complementary" did not distract Africans from noting this unpleasant interpretation of partnership.

More damaging was the effect which some of Welensky's words had in Kenya. He flew up to Nairobi to open the 1958 Royal Show and, for old time's sake, drove a goods train out to the showground. Exhilarated by this, he delivered a more spirited speech on the theme "What Africa owes to the white man" than Kenya whites ever remembered hearing. Those Kenya settlers, who were rebelling against the tendency to look to the Colonial Office Government for protection, began to see Welensky as a possible saviour of the White Highlands. They began to talk vaguely of a form of federation with Central Africa. It was only a brief phase, and ended abruptly with the Emergencies. But two members of the Kenya Legislative Council felt encouraged to fly to Salisbury and lobby Welensky on such matters. One of them, Group-Captain Howard-Williams, also called on a curious figure called Mr. David Blackman, the owner of a native trading store, who had recently formed a European National Congress to "get publicity overseas for the white man's point of view". All this was "lunatic fringe" behaviour, but it needlessly increased the hostility of Kenya Africans to the Governments of Central Africa. Since Tom Mboya soon afterwards became chairman of the Accra Conference and helped to set the tone of the Conference's policy towards Central Africa, Welensky's Nairobi speech had a boomerang effect.

While these white extremists were being unnecessarily encouraged by Welensky, Africans were being gratuitously antagonised by him. During the Federal Election campaign he traded punches with an African audience about the franchise:

"In my opinion, adult suffrage is rubbish and completely unsuitable for Africa," he said. "I don't believe adult suffrage has made any contribution to Great Britain's greatness. It is significant that you can almost date the time when adult suffrage was introduced in Great Britain from the deterioration in the standard of politics there."

This argument against adult suffrage would have carried more weight with Africans if the federal franchise had excluded a considerable number of Europeans as well as the vast majority of Africans. But the Rhodesian franchise amounted to universal adult suffrage for whites, and at least two-fifths of those white voters would in Britain belong to the class whose enfranchisement (according to Welensky) had brought the lowering of British standards of politics. When Africans heard Welensky say this, and read in Greenfield's election address that:

"The UFP has laid the foundations of the Federation firmly. All the essential legislation, including a fair and reasonable Electoral Act on the dual roll system, has been passed,"

the prospect of adult suffrage naturally gained in appeal for them.

A final blow was given to African hopes of fair treatment by a remark of Julian Amery in the Commons on February 25th 1959. Perhaps Amery did not even realise that he was inflicting a blow, so sensitive had African leaders become to possible innuendoes in their interpretation of Ministerial statements. Amery, as Under-Secretary for the Colonies, was asked to declare that the British Government would stand by its pledges to protect the African peoples in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Instead, Amery put his declaration in the past tense, and said:

"Her Majesty's Government have never departed from their pledges given at the time Federation was introduced."

Africans, reviewing the British Government's past record, including the approval of the Constitution Amendment and the Electoral Bills, could see in this statement no guarantee of protection in the future. Because Amery avoided saying that Britain intended to keep her pledges over the period of

the 1960 Conference, Nyasa leaders could only conclude that Britain was under strong pressure from the Federal Government over Nyasaland, pressure which the British (and Nyasaland) Governments would not promise to withstand. A mood of utter frustration and despair descended on Dr. Banda and his close followers in the week before they were arrested.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

### “Not Even a Glass Broken. . . .”

Lord Malvern, summing up a month that had seen three Congresses proscribed, some two thousand Congressmen arrested, fifty-two men and women shot dead in Nyasaland and the harshest of “security” legislation introduced in Southern Rhodesia, told a group of young white would-be politicians in Bulawayo in April 1959:

“It is a very good thing the balloon went up in Nyasaland. It would have been a lot worse if it had been two or three years hence. It has caused the European to do some hard thinking. . . .”

What good *has* come out of the Nyasaland disturbances? Malvern wisely refrained from elaborating his thought. Good has come, but not in the way he would have suggested. Nyasaland Africans have made their protest widely heard for the first time in Britain: they have prevented the British Government from granting Dominion status to the Federation at the earliest opportunity, from delivering the control of African affairs in the northern territories into the hands of Welensky's Federal Government.

These are the effects of the Emergencies on the policy of the British Government. In Central Africa, however, the net effect is anything but good. When the governments speak of “law and order being re-established” and “widespread relief being felt among the ordinary Africans that the agitators who intimidated them have been put away”, they are deluding themselves. Certainly, law and order were re-established by punitive expeditions: but how long will they remain

established without a permanent show of force if substantial reforms are not enacted? A number of Africans were intimidated by Congress, and a very few expressed relief at the arrest, but theirs is nothing to the relief which would be felt by Africans if the laws discriminating against them on grounds of colour were swept away. Unless that happens, disturbances worse than any Nyasaland has yet seen are bound to recur sooner rather than later.

The pity is that the Emergencies did not, *pace* Lord Malvern, cause many Europeans "to do some hard thinking". A few hundred liberals, now mostly members of the Central Africa Party, were shocked into realising that radical reforms in agriculture, industry and education must come (in Todd's phrase) "in a matter of weeks, not of months". But no government showed any sign of having absorbed this. The chance of setting a new course was open for a few weeks to the British, Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments. It would have been possible to create a mood for the acceptance of new ideas among white Rhodesians while they were still shocked by the riots and facing the raw realities. But there was no politician great enough for the occasion. In Southern Rhodesia the weeks were spent debating and passing repressive legislation, compared with which the few "liberal" measures were poor sops. In Nyasaland the administration made its first priority the task of re-establishing order and assembling evidence of the "massacre plot"; the new interim constitution, announced five months later, was a ludicrous affair, and the four Africans nominated to Legislative Council were inevitably dubbed "stooges". The Federal Government made a cautious attempt to deal with the problem of African advancement on Rhodesia Railways, but ran into stubborn opposition from white union leaders. The main conclusion that Welensky seemed to draw from the Emergency was that the Federal Government should have its own police force. Finally, the chance to rise above racial considerations and to

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show statesmanship passed away. The governments had given no example of “hard thinking”. Why should the ordinary European do any for himself? Most lapsed back into complacency. Those who thought a firm hand more effective than an open hand were emboldened.

The declaration of a State of Emergency in Southern Rhodesia came like a thunderclap. As one of the released detainees described it months later, “There had not been even a glass broken”. On February 20th troops had been sent from the Rhodesias to Nyasaland; on the 23rd territorials were called up in Southern Rhodesia, some of whom were sent to Kariba where Africans had gone on strike after eighteen workers had been killed by the collapse of a platform in a deep tunnel. Then, on the 26th, instead of the 8 a.m. news from London, Southern Rhodesians heard the voice of Sir Edgar Whitehead saying:

“. . . and whereas it appears to me that action is immediately threatened by certain persons in various parts of the Federation of such a nature and on so extensive a scale as to be likely to endanger the public safety or to disturb or interfere with public order or to interfere with the maintenance of certain services in the Colony; now therefore, under and by virtue of the powers vested in me, I do hereby declare that a state of emergency exists in the Colony. God save the Queen.”

He was frank about his hasty use of powers:

“It is a very ancient tradition of the British people that Governments should defer action against subversive movements until actual rioting or bloodshed has occurred. My Government does not subscribe to that tradition. As soon as it became evident that normal methods could not check the mischief, preparations were under way for the measures that are being taken today. I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that the security forces have always been a little in advance of the subversive elements in Southern Rhodesia.”

Africans and others could be forgiven for thinking that, in this case, he was so far in advance of subversive elements that he would have a hard case to prove that there had been any at all. But since none of the 495 detainees was to be given a public trial, and the tribunal, set up to review individual cases, would not be obliged to publish its findings, Whitehead did not have to prove his case with facts.

However, that same afternoon, he gave the Assembly his reasons. Congress, "a comparatively innocuous body to begin with," had made "a very determined and set attack upon the Land Husbandry Act", which developed into a campaign against the Native Commissioners, land development officers and Africans administering the Act, and finally into showing "disrespect to the chiefs". It became evident, said Sir Edgar, that, "unless some effective measures were taken to stop the many deliberate lies that were being told . . . the whole administration of the Native areas would break down". If he tightened up the existing security legislation, "what we would really be doing would be to diminish the liberties of all the inhabitants of all races in this country in order to try to check the activities of a body of agitators . . . a maximum of five hundred people". That was why the Government had decided to impose detention regulations and now proposed to introduce "a measure on a more permanent basis which will enable the Government to prevent a small body of irresponsible people from interfering with the economy, the happiness and the liberty of all the other people of all races in the country". He added that the Cabinet had approved the preparation of such a plan at least two months earlier. He did not, in the course of a lengthy speech, mention Nyasaland once.

Clearly what had happened was that the Cabinet had originally planned a more limited round-up, probably of about a hundred Congress leaders. Nyandoro had already been sentenced to seven months' imprisonment, but was free

on bail pending an appeal; Chikerema was about to be convicted under the Public Order Act. These leaders had not, as Whitehead suggested, found a loophole in the Act; the unwonted leniency of the Government in allowing Nyandoro bail was due to fear that his imprisonment might precipitate widespread trouble. It was therefore planned to detain the Congress leaders who might stir up trouble if Nyandoro alone was jailed. When the situation in Nyasaland reached boiling-point, the list of those to be detained was hastily enlarged.

Because of this haste, appalling injustices were done. The lists included men who had never joined Congress, even men who had resigned from Congress and were now members of the UFP, like Isiah Gowera, a well-known Rusape businessman. Moses Makone, a cobbler from Mabvuku townships and former chairman of his local URP branch, was detained in mistake for one Savanhu Makoni. Both Gowera and Makone were kept in prison for more than a month before the mistakes were acknowledged, and then released without indemnity.

The same inefficiency, due to ignorance, was shown in the case of Guy Clutton-Brock. Guy and Molly had left St. Faith's Farm and were near to final agreement about starting a similar venture for Tshekedi Khama in Bechuanaland. They were on holiday in the Matopos Hills beyond Bulawayo when Guy was arrested, the only white man to be detained. In Guy's words:

“My wife and I . . . had joined the African National Congress because it was the people's movement and its policy was non-racial, liberal and democratic. To build a strong bridge, where the gulf is wide, means committal for some to the depths of the stream. . . .\* My interrogation by overworked but courteous security officers, who were

\* A phrase reminiscent of the comment on Abraham Lincoln by the editor of the *Wisconsin Pinery*: “He looks as if he was made for wading in deep water”.

anxious to penetrate the vagaries of truth, revealed that I was suspected of being a deep and sinister influence underlying the Congresses in all three territories; it was hard for them to discern the motives of all those whose ways had lain with the more despised and rejected of men. So remote they were, it was hard for them to know what moves all African people. So to Salisbury jail I went, there to be treated well while, as with many others in my position, my wife and daughter remained outside to discover countless friends unknown before.

"I sat in the cell and pondered on what the future held for a country with a Government so muddled in its motives, so scanty in its knowledge of its people. It did not last long; after twenty-six days I was released not knowing why. Had my friends made a fuss? Was Government moved to compassion? Or was I innocent after all? Four hundred remained inside, three-quarters of them gradually to be let out later. They came out stronger than they went in: they had suffered for a cause."\*

Guy is charitable towards the Southern Rhodesian Government. He was released because he speedily became the Government's chief embarrassment: he was patently innocent of any crime of subversion, his story led to articles in the overseas press, and questions were being asked about his status in the Lords and the Commons. But before he was released, the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments sent representatives to the prison to try to make him accept conditions which would have amounted to an implicit confession of misbehaviour: to give up his Southern Rhodesian citizenship, to leave the country permanently and to promise never to take part in Rhodesian politics again. He refused these conditions flatly, knowing that this refusal could result in five years' detention without trial. As it happened he was soon afterwards released unconditionally. At a press conference held after his release he described himself as a "sleeping member" of Congress, before going on to say that Congress had never

\* From *Dawn in Nyasaland* by Guy Clutton-Brock: Hodder.

done anything which he believed to contradict its principles. The *Rhodesia Herald* seized on the phrase “sleeping member” to insinuate that Clutton-Brock had not known what was going on in Congress, and that he had been the dupe of a subversive organisation. Thus the Government’s injustice in arresting him was partially covered up. But among Africans the arrest and imprisonment of such an eminently good man left deep resentment. Months later, the Mashonaland Diocesan Standing Committee took its cue from the Government and reorganised St. Faith’s Farm by dismissing John Mutasa. Many other colleagues of Clutton-Brock’s left, and the reputation of St. Faith’s as a liberal stronghold seemed to have been finally extinguished.

It became clear that the scale of intimidation had been exaggerated by Whitehead. At first he claimed that there was *widespread relief among Africans at the arrests, and that he had received many letters of appreciation*. Later, the number of these letters was given as fifteen. What was not announced was that he had also received a delegation from five leading Africans—the barrister Herbert Chitepo, the journalists Stanlake Samkange and Enoch Dumbutshena, and the country’s two African doctors, Dr. Parirenyatwa and Dr. Pswarayi, who protested that they, with many others who subscribed to the principles of Congress, did not believe that Congress had done anything to deserve proscription and warned Sir Edgar that repressive policies would only lead the country into ruin. Whitehead heard them courteously. He told them that he had been forced to detain leading Congressmen before the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill was enacted, for fear that Congress would gain control of the trade unions.\* He further assured them that Africans would have another chance to organise politically—inside European-led parties—and that he would set up United Federal Party branches in all the townships.

\* A point of view discussed in Chapter 9.

The African leaders came away sceptical about the Premier's political realism. And just how unrealistic Whitehead had been was quickly demonstrated. The following Saturday he sent a recruiting team of M.P.s—Dr. Burrows, Mrs. Muriel Rosin and Chad Chipunza—to Highfield. A large crowd of Africans gathered, having been told by Chipunza from a loud-speaker van that they would learn more about the Emergency. But when it became clear that the M.P.s had come, not to tell the Africans why their husbands and brothers had been arrested, but what a fine, progressive party the UFP was and to urge them to join it, the crowd lost patience, shouted the speakers down, watched them depart hurriedly, and then vented their frustration on a political friend of Chipunza's, a trader called Chanetsa. They threw stones at his store, and one stone hit his aged mother. The Rhodesian press showed anger at this violence against an old woman, but gave no hint of understanding the frustration which had caused it.

Whitehead was soon deeply involved in the passing of a series of six laws to tighten up security legislation (his earlier promise of "a measure on a more permanent basis" was multiplied). In severity they surpassed any law known in South Africa, although the *Central African Examiner*, which had swung round to become "the Government's principal spokesman" (in the phrase of Pendennis in the *Observer*), made the astonishing claim in a headline: "Most Other States Have Similar Laws". The article underneath hardly substantiated the claim: it quoted only war-time Britain and present-day Ghana, and then admitted that "the Preventive Detention Bill, in the form originally proposed, would have gone further than similar measures in either Ghana or South Africa". No other countries were mentioned, until in the last paragraph the author, who had readily agreed that Sir Edgar "has presented a good case for the five years' duration of the Emergency Bills", contrived to wonder whether

“one year might be better. In Malaya, where there was for some time open warfare, the Emergency regulations had to be renewed every three months. Five years is longer than the expected life of the Southern Rhodesian Parliament. The next Government might be well to the right of the present one.”

The mildness of the reservations held by the *Examiner* about these laws was not shared by white liberals and Africans. They were aghast at the severity of them. The Unlawful Organisations Act 1959 gave the Government power to declare any organisation to be unlawful at its own broad discretion—for instance, “if it appears that any of the members of such an organisation are likely to raise disaffection among the inhabitants of the Colony or to promote feelings of ill-will or hostility between different races or classes or between different sections of the community”. The Act proscribed the four African National Congresses of Central Africa and the ANC of South Africa, which had not then been declared unlawful in its own country. The penalty for taking any part in such organisations might be as much as five years’ imprisonment and a £1000 fine. The Act empowered a police sergeant to search without warrant and to imprison without bringing a charge.

Nor did the Government assume these wide powers without intending to use them to the full. René MacColl, of the *Daily Express*, reported the case of an African who was sentenced to nine months’ hard labour for merely uttering the word “*Ufuru*” (Freedom) at a public meeting near Salisbury seven months after the Act in October 1959. The African had offended the clause which makes a criminal out of

“any person who carries or displays anything whatsoever or shouts or utters any slogan or makes any sign indicating that he is or was an office-bearer, officer or member of or in any way associated with an unlawful organisation.”

Originally there was also an obnoxious clause for “pre-

sumption of guilt" on the unsupported allegation that a person was a member of Congress. The Salisbury Bar objected that this "could lead to very serious injustice" and the section was removed from the Bill. But guilt is still presumed "if any books, accounts, writings, papers, documents, banners of insignia of or relating to an unlawful organisation" are found in anyone's possession. This clause, and indeed most sections of the Act, were extracted from South Africa's Suppression of Communism Act. Dr. Ahrn Palley, a Dominion Party M.P. and lawyer who had arrived in Rhodesia from South Africa only three years earlier, commented on this point and added:

"It is an extraordinary surprise to me that a government that puts its faith in partnership . . . should go to those governments which in fact practise *apartheid* for the source of its legislation."

Dr. Palley, urged by an abiding reverence for parliamentary government, was the only M.P. openly critical of the dictatorial powers the Assembly was voting for itself. He declared that the laws which the Government already possessed were sufficient to maintain order, a view held by several other lawyers in Southern Rhodesia who believed that the Government had in the past bungled its prosecutions and prosecuted on inadequate grounds. Dr. Palley shortly afterwards resigned from the Dominion Party and sat as an Independent without friends or allies in the House.

A final blow to liberals was the fact that the validity of the Unlawful Organisations Act could not be tested in a court of law. The Anglican Archbishop called the Bill an "echo of the Hitler régime", and Mr. Todd warned that it would bring Southern Rhodesia into contempt with other Commonwealth members. His sorrowful prophecy was soon realised.

The first Preventive Detention Bill was so fierce that even the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent spoke of "Star Chamber legislation". It began with an extraordinary Preamble,

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reminiscent of a mediaeval rigmarole for the exorcism of witches, which stated that the members of

“certain organisations . . . have wickedly and maliciously embarked upon a campaign for usurping the functions of government, have resorted to various dishonest and seditious practices and have assembled meetings or gatherings of ignorant and unwary people, wilfully misrepresented facts, sown seeds of discord and racial hostility, excited disaffection towards established authority, urged civil disobedience and passive resistance to the law of the Colony.”

Sir Edgar, after confessing “I rather like these expressions”, explained that the idea of a Preamble was copied from “a lot of the older legislation in the United Kingdom . . . they always had a lengthy Preamble, so that the courts could see what the Bill was designed to stop and to control”. This explanation was scarcely logical, since the Rhodesian courts could play no part in administering the Act: the only court involved would be a review tribunal set up by the Minister of Justice. This Preamble was finally dropped from the Preventive Detention Bill but survives in the Unlawful Organisations Act.

Under the Preventive Detention Act, any person may be detained “during the Governor’s pleasure” if it appears to the Governor that he

“(a) has been concerned in any of the activities which, or has been associated with or has supported, directly or indirectly, any of the activities of any organisation which led to the state of emergency; or

“(b) is concerned in any activities which in the opinion of the Governor are potentially dangerous to public safety or public order to such an extent that the continuance thereof might necessitate the declaration of a state of emergency under the Public Order Act 1955.”

Since the Governor of Southern Rhodesia is little more than a social figure-head and by tradition avoids political con-

troversy, this section—with its all-embracing words like ‘indirectly’, ‘potentially’ and ‘might necessitate’—placed the widest possible powers in the Government’s hands. It turned Southern Rhodesia into a police state, and made any opponent of the Government liable to imprisonment for at least five years, the agreed duration of the Act. Any Congress member (and there were said to be three thousand in Sipolilo Reserve alone) could be jailed for five years. Anyone on friendly terms with Congress leaders—including lawyers, journalists and social workers—could be detained. Anyone who had shown the slightest sympathy with Congress principles was in danger.

The Act might have been more defensible if detainees had been allowed a public trial, but both the discarded first Preventive Detention Bill and the second enacted Bill rejected this possibility. The first Bill provided for a Special Committee of five Southern Rhodesian M.P.s to review the cases of detainees in secret session. The detainee did not need to be given a hearing before such a tribunal; no provision was made for a lawyer to plead his case; the Minister of Justice could withhold any information he wished from the Special Committee “in the public interest”; and the evidence taken by the Committee was not to be published. It would be hard to conceive of a more thorough curtailment of the liberties of the citizen.

The Minister of Justice, Mr. Reginald Knight (on whose political wisdom friends comment tactfully: “He’s a good lawyer”), defended the setting up of a Special Committee thus:

“Perhaps it is unique, but hon. members will be aware that Parliament was originally known as the High Court of Parliament, and that this residual function is still maintained. . . . It might be thought, why should not the normal approach to the courts be allowed? But it is felt here that what is really involved in the issue is a matter of an executive act of Government.”

He quoted in support the case of Liversedge and Anderson, a precedent for detention without trial taken from the case-history of Britain's war-time Regulation 18(b).

A weekend intervened before the Bill's Second Reading debate. During it sharp protests were heard. The Salisbury Bar Council called the Bill

“a serious encroachment on the rule of law which cannot be justified in time of peace. . . . Preventive detention is objectionable in principle in that detention is based not on the detainees having committed any defined offence but simply on the Governor's—that is, the Cabinet's—view of what is necessary in the public interest. The existence throughout the country of a network of Government espionage, armed with and ready to use these powers at a moment's notice, creates an atmosphere of fear and suspicion. There is an ever-present danger that great injustice may be caused by anonymous denunciations used as a means of paying off private grudges. The abrogation of the rule of law by this Bill could only be justified by the premise that the Colony is in a state of war.”

Whitehead received another protest signed by nearly every member of the University staff, and the church leaders, headed by two archbishops, wrote complaining that detention without trial was “a violation of established principles and liable to grave injustice”. The Argus group newspapers were shocked into opposition, and the *Chronicle* of Bulawayo was particularly forceful in denunciation.

On the Monday evening Whitehead announced over the radio that the Bill had been withdrawn, and that a modified Bill would be introduced the following day.

By this second Preventive Detention Bill, which became law, the Government replaced the Special Committee of five M.P.s with a Review Tribunal of a High Court judge, a magistrate and a Native Commissioner; but this did nothing to answer the criticisms of the first Bill. The Tribunal was to operate in the same secretive manner as the Special Com-

mittee. If a detainee appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence, he could be cross-examined under oath by the Minister's representative, but neither he nor his advocate (if he could afford one) was allowed to cross-examine the Minister's representative or his witnesses. Indeed, the Minister might direct "on grounds of public policy" that the evidence of any witness might be given to the Tribunal in the absence of the detainee and his representative. The Minister reserved the power "to accept or reject the recommendations of the Tribunal" through the Governor without giving his reasons, except to M.P.s in secret. The secrecy of the Tribunal proceedings was finally safeguarded by a section making anyone who "directly or indirectly discloses anything that has taken place at any proceedings of the 'Tribunal'" liable to seven years' imprisonment. The Tribunal, in fact, behind a semi-respectable façade, was an instrument of Government policy.

The liberal opposition was caught off balance. Having fancied that they had won a victory by forcing the withdrawal of the first Bill, they were unprepared to muster quick protests against the second Bill. Only the small group of "Black Sash" women continued to stand in silent mourning round the Legislative Assembly, doing their dignified best to shame the M.P.s who hurried past them, heads lowered, to pass such laws "in the public interest".

The Act laid down that the proceedings of the Review Tribunal "shall not be published". But the report of the Beadle Tribunal was unexpectedly published in August. The purpose was almost certainly to rally those white Rhodesians whose belief in the rightness of the Government's actions had been momentarily shaken by the Devlin Report. One of Whitehead's backbenchers, Mr. Harry Pichanick, explained that:

"the findings of this [Beadle] Commission have brought

out something that another [the Devlin] Commission could never find out. . . . They understand the mentality of the African, but people who come from overseas, no matter how long they stay, can never really get to the back of their minds the mentality of the African.”

The Beadle Report is a thirty-two-page account of why three men concluded that the Southern Rhodesian Government was right in condemning Congress as a subversive organisation. The evidence they quote is extremely skimpy. They examine (and find proved) eleven allegations of Congress intentions, of which “the over-riding object” was to “excite disaffection towards the Constitution with the object of altering the Constitution by unlawful means”. To support this allegation they produce the following “excerpt from the evidence of a secret witness”, which purports to be an account of a conversation with an unidentified Congress leader. The Congress leader is supposed to have told the witness:

“We are going to start the trouble from one place to the other, one at a time, so that when the Government sends soldiers to Northern Rhodesia there is another one in Nyasaland and automatically another one again in Southern Rhodesia in Salisbury, then another at Bulawayo, then Umtali, Fort Victoria and in all the reserves, and when all places are making trouble we can then see how the Government is going to deal with it. While the Government is busy distributing its troops all over the country, we can then occupy some Government offices and buildings in Salisbury, Umtali and Bulawayo and so on, thus taking the Government into our hands. Every person will be making trouble so much that the Europeans will run away from their buildings and then we can occupy them. All our men will hold the positions while our women will do the protesting to the Government that we want our country back. . . . When Nkomo comes back, our people will have to buy enough food to last a long time during the strike. All of us will then decide to die at that time and the Europeans can decide to do what they like with their guns on us.”

## CENTRAL AFRICAN EMERGENCY

To treat this alleged conversation as prime evidence of a plan for concerted violence is ludicrous. To start with, it is thoroughly self-contradictory: at one moment there is talk of taking over Government by occupying buildings, and at the next of sending women to protest to the ex-Government "that we want our country back"; anyway, why plan to buy up food stocks when everyone is determined to die? The Beadle Tribunal believed that "plans had not yet advanced beyond the discussion stage", and that "the declaration of a state of emergency in the Colony may well have nipped in the bud any plan for co-ordinated action". On the evidence they offer, no feasible plan was even being discussed.

Of course, there were wild statements made by Congress leaders. Some were simply abusive, like the generalisation of James Mzillah that "All ministers of religion are thieves". Some were schoolboyishly mysterious, like the promise of Daniel Madzimbamuto that "Nkomo would press a button and start anything that was necessary; Nkomo would direct operations from somewhere in the bush". Some had a Gandhian, sacrificial note, like the exhortation by David Munyoro: "Do not fear to be arrested. Jail is our paradise." And George Nyandoro had threatened to empty the churches by setting up a purely African church and drawing the congregations away, unless the church leaders "joined hands with Congress". But what does all this add up to? The Beadle Tribunal arrived at this answer to the sum:

"These statements each taken individually might appear little more than the type of extravagant statements often made by turbulent politicians . . . but repeated time after time and fitted into the pattern of Congress activities, as revealed by the secret evidence, they have definite probative value."

The Tribunal failed to prove the Government's case to any dispassionate observer. All that was proved was that there were widespread dissatisfaction and frustration among

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Southern Rhodesian Africans; that Congress leaders, by showing skill at organisation and by making vague promises and by fighting at law for their people's rights, had begun to channel these into support for their movement; and that they had also engaged in tentative talks with the Congress leaders of other territories about co-ordination of general policies. But the determination of the Mashona-Matabele to struggle violently for what they see as their rights is questioned by one leading member of their tribe, who speaks with Congress sympathies. He is a man who has come to admire the Nyasas for their single-minded determination to gain independence, and sadly admits that his own people are not like the Nyasas. “The Matabele are too conservative, and the Mashona are too materialistic,” he says. There is no doubt in his mind that the Southern Rhodesian Congress had made no plans for widespread violence; he does not even believe that there could have been any spontaneous “people's movement”, as in Hungary. Thus, the Beadle Report strikes him as a laughable document.

When Whitehead gave his reasons for declaring the state of Emergency, one of his backbenchers, John Pittman, sounded a note of self-criticism not often heard in the Assembly. (Pittman is in many ways unusual in that company: a barrister who is surrounded by liberal influences at the Bar, he was once a member of the Inter-racial Association and, alone of M.P.s took the trouble to go and hear John Stonehouse's controversial speech to Congress at Highfield.) Having assured the House that “I naturally agree wholeheartedly with the steps taken by the hon. Prime Minister. He has acted with wisdom and discretion in this unhappy matter”, Pittman added quietly:

“We must accept that at least some of the grievances which Congress have been able to exploit so successfully and so dangerously must have some foundation in fact, and . . .

the best service that we as Members of this House can do to the country is to examine with open minds the whole course of relationships between black and white in this country over the last few years and to ask ourselves honestly whether we believe that we have done all we can to remove any genuine grievances that exist in the African population and whether we will attempt to do so in the future."

His line of thought was not pursued by many subsequent speakers.

There were, however, a number of Bills passed soon after the Emergency which were well publicised as positive moves towards partnership. The Federal Government abolished separate entrances to post offices, and appointed Savanhu a junior minister. The Southern Rhodesian Government passed the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill permitting the creation of multi-racial trade unions, and another law allowing Africans to buy lottery tickets.\* Sceptics termed all this either "panic legislation" or "window-dressing for the overseas public", and were partly justified. The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Bill had been inspired by Todd and had been many years in the drafting, but would probably not have been allowed such a smooth final passage if there had been no Emergency to urge M.P.s into action. Savanhu's appointment and the post office legislation were more impressive to overseas observers than to Africans. The opening of civil service grades to Africans was debated, but legislation was not pressed through; in this matter Southern Rhodesia has lagged behind the other three Governments in Central Africa. Generally, the wall of segregation still stood formidably firm.

Garfield Todd was not impressed by this legislation. He held a meeting in Salisbury in March to which six thousand Africans travelled a dozen miles from their townships. At a

\* Within a few months, two Africans had won the top prize of £30,000; this fortunate win turned them into "civilised" persons, able to register as voters. A curious example of tropical chemistry.

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time when Welensky was speaking without urgency about the need to remove social “pinpricks”, Todd called for a “massive and immediate” ending of the colour bar in the Government sphere. It was an amazing and heartening evening. Crowds waited patiently for hours outside the Athenaeum Hall while Todd spoke to three relays of audiences. His was the first positive and hopeful voice raised in a month of negative malice and fear.

What he said to his audiences was hardly new. He confessed that he had not done enough when he was Premier; he said that he loved the country and trusted its Africans, that its potential was so rich that no European need ever fear African economic competition, and that in a few years it could achieve a standard of living as high as that of New Zealand. Rolling up his sleeves and leaving the microphones far behind him, he urged that the country must plan advances in weeks, not in months. He inspired confidence by echoing Franklin Roosevelt’s words: “There’s nothing to fear but fear itself”, and trust, paradoxically, by confessing to selfish motives in wanting to share all the possibilities of Rhodesia and realising that this could only be done by implementing partnership without delay.

After the meeting I ferried back some Africans to the townships and I asked one car-load why they had walked so many miles to hear a politician who had lost all political power. “Because we wanted to be made happy,” one answered for the rest.

Five African Federal M.P.s took a different view of Todd’s meeting. With four white colleagues they issued a strange statement:

“At this critical stage, Mr. Garfield Todd has seen fit to make extremely provocative statements advocating measures of African advancement which he himself did nothing to implement during the four years in which he was Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. . . . Africans in

Southern Rhodesia were very nearly unanimous in applauding the Government's action in removing Congress intimidators and extortionists who made it nearly impossible to live normal peaceful lives. We feel that Mr. Todd's attacks at this time on the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments are calculated only to introduce confusion and doubt in the minds of the people."

If the nine M.P.s had been abroad in the streets of Salisbury that night, they would have found six thousand Africans to disprove their arithmetic of applause.

How could the Government have deluded itself so far as to believe its actions were being applauded? The staggering suddenness of the Emergency and the arrests had bewildered Africans, but their sullen quietness could have been taken for acquiescence only by someone determined to believe his own propaganda. Suspicion of informers and fear of more arrests inhibited protest. Only one African woman was brave enough to stand with the whites when the "Black Sash" group lined the Parliament buildings. Two of the five leading Africans who had gone in protest to Whitehead were approached by young men who said they had been sent from Mabvuku township to start a new Congress-type party; when they investigated this through friends, they found that the mysterious youths were unknown in Mabvuku and concluded—such was the mood of fear—that this had been a police trick to incriminate them.

Nevertheless, the five leaders went back to Whitehead to ask him not to press through three other measures of "security" legislation until Africans had had time to discuss the measures and make representations. Whitehead agreed, but never implemented his promise. The Public Order Amendment Act, the Native Affairs Amendment Act and the Native Land Husbandry Act were introduced and passed swiftly into law, each of them diminishing the liberties of Africans.

The Native Affairs Amendment Act provides that:

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“Any Native who is insolent to, guilty of contemptuous behaviour towards, or makes any statement or does anything whatsoever which is likely to undermine the authority of any officer of the Government of the Colony or of the Federation or to bring such officer or any such Government department or any chief or headman into disrepute or contempt shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds or to imprisonment not exceeding six months.”

Another section forbids anyone to

“hold, preside at or address any meeting, gathering or assembly at which twelve or more Natives are present at any one time in any reserve or tribal area without the permission in writing of the Native Commissioner.”

The penalty for holding an unauthorised meeting is a year's imprisonment. The Act only makes exceptions for a meeting held by a chief, an M.P. on parliamentary business, a minister of religion for *bona fide* religious purposes and a Government officer for administrative purposes.

The Public Order Amendment Act increases from one year to seven years the penalty for a group of political offences, and adds to the list of crimes those of “attempted intimidation” and of encouraging any kind of boycott. Press freedom is further limited by a penalty of up to five years' imprisonment for anybody who

“makes or publishes any statement which is false in any material particular and is likely to encourage any person to do any act which may endanger the public safety, disturb or interfere with public order or interfere with the maintenance of essential services.”

Since no journalist is infallible and the reactions of readers are unpredictable, the chances of a political writer going to prison for five years are far from negligible.

The Native Land Husbandry Amendment Act 1959 stopped Africans bringing court cases to question the workings of the Native Land Husbandry Act 1951. By challenging the

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makes a weakening of the structure, and the cumulative effect can be very great indeed.”

This warning came none too soon from a distinguished fourth-generation Rhodesian. But for the next five years at least—the duration of these Acts—a form of totalitarianism appeared inevitable for many Africans. Khami prison, in the bush beyond Bulawayo, where the detainees were first held, symbolised the new order. Soldiers with fixed bayonets guarded the heavy main door. At the corners of the high wall, on sun-sheltered platforms, other soldiers sat behind Bren-guns staring out across the bleak scrub country for the surprise attack by a relief force of Matabele warriors which a fearful Government at first expected.

When I brought the wives of three detainees more than three hundred miles to Khami to see their husbands through grilles for a few minutes, they were turned away rudely by an official who avoided my eyes and said that he could allow no visitors on Sundays, and that he did not care if the Ministry of Law had told me in Salisbury that Sunday was a visiting day. On the way back to Bulawayo, the three wives were sad, not only for themselves but because they had given me the trouble of motoring six hundred miles to no avail. I could hardly credit their inexhaustible reserve of patience.

I should be surprised if that patience lasts much longer. The African women of Zeerust and Durban have given warning of what happens when patience is finally exhausted. Inside Khami the detainees read books on economics and staged a production of *Macbeth*. But ideas of freedom cannot be detained like men; assassination plots may not always remain on the stage. There is a lesson which the Southern Rhodesian Government can learn from Shakespeare: that women, when aroused, can be more ruthless than their husbands.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

### Devlin and Disillusion

It is tempting to write at length about the Nyasaland disturbances. They provided many of the classic story-book incidents of African rebellions—the lone white woman surrounded suddenly by a black mob, the district commissioner trying to outface a crowd for hours until force of personality had to give way to force of arms, a Governor loth to let his colony sink into turmoil but powerless to prevent it. . . . Further decorations, from undisclosed sources, were added by overseas journalists. Noel Barber, who never fails to find a sensational tale for his *Daily Mail* readers, described Congress as organised into killer-groups with clear instructions on the assassination of all Nyasaland's whites, and with drums ready everywhere to spread the news of Banda's arrest.

The Conservative Government finally lost the trust which Nyasas had put in it as their protector. When the memory of the incidents themselves becomes blurred, one fact will remain clear in African minds: that the British Government refused to accept the report of the Commission which it had appointed. The Earl of Perth had told the Lords on March 24th, when announcing the names of the Devlin Commissioners: "I do not doubt that, with such eminent men of such wide experience, we will get to the heart of things". The heart of things was, according to the Commission, a "deeply-rooted and almost universally held opposition to Federation" among Nyasas.

Lennox-Boyd had declared, on occasions almost beyond

number, that "Federation is here to stay", and, since Lyttelton's period as Colonial Secretary, the British Government had advertised Federation as a great experiment in partnership between black and white. In Devlin's words, it believed "that its failure might well be disastrous for the whole of the free world". Remote from African opinion, Conservatives could not accept the blow to their self-esteem contained in the proof that Federation had so far been a failure, and that their own lack of information was to blame. Lennox-Boyd had been busy with Cyprus, Kenya and Somaliland. Armitage, after the sad fiasco of his governorship of Cyprus, was anxious to send as few alarming dispatches as possible. Welensky and the white politicians, intent on Dominion status, had painted a picture of tranquil government and dismissed the signs of disturbance as "the work of a few agitators". Conservatives had been happy to accept this version and to disregard more disquieting evidence. Psychologically, they were not prepared to admit self-deception; while, tactically, they felt they could not confess to such an error of judgement only a few months before a General Election. If the Government had accepted the Devlin Report, they could hardly have resisted a call for the resignations of Lennox-Boyd and Armitage. It was not so much that Lennox-Boyd had irresponsibly told the Commons on March 3rd that a massacre was being planned and that his Under-Secretary, Julian Amery, had talked wildly of Mau Mau, a "blood bath", and a conspiracy to murder. The Report had concluded that the Nkata Bay tragedy was "the only clear case we have come across of a belief in the murder plot having a significant effect on the course of events", and the twenty Africans were shot dead at Nkata Bay a few hours before Lennox-Boyd spoke. It was rather that, if the Report were accepted, Lennox-Boyd and Armitage would have had to take responsibility for a larger failure. Public school traditions made Conservatives loyal to

a man whose long record as Colonial Secretary they had often proudly praised. On the day the Devlin Report was published, the *Daily Telegraph's* political correspondent accurately reflected the Conservative back-benchers' attitude:

"Mr. Lennox-Boyd, whose standing among his Cabinet colleagues has never been higher . . . is said to have been warmly received, apparently an assurance of sympathy and support."

Ingrained loyalty, the realisation that they would condemn themselves by sacrificing Lennox-Boyd, and a psychological resistance to the now plain truth that they had been fundamentally wrong about how Nyasaland could develop, all combined to produce reluctance to accept the Report. Some Conservatives calculated that there would be a time later for steering the Government's policies round towards the course which it was now clear must be followed, ignoring the danger that, in the interval, even worse harm could be done to Britain's reputation among Nyasas.

In deep sadness Sir Jock Campbell, head of Nyasaland's largest trading combine, wrote to *The Times* on July 25th:

"The Devlin Report, with its unprejudiced account of the tragic historical process in Nyasaland and with its candid judgement of Africans and Europeans, of Government and Congress, seemed to offer the foundation for the restoration of African confidence, and for building new understanding between all the peoples and leaders of Nyasaland.

"The report could have cleared the air. But if now, as appears from the Governor's reply to the report and your leading article today, the British and Nyasaland Governments are going to concentrate on proving that Africans were far wronger than the Devlin Commission judge, and Europeans far righter, what conceivable hope is there for the future?

"If African leaders are to be expected to learn from their mistakes, so should Europeans. That is what matters."

The chance to admit mistakes soon passed. Conservatives continued to pretend that the Nyasas had been misguided and misled. African tempers set in cold sullenness. The Government, which might have been acquitted of everything but stupidity, had now to be condemned for dishonour.

The grounds given for rejecting the Devlin Report were woefully trivial. There was righteous anger that a British colony had been dubbed "a police state", the phrase used by the Commission to explain why Congress supporters had been allowed to give secret evidence against their own people. The Governor protested that he had promised that there would be no prosecutions as a result of evidence given to the Commission; yet, since one man had been sentenced to three years' hard labour on the strength of the evidence which he gave at the Nkata Bay inquest, it was hard to convince others of this assurance. The notorious May 6th bulletin of the Nyasaland Information Department increased that fear. This inept publication was a British version of police state propaganda, appealing to Africans in these words:

"You can help in this task of bringing back peace. Do you know of any member of Congress living near you who has not yet been arrested? Do you know of any group of Congress members near you who are plotting to cause trouble? If you do, you must tell the Boma, so that these wicked people can be arrested and removed from your area. Tell your District Commissioner or your nearest Government Officer the names of any Congress member who you know has not yet been arrested. You can either report personally to a Government Officer or, if you prefer to remain anonymous, send an unsigned letter to your District Commissioner or Police Officer, giving the name and address of any Congress member still at large. (There is no need to put a stamp on the letter.) If you do this, you will be helping the Boma in the best way."

There was also the argument that the Devlin Commission had exceeded its terms of reference, which were to inquire into

the Nyasaland disturbances and "the events leading up to them". Lord Coleraine put this argument forcibly, and caused a storm in the House of Lords of which Lord Malvern might be proud, when he called the Report "irresponsible . . . almost unbelievably naïve . . . and remarkably disingenuous". He argued that the Commissioners were "intellectually dishonest" because, "having said that they are not going to offer judgements, they offer a moral judgement of a very damaging kind, while maintaining the fiction that they are not offering a judgement at all". A man of great intellectual honesty himself, Lord Coleraine could not forgive the Commissioners this fault. Nor could he understand that they were driven to it by the narrow terms of reference—narrower than those given to the Watson Commission, which had been asked to inquire "into the underlying causes" of the Gold Coast riots of 1948. Finding that the scope of its inquiry was continually widening, the Commission felt that it would be failing to offer (in Sir Jock Campbell's words) a proper "foundation for the restoration of progressive government", if the Report was restricted to the original terms.

The British Government would have liked the Report limited to three main conclusions: that Congress had been planning violence, that it was therefore necessary to declare an Emergency, and that Welensky had not cajoled Armitage into taking repressive action. The Commissioners agreed with the Government on these points (although they left a lingering doubt about the last in some people's minds), but they regarded them as of superficial interest and preferred, like Lord Perth, to "get to the heart of things".

In the tense atmosphere surrounding the publication of the Report, many newspapers made unworthy comments. The Report was treated like a bran-tub to be dipped into by leader-writers until they found something to their fancy. The *Daily Mail* persuaded itself that, because the Commission decided that the Governor was justified in declaring an Emergency on

March 3rd, this also justified the Government's course of action during the preceding months. The *Central African Examiner* refused to accept the Commission's view that "Dr. Banda would never have approved a policy of murder", tartly commenting: "Many responsible people who have . . . seen him in action at public meetings have no doubt at all that he is capable of approving such policies". The *Ghana Times* of Accra, a semi-official paper, went a stage further than any Labour journal and called for the resignation of Mr. Macmillan, "because the British Government stands condemned before the bar of world opinion". The Blantyre correspondent of *The Times* sent a sadly unimaginative piece:

"The Nyasaland Government now faces the problem of how it will retain the confidence of Africans once it becomes widely known that the Devlin Commission found no detailed plan for murder and assassination. . . ."

Lord Coleraine, wondering about the fate of the Devlin Report, thought that "it may go into a pigeonhole, but I fear that it will continue to poison relations between the two races . . . long after the occasion of it has been forgotten". It is not the Report itself—which the *Observer* termed "perhaps the best study in modern colonial politics ever written" and the *Daily Telegraph* "a thoughtful and humane State paper"—but the unworthy reception it received from some politicians and newspapers which will poison race relations for years. Judiciously, *The Economist* concluded: "The Government . . . is surely going to find that living with the Devlin Report is its own penance".

Like the British Government, Welensky would admit no error, either. Picking an audience of ex-servicemen in Ndola for the occasion, he explained:

"The most cogent lesson to be learned from the recent disturbances in Nyasaland is the need for adequate policing of the right sort, properly trained and with an effective intelligence service."

He had earlier described "this Congress plan" as "diabolic . . . it envisaged strikes, riots, real violence culminating in assassinations. . . ." In the rumour-filled atmosphere of Salisbury in March 1959, Welensky's private secretary, Stewart Parker, had been excited into spreading tales of "sensational evidence". The most memorable one alleged that secret massacre instructions had been discovered inside one of the hub-caps of Chipembere's car. Heads nodded, and the corners of mouths turned down.

Quick to see an advantage, and to know when to shift his ground, Welensky spoke out for the federalising of the police force. His hopes of swiftly gaining Dominion status had ended with the disturbances, but at least he could attempt to gather as many as possible of the strings of real power—the police, the civil service, the information departments—into the hands of the Federal Government against the day when the northern territories would have Africans in a majority in their legislatures.

Under Item 36 of the present constitution's Federal Legislative List, the Federal Government may establish a Federal police force "for service in the employment of, or use in, any territory at the request and under the operational control of the Governor of that territory in addition to, or in substitution for, the police force of that territory". Welensky is loth to spend Federal money on building up a police force which only the Governors, and not he, could control. In 1954 all the four governments agreed that nothing could be gained from establishing a Federal police force, and in 1958 the Chief Secretary (now the Governor) of Northern Rhodesia said that any new proposal to set up such a force would have an adverse effect on the morale of the territorial forces and would be strongly opposed by Africans.

Nevertheless, in June 1959 Welensky did some more "thinking aloud". He suggested that a Federal police force "might take the shape of a gendarmerie or some organisation

similar to that of the Canadian Mounted Police". Colonel A. S. Hickman, former Commissioner of the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia, followed up Welensky's remarks with an article in the *Central African Examiner* (15th August 1959), in which he said that he was opposed to a Federal police force on grounds of expense: "It seems unlikely that Federal police would be called in except for an emergency. Therefore they might remain chiefly on stand-by, which would hardly justify their separate existence." Instead, he suggested that a Federal Police Authority should be set up, with a liaison officer "maintaining goodwill between the three police forces and the Colonial Office". Later, when the northern territories had taken over control of their own police forces from the Colonial Office after self-government, a Federal Inspector of Constabulary could be appointed "to maintain desirable standards". This is the British system; Colonel Hickman also suggested that, as in Britain, the central government should pay half the costs of the different police forces.

To an administrator concerned with efficiency Colonel Hickman's scheme may seem sensible, but in the eyes of an African politician it is fraught with dangers. If the Federal Government pays half the costs of the territorial police, it will inevitably control the police to a large degree. Colonel Hickman stipulated that "the three police forces must retain their identity", but no African would agree that this would be feasible.

Welensky is certain to make the question of responsibility for law and order a main point for discussion at the 1960 constitutional talks. He may begin by asking for the complete federalising of the police force, citing the system in Nigeria in support and pleading that federalisation would remove the anomalies by which the Federal Minister of Defence may have to watch a political situation in one territory deteriorate to a state of riot before the Governor asks his help in restoring law

and order. If this argument does not win the day, he will probably ask for a Hickman form of federalisation. Members of a Conservative Government may agree to this system, attracted by its advantages in efficiency and economy.

Welensky is also likely to argue that the Federal Army would be in a better position to give Britain help in any operations in northern Africa or the Arab countries if the police force were reorganised along Hickman lines, in the hope that this argument will appeal to Conservative self-interest. If the Conservatives do agree to this they should realise that Africans in the northern territories will treat it as a final betrayal of their interests, for any measure of self-government gained will be a shadow if they are denied the substance of responsibility for law and order. Political psychologists propound the theory that you can only make governments responsible by giving them responsibility. To deny African governments in the northern territories responsibility for law and order would be the surest way of turning them towards irresponsible mischief-making.

The arrests of 1322 Congressmen in Nyasaland took more than two months. During that period the Nyasaland Government was concentrating on "the restoration of respect for law and order". Congress, said a Nyasaland Government policy statement in April,

"had clearly won the support of a large section of the African community through promises which could not be fulfilled and through various forms of intimidation. The Nyasaland Government sees as its first task the restoration of respect for the customary authorities and established agents of the Government, namely the recognised chiefs and headmen throughout the country."

The Devlin Commission was sceptical about the possibility of success for these time-honoured tactics in modern Nyasaland, on two grounds. First, chiefs would be placed in an

impossible position. "Even amongst the chiefs", says the Report, "many of whom are loyal to the Government and dislike Congress methods, we have not heard of a single one who is in favour of Federation." The Nyasaland Government has in public committed itself firmly to the present system of Federation, whatever private misgivings it may have. If its chiefs must also show public fervour, their chances of regaining the respect of the people are non-existent.

Secondly, the Commission suggests with great delicacy that the system of indirect rule through chiefs who are often uneducated is archaic, because the method of selection makes it impossible to predict, and so train, the successor. There is little room for the vigorous, educated younger man. There were five places for Africans in Legislative Council, but the Government was pained when the African Members proceeded to spend all their time harassing the Government and making propaganda speeches which turned *Hansard* into a best-seller among Nyasas. Government thought that they should have been quietly availing themselves of "their chance to learn how to run the estate which would some day be theirs". Instead, in the words of the Report, "they have behaved as though they were the opposition in a fully-fledged democracy. . . . But the forms of government and the attitude of the Government towards its subjects are still essentially paternal".

Although the Emergency had shown the growing splits in the political fabric, the Government did no more than patch them up. The date for a new constitution was delayed a further year, and a stop-gap plan, graced with the title "interim constitution", was introduced. Chipembere and Chiume forfeited their seats on Legislative Council, and the number of Africans on the Council was raised to seven by the Governor's nomination of four more. Africans were not as pleased at being given a majority of one over the European elected members as hoped. They maintained that the system

of nomination was retrogressive and that the four nominees—a retired bank clerk, a hospital assistant, a civil servant and a clergyman—were political nonentities. The bank clerk and the hospital assistant were also put on Executive Council.

Sir Robert Armitage surveyed his handiwork, and with unbelievable optimism told a correspondent of the *Sunday Times*: "That should provide a two-year lull in the most spectacular forms of political activity. I hope politics here can be kept to door-to-door canvassing." The *Guardian* did not share Sir Robert's complacency: "One might as well ask for a two-year lull in the flow of the Zambesi". Its gloom was justified within a few weeks. The nominated clergyman, the Rev. A. D. Kayira, resigned from Legislative Council after his manse had been burned down by Nyasas violently expressing their preference for free elections. Nor was quiet door-to-door canvassing used as the accepted method of enrolment when Orton Chirwa, soon after being released from detention as legal adviser to Congress, announced the formation of the Malawi Congress Party with the same aims of self-government and independence as the original Congress. The news spread like veld-fire, and Chirwa was able to claim a membership of 15,000 within a month and 100,000 within six months.

The Government also attempted salvage work by spending a large amount on expanding the police force. At the time of the Emergency, the strength of the Nyasaland police was equivalent to one in 1,400 of the total population; in both the Rhodesias the ratio was one policeman to every 700. These figures should not be contrasted without reservations: for instance, district messengers, based on the Boma, do an amount of quasi-police work in the northern territories, and the chiefs play a greater part in keeping order in rural Nyasaland than they do in the urban areas of the Rhodesias. Nevertheless, one immediate repercussion of the Emergency

was that £700,000 was put aside for increasing the police force in Nyasaland.

Another £400,000 was to be spent on improving airfields in the Northern Province. The Fort Hill airfield, owned by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Mines, had been captured by two hundred Congressmen who held it for eight days until the police motored down from Tanganyika to re-occupy it. The two hundred had behaved with great restraint; no harm was done to Mrs. James, the radio operator and only woman there, and the leader had even spent time hunting for her dog before taking her back to her house. However, the episode had been a blow to the Government's prestige, and this large sum was to be spent to avoid any possible repetition.

I remember the resentment of Nyasas in July 1958 when the new budget increased the provision for police by £79,000. "We want money put to education, not to police," they said. In 1958 the Nyasaland Government spent £909,000 on education (or fifteen per cent of the total budget), and now Nyasas feel bitter that an extra £1,100,000 is being spent on "internal security"—more than all that is spent on education. The Governor has one attractive excuse for this expenditure: that he is weakening the argument for federalising the police forces by strengthening the Nyasa police of his own accord. But this point is not appreciated by education-hungry Africans in Nyasaland, where schoolchildren took Higher School Certificate for the first time in 1959, in the new sixth form at Dedza secondary school.

Another lasting effect of the disturbances has been the changed relationship between Nyasas and the administration. Officials in Zomba had always seemed insulated by bureaucracy from the real life of Nyasaland. There had been annoyance that John Ingham should be designated Secretary for African Affairs ("as if we were one section of the people. We *are* the people"); and the point was conceded when his portfolio was altered to Local Government after the Emer-

gency began. But Nyasas had generally looked on District Officers and Commissioners as their helpers and trustees.

Much of that has gone. In many parts of Nyasaland the District Officers and Commissioners were seen beside police and troops from the Rhodesias in incidents where Nyasas were shot dead. It was their duty to be there; in most cases they had formally handed over control of the situation to police or army officers before anyone was killed. But this was a technical nicety too fine for the relative of the dead man.

The most notorious incident which embittered relations was the behaviour of the District Commissioner at Mlanje. Road blocks had been built by villagers, and some Indians' shops had been looted. By order of the D.C., thirty-eight houses were burnt on March 9th as a reprisal, eleven of them near road blocks and twenty-seven where looted property was said to have been found. The Devlin Commission reports that the D.C. admitted that he was aware he had no legal power to order the burnings, and that he did not satisfy himself personally that looted property had been found in any of the houses burnt or that they had harboured anyone who had built the road blocks. The Commission contrasts these burnings, carried out so peremptorily that the owners had no time to remove their property, with the way a veterinary surgeon's house was burnt by rioters at Kaseye in the Northern Province. There the gang of twenty Nyasas told him to remove his belongings, put them upwind of the house, and then informed him, "According to our law, you must be the first to set fire to your house". When he refused this unusual invitation, they fired it themselves and quietly dispersed.

The D.C. at Mlanje also imposed a collective fine of £8,734 to cover damage which he had assessed at £8,510 and which had been done by some two hundred people. The fine, which represented a month's wages for each man, was paid "surprisingly willingly", he recorded, by the 5,823 adult males in the district. He wrote: "My own view is that the levy on all

the people, whether guilty or not, will have the effect of making Nyasaland African Congress really unpopular". It is more likely that it made the D.C. really unpopular, and the Devlin Report suggests that the fines were paid swiftly as much from fear of reprisals as from acceptance of responsibility. The Provincial Commissioner mildly described the D.C.'s action in burning the houses as "not strictly in accordance with the rules". The D.C. was neither replaced, nor moved to another district, until nine months after these incidents.

The Mlanje incidents were the most striking, but the Devlin Report lists many instances where "unnecessary and therefore illegal force" was used in making arrests. The D.C. at Mzimba was responsible for an order to handcuff, truss and gag detainees on their way to prison. Among four who had to endure a 120-mile journey in this condition were a Presbyterian minister, the Rev. Henry Makwakwa, and a village headman. Another four detainees had a ten-hour ride trussed, and were continually thrown on their faces by jolting because they could not sit up properly. The Report deals fully with several similar incidents. To read of them is to realise why the Nyasas' old, perhaps child-like, acceptance of the Government as their protector has gone for ever. They grew up quickly and painfully, in a single month.

The Governor of Northern Rhodesia was in the fortunate position in March 1959 of being able to prevent threatened disturbances without having to declare a state of emergency. In 1956, he had had to declare one when the African Mineworkers Union had begun a series of "rolling strikes" in protest against the recognition by the mining companies of Godwin Lewanika's Mines African Staff Association. The sledge-hammer of emergency regulations had been used to end the strikes and to "rusticate" thirty-two union leaders to their villages. In consequence, next year the Emergency Powers Ordinance was amended to give the Governor powers

to imprison without trial or to restrict residence, if he was satisfied "that action has been taken, or is threatened, which is calculated to create or lead to a situation" in which he would have to declare an emergency.

Sir Arthur Benson waited until March 12th before taking action. Then, unwilling to risk the possibility of a fiasco at the territorial elections, if the 7617 Africans who had been coaxed into registering as voters were stopped from going to the polls because of intimidation by Zambia Congressmen, he proscribed the Zambia Congress, and had forty-five of its leaders arrested and rusticated. The elections were carried out on March 20th without incident.

He announced his Government's action in a radio broadcast, in which he melodramatically described Zambia's plans as:

"on all-fours with what happened to millions of law-abiding Americans when the comparatively few Chicago racketeers established their protection rackets, corrupted the local governments, ruled by the gun, the sap, the knuckle-duster, the bicycle chain, and went on to establish the organisation of killers which was known as 'Murder Incorporated'."

He added that "Government's information about this seditious organisation is very full and detailed".

He then appointed Mr. N. C. A. Ridley, Chairman of Committees to the Northern Rhodesian Government, to make a full inquiry "into all the circumstances which gave rise to the making of the Safeguard of Elections and Public Safety Regulations 1959". These were wider terms of reference than the Devlin Commission were given, although Mr. Ridley, as a civil servant, could not be expected to bring as independent a mind to his inquiry as Sir Patrick Devlin did. But within these limitations, Mr. Ridley worked conscientiously and fairly, and the evidence of the Ridley Report justifies the Governor's actions, if not his 'Murder Incorporated' analogy.

Ridley leaves some important questions unanswered, nevertheless. It is not clear how Zambia intended to stop Africans from voting: the most specific quotation from a Zambia leader's speech suggests that supporters were going to picket the polling booths and draw police fire on to the voters as well as on to themselves. Again, although Ridley recounts how Michael Mutale of Mpika recommended that informers should have their eyes gouged out, refers to fifty cases of arson and quotes the resolution of a Zambia meeting at Broken Hill to burn policemen with "inflammable liquid", other evidence which he accepts appears thin. For example, he cites, as major evidence of a conspiracy to corrupt the police, a statement by Ralph Kombe that "when the African policemen understand Zambia policy, they will throw their helmets away". Seditious circumlocutions by Zambia speakers are quoted—the favourite one being "you must hate anything white which moves with two legs"—as well as what must be the world's quaintest instructions to an arsonist: "Get a snail's shell, put fire therein, and after two days the house will catch fire." The effect of reading the Ridley Report is infinitely saddening: it leaves the reader with the impression of a people labouring under many grievances—some real and some imagined—but, unlike the Nyasas, seeing no clear way out of their troubles.

With a fairness lacking in the Beadle Report, Ridley allows some weight to the grievances mentioned by African witnesses: unnecessary removals from Crown land, colour discrimination in mining and railway jobs, resentment against Italian, Greek, and Portuguese immigrants taking good jobs from Africans, and the low price being paid for African-grown maize. But the greatest fears expressed by Zambia witnesses were of Federation and of the new territorial constitution. Zambia leaders were convinced that the new Legislative Council, with fourteen elected Europeans and eight elected Africans (who would in their view be "hand-picked" because

they were obliged to get the consent of the chiefs to stand as candidates), would vote in favour of Dominion status in 1960, and that this would influence the British Government to grant it. As in Nyasaland, the Congress leaders believed that they must "act or abdicate".

Ridley ended his list of recommendations with the suggestion that "the Government should examine the adequacy of its facilities for counteracting the effect of false and misleading information". He had listened to the Chief Information Officer, Christie Lawrence, complaining that funds for his department were so short that he was prevented from setting up a provincial information organisation in the Central Province, which includes Lusaka, the centre of Congress activities. Lawrence, who for two years fought beside Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia, has a deep respect for the innate strength of a people's movement. Under his influence, his department has followed an enlightened policy of sympathy with reasonable grievances, matched by alert skill in exposing the charlatans and self-seekers among African leaders. The difficulties he faced in carrying out this important job were greatly increased when his department's budget allocation was cut from £122,800 in 1957-8 to £87,000 in 1958-9. The removal of the African broadcasting service to the Federal field accounted for £23,000 of this, but he still had to run his normal services on a budget reduced by £12,800. Patrick Wall asked the Colonial Secretary questions in the Commons about this reduction, but received no satisfactory reply from Lennox-Boyd. Colonial Office policies of expenditure—starving the Northern Rhodesia Information Department of £12,800 and pouring nearly one hundred times that amount into extra "internal security" for Nyasaland—are strange indeed.

In his broadcast proscribing Zambia, Sir Arthur Benson was at pains to show that Harry Nkumbula was not a party to any plans of violence which might have been agreed upon

during the Accra Conference.\* Nkumbula, said Benson, "had disagreed with certain things and left before the conference had ended". This show of favour by the Governor did Nkumbula more harm than good. He was elected to the Legislative Council on March 20th by his Ba-Ila tribesmen, but outside his own area his following swiftly melted away. Some Africans dubbed him a "stooge", but his lieutenants turned against him because he was becoming the complete antithesis of the ascetic leader devoted entirely to his people's advancement—a figure well embodied by Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambia President. Kaunda was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment in June, for convening an unauthorised assembly. His secretary-general, Sipalo, was also sentenced for sedition. In their absence, Nkumbula in Legislative Council tried to regain African support by reverting to fiercer speeches: he called the new constitution "rotten" and declared that "the Africans of Northern Rhodesia do not accept the idea of a multi-racial government". But his days of popular leadership were over. In July Paul Kalichini, a Zambia leader who was released early from his area of rustication, formed the United National Independence Party. The UNIP carried the standard for Zambia in the same way as Orton Chirwa's Malawi Party carried it for the Nyasaland Congress and the National Democratic Party for the Southern Rhodesia Congress. As Nyasas waited for the release of Dr. Banda, so Northern Rhodesian Africans waited for Kaunda to return from prison. Any other leader could only be a temporary figurehead.

\* The Accra Conference, in fact, voted after long debate in favour of non-violent tactics. The declaration by Committee No. 1 stated: "Recognising that national independence can be gained by peaceful means in territories where democratic means are available, the conference guarantees its support to all forms of peaceful action. This support is pledged equally to those who, in order to meet the violent means by which they are subject and exploited, are obliged to retaliate." Benson chose to interpret this declaration as: "They said in effect that . . . they could use violence against any legitimate force used by the authorities against them. In other words, if it was impossible to achieve their aims without violence, then violence might be used."

PART IV

THE FUTURE

## A Plea for Flexibility

Britain—and white Rhodesians—have been fortunate in the way political events have turned out recently in Central Africa. The Nyasaland disturbances have given a sharp warning of the disastrous course on which their policies were set. Usually no warning is given: disaster just suddenly breaks. In Central Africa the opportunity to set a new course has been offered, and the need for one has been clearly shown. But it is still very doubtful whether the opportunity will be grasped.

There are those who refuse to admit the seriousness of the situation for the most short-sighted of motives. Typical of these was the editor of the *Nyasaland Times*, who greeted the publication of the Devlin Report with the lament:

“The sharp tone of the Report may set back the country’s return to peaceful conditions even further, and destroy any hope of outside investment in Nyasaland.”

Many Conservatives and many white Rhodesians belong to this “three monkeys” school of political thought. With memories perhaps of the Great Slump, they reason that optimism and confidence are all-important; once admit doubts about your basic policies and everything crumbles around you. This argument may make sense on the stock market; in politics it does not. Optimism becomes self-deception, a Report which shows the grim truth is pigeon-holed, and any ameliorative measures planned are carefully spaced out (partly under the influence of gradualists, partly in order to avoid passing what might seem to be “panic legislation”). Urgent warnings are ignored, for legislators

must maintain a dignified face and only change course gradually. Too gradually. In Central Africa gradualism will bring a real smash-up with bloodshed.

There are also the historical pessimists. Sometimes they are tempted to draw a superficial parallel between British Central Africa and Roman Britain. All that will be left of the white man's years of occupation, they say, will be some straight roads and a memory of a few good laws. (The parallel can be taken a little further: Roman Britain had its own Devlin Report after Boadicea's rebellion. Nero sent his freedman secretary Polyclitus at the head of a commission of inquiry to Britain. When the commission decided that enough punishment had been inflicted, the governor, Paulinus Suetonius, "to whose soldierly mind it seemed that clemency toward the native was only a name for weakness", refused to accept the decision.\* Thereafter the parallel ends: for Nero replaced the governor.)

Such pessimists cannot really believe at all deeply in their historical parallel: the close interdependence of countries in the modern world makes the elimination of British influence in Central Africa unthinkable. Yet their defeatism tends to strengthen the case of the white reactionary; for they are usually liberals fallen into despair, and the reactionary sneers at their "lack of faith" and dedicates himself to defending Central Africa as a bastion of British strength, imbued with various fine-sounding "British ideals". The reactionary plays on every possible fear for the future to persuade any white Rhodesians of moderate or hopefully liberal views that all change must be for the worse: and in this, of course, he is helped by the liberal-pessimists.

The bogies which reactionaries raise are varied. If Nyasaland were to be given the right to secede at some later date (perhaps after an agreed interval of five years), that would

simply be setting a date for its secession, they declare. And if Nyasaland were allowed this right, it could not be denied to Northern Rhodesia. The Federation would break up completely, and Southern Rhodesia would be forced by economic necessity to join South Africa. If Nyasaland were given independence, it would have no trained leaders and no resources to save it from swiftly sliding into poverty. It would become an easy prey to Communism. Or, if it avoided that fate, it would lapse back into barbarism, with a sort of Established Mau Mau Church in charge of the inevitable chaos. Spine-chilling forecasts are made, and even the phrase "a Ghana on the borders of Rhodesia" is sufficient to produce shudders.

Of course, none of these fearful prophecies can be dismissed as completely impossible, but we are dealing—and can only deal—with probabilities. What is the likelihood of Communism in Central Africa? One of Welensky's favourite themes has long been the Communist threat: he saw the Red Hand creeping down the continent; Cairo Radio, starting to broadcast in Swahili and chiNyanja, he declared to be its herald.

Two Southern Rhodesian African journalists discussed "How real is the Communist threat?" in the *Central African Examiner* (11th October 1958). Edson Sithole, later detained as a Congress leader, wrote that Welensky's alarm was justified, though he had not a single positive suggestion to stop Communism. Sithole's solution was simple:

"The only successful way to stop Communism is to abolish artificial privileges, build a prosperous and contented society by clothing, feeding, governing and treating everyone equally as a rightful and responsible citizen of the country. Propaganda will do nothing to a well-contented people."

Enoch Dumbutshena agreed, adding the opinion that "the African by nature and tradition is anti-Communist and

opposed to any political ideology that deprives him of his right to possess property", and that the Mashona of Southern Rhodesia were particularly "well known for their materialistic outlook to life".

It is stating the obvious to say, in Dumbutshena's words, that "the efforts of our various Governments must be directed towards the raising of the Africans' standards of living, if Russian propaganda is to have no appeal," but few white Rhodesian legislators see this truth. Or, if they do, they think primarily of raising economic standards of living, and themselves cling tightly to the reins of political power. In Southern Rhodesia's June 1958 elections, the liberal candidate Hardwicke Holderness told his constituents that both economic and political concessions must be made to Africans in good time, and added:

"If the change is made in time, their desires for co-operation and partnership will be retained. If not, they will be forced to become racialist and hostile, and eventually a seed-bed for Communism."

Joshua Nkomo fell under deep suspicion from the Southern Rhodesian Government because, after attending the Accra Conference, he spent some months in Cairo. Rhodesian officials took this as proof that the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress was building up "Communistic connections". Months later Nkomo talked to me about his stay in Cairo and said:

"You English are so strange. Just because you disapprove of a Government or people you treat them as untouchable and will have nothing to do with them. Because I stayed in Cairo does not mean I necessarily approve of what they do. I just wanted to get close to them and watch how they think and how they run things."

Legislators in Rhodesia take a very different view. They are either hypnotised with fear at the insidiousness of Communism, or else are stirred by its evil to swing their swords and

make unrealistic, dragon-slaying speeches. Very few take the positive line that western systems of government are better, and that the Communist interest in Africa should put Rhodesians on their mettle to prove that they sincerely believe in rule by consent, at the very least.

This reluctance to put their system of rule to the test of "consent by the governed" accounts for the refusal by Welensky and his followers to allow Nyasaland the right of secession at a specified date. It is pure defeatism to declare that the granting of such a right is tantamount to setting the date for secession. It is an admission that Africans can never find the same opportunities inside the Federation as they believe they may outside it. Granting the right to secede is the only way to test the sincerity of the professions of partnership made by the white oligarchy in 1953. Admittedly, there may be a stigma in being "put on probation", and Welensky rouses his voters' emotions by declaring that "Rhodesia is not in the dock". Change the metaphor, then, and borrow from a philatelist. Let the Federation be "on approval".

With Federation "on approval" for another five years, and a bold policy to transfer political power approved by the Governments, there is a chance that the Federation may be saved. Nyasaland would certainly need to be given territorial self-government at the beginning of such a five-year plan; in the Rhodesias Todd's call for "an immediate and massive ending of the colour bar" in the administration would have to be carried out, in order to give Africans a proper share of government. Governments would need to provide some measure of integration in hospitals and schools. A freedom of choice must be left to individuals; but, if people want to send their children to segregated schools or themselves to segregated parts of hospitals, they must be prepared to pay more for this decision, since segregation is an extravagance. The old argument that standards are inevitably dragged down through the integration of different classes or races has been

refuted by experience in Britain's "new towns": there families from the slums of London's East End live among middle-class families, and general standards have risen rather than sunk. "People rise to their environment", was how the headmistress of a Stevenage girls' school described it to me. In Central Africa, more than in Britain, there exist opportunities to make the fine environment of a spacious young country influence general standards for the better, when integration takes place. The University College is the most obvious example.

There must, of course be an "urgent and drastic alteration" of the Land Apportionment Act, as Sir Ronald Prain pointed out in his chairman's statement to the 1959 annual meeting of the Rhodesian Selection Trust shareholders. To keep half of Southern Rhodesia's farmland for a few thousand white farmers, and to impose *apartheid* on most aspects of town life, is a mockery of partnership policies.

This is a gigantic and almost revolutionary programme to carry out. A start in clearing away the rotten foundations of the State's legislation should have been made years ago. Of the Southern Rhodesian legislators, Todd first understood the need for such drastic action. He achieved a certain amount, but was hamstrung by reactionaries within his own party. They disposed of him, and later sneered at him for not doing more, and made that an excuse for not doing more themselves when the need had become blindingly apparent. The chances of their endorsing the drastic programme outlined above are very small indeed.

African fears that Dominion status may be granted at the 1960 talks and control of "native policies" handed over to Welensky's Government have been dispelled. But Dr. Banda had to return and the Nyasaland Congress had to make violent protests before those fears were recognised by the British Government. It was only on 22nd July 1959 that Mr. Macmillan made the comforting declaration:

## A PLEA FOR FLEXIBILITY

"We want to make it abundantly clear that the purpose of our policy is, as soon as possible and as rapidly as possible, to move towards self-government in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. . . . The British Government will certainly not withdraw its protection from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in the short run. . . . When all the units are in a position to agree, and are agreed, that British Government protection is no longer needed, then—and only then—can the whole Federation go forward to full independence and full Commonwealth membership."

It was a comforting declaration, but more than two years too late. If Macmillan had made that statement early in 1957 and had not allowed Lennox-Boyd to conclude the London Agreement in April 1957 with Welensky, all the turmoil of the Nyasaland disturbances could have been avoided.

Not until months after the British General Election in October 1959 did Macmillan's Government show publicly any realisation of the true urgency of the Central African situation. Even then, the indications which Macmillan and Macleod, his new Colonial Secretary, gave of their concern were only oblique. Macmillan's "wind of change" speech at Cape Town in February 1960 was welcomed by Africans in Rhodesia and Nyasaland as evidence that he appreciated the continental strength of African nationalism and that he believed that similar political "solutions" must be worked out in all parts of Africa. Macleod, it was thought, would have to match his initiative on Tanganyika and Kenya with similar moves of liberalism in Central Africa when the time seemed appropriate to the British Government. But, although their intentions began to seem plainer, they did not show haste to execute these intentions; rather, they were waiting for the Monckton Commission to report.

With this behaviour Africans had little patience. The British Government's rejection of the Devlin Report, following its dismissal of the African Affairs Board's clearly expressed objections to Federal legislation in 1958, had long ago con-

vinced Africans that Macmillan's Government was not concerned to tackle problems drastically or risk a public argument with the Federal Government. They may have misjudged the new temper of the British Government, but from the very first Africans showed a complete disinterest in the idea of the Monckton Commission. Their problems, they began to say ominously, would have to be settled by themselves.

Macmillan failed to get the Labour Party to join the Monckton Commission, because he was apparently already tied by the terms of a private agreement made with Welensky in July. Welensky had opposed the idea of a Parliamentary commission of any kind touring Central Africa, and suggested a preparatory "conference of officials", similar to that which was responsible for the Federation blueprint in 1951. What would have been most useful was a fact-finding team of British M.P.s touring quietly and making no public report. (Seven M.P.s, including Richard Wood, James Callaghan and Patrick Wall set a precedent for this in 1957 although, at Welensky's insistence, they produced a short report.) Instead, Macmillan and Welensky compromised on a plan for an unwieldy 26-man Commission, charged:

"to advise the five Governments, in preparation for the 1960 review, on the constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievement of the objects contained in the Constitution of 1953, including the preamble."

Immediately suspicions arose. To have only five Africans among the Federation's thirteen representatives showed that the old views about "junior partners" were still honoured; to exclude Callaghan, Dingle Foot and Jo Grimond because they were not Privy Councillors made nonsense of the idea that this could be a Commission of the most nearly concerned and influential people; and the explicit refusal to widen the terms of reference so that the Commission could inquire into the consequences of secession was the final factor in persuading

Mr. Gaitskell to boycott the Commission. (Macmillan's evasiveness about the terms of reference indicated that he was already committed to some private agreement with Welensky. He told the Commons that these terms would cover "the whole field of the redistribution of powers in either direction between the Federation and the territories". Privately he told the Labour Party leaders that this could include a discussion of secession. But, since he would not write this into the terms of reference, Labour leaders believed that Welensky and other possible witnesses would refuse to answer questions not strictly germane to the terms, and that consequently they would be unable to explore the issues broadly enough to gain material on which to base a minority report. Welensky soon confirmed this fear: in an interview with a *Daily Telegraph* correspondent he asserted that there was no question of the Commission considering secession by any of the three territories.)

This chapter is being written before the Monckton Commission begins sitting; but the refusal of the Labour Party to join it, and the antagonism of Africans to it, make it a virtually certain fiasco. Whether it will do more harm than good is a separate matter. It has spurred the Federal Government to press for an "African advancement" scheme on the railways on the "rate for the job" principle, in order to impress the British members of the Commission. On the other hand, the Commission is not going to hear the case of the African nationalists except indirectly. It would be very remarkable if the Commission, whose members are, on balance, anything but biased towards progressive policies and whose witnesses will not be representative of African opinion, was to produce realistic and far-sighted recommendations. The 1960 talks have been cursed with an unhappy prelude.

At the 1960 talks Welensky will be concerned to get control

Northern Rhodesia Information Department, under Christie Lawrence, has been able, by unorthodox tactics, to get Africans to approve of Government actions which would otherwise have stirred grim opposition; conversely, it has been able to advise officials about trends in African opinion, and so shape Government policies to the best ends. It can easily be imagined what irreparable harm would be done to the territorial Governments if these departments were transferred to Federal control. It would be like blinding a man in one eye; and the damage done now would be magnified when the two northern territories gained self-government.

The only realistic attitude for the representatives at the 1960 talks is this: they must take as their basic premise the proposition that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are going to have African-run Governments very soon, and all their recommendations must be made in the light of that fact. This means, immediately, that the links between the territories must be loosened, to the extent that each territory may be able to develop in its own way and at its own pace. At present, there is a "convoy speed" imposed on advancement. The Central Africa Party's franchise proposals make good sense in this context: instead of the territorial franchises being based, as they are now in the Rhodesias, on the same qualifications as the Federal franchise, the CAP suggests that each territory work out a franchise appropriate to its stage of advancement. The CAP goes further and says that the Federal franchise qualifications should not necessarily be uniform in each territory, but that each territory should have power to decide how to choose its representatives for the Federal Assembly.

Such a plan would involve the shifting of the whole balance of power from the central Government to the three territorial Governments, and this shifting must be done if the Federation is to be saved. Liberal critics may complain that this shifting of power back to the territories would hinder the

advancement of Africans in Southern Rhodesia, which a more powerful Federal Government could achieve. Since Southern Rhodesian members dominate the present Federal Assembly—they number twenty-nine, against nineteen from Northern Rhodesia and eleven from Nyasaland—this complaint carries no weight. What would happen would be a swift advance in the northern territories, as soon as they were released from tight Federal Government control; and Southern Rhodesian white politicians would then find it difficult to deny a swifter rate of advance to their own Africans, once it had been proved that Africans in the northern territories had shown the ability to govern themselves reasonably.

Another consideration—and by no means a minor one—in the redistribution of powers is the control of immigration. It was ludicrous enough for the Federal Government to have the power to declare John Stonehouse and the Rev. Tom Colvin “prohibited immigrants”. Stonehouse was barred from territories for which, as a British M.P., he had legislative responsibilities. Colvin, as general secretary of the Blantyre Synod of the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, was barred from his important administrative post in Nyasaland. But the position will be still less defensible if this power is held by the Federal Government after Nyasaland has achieved self-government. If Nyasas are considered responsible enough to govern themselves, they must surely be allowed the right to choose their own visitors, whether they be Ghanaians or Russians or Scots missionaries.

There is little chance, a realistic liberal must admit, that Welensky and Whitehead will come to the 1960 talks prepared to concede such terms. Gently, the author of an *Observer* “Profile” wrote in November 1959:

“It may well be that the new Colonial Secretary, in his attempts to reconcile white and black in Africa, will find Whitehead, with his insensitivity to African emotions, his most difficult colleague. Somewhat like Soustelle of France,

Whitehead is inclined not to let a political solution grow out of the situation, but to try to impose his own intellectual answer."

Whitehead's prime interest is in the economic advancement of Southern Rhodesia. He believes that the population of Central Africa will have increased from seven million to 110 million during the next century. Industrialisation on a giant scale is his solution to the future problems of population pressure. He has prepared for this situation in some degree by enacting the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act and the Apprentices Act. But he is inhibited from proper planning by the Land Apportionment Act and by the reactionary character of the municipal councils. There are 102,000 Africans who are entitled to farmland under the terms of the Native Land Husbandry Act, but are deprived of it because of the distribution under the Land Apportionment Act. When these figures were announced by the Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives in October 1959, no one in Whitehead's Government suggested that the Land Apportionment Act should therefore be revised. The Select Committee reckoned that another 250,000 Africans would crowd into Southern Rhodesian towns in search of work before 1964. But Whitehead is loth to reorganise the African urban townships under the control of municipal government, because the present Salisbury Council is a byword for reactionary stupidity and other municipal councils are little better. The solution, greatly enlarged municipal councils with a majority of African wards, is unthinkable to Whitehead's Government. Consequently, over-all planning for urban development is made impossible, the sensible and thorough recommendations of the 1958 Plewman (Urban African Affairs) Commission continue to be ignored, and the problems mount yearly.

Whitehead is seldom available to deputations of African critics. He believes that he is doing his liberal best under difficult circumstances, and does not easily accept criticism.

He is trying to impose what he thinks is an economic solution to the country's industrial problems but it is only a part of the solution. He is unable to press through the necessary sweeping measures because of old laws which are jealously guarded by prejudice. When Africans attack these laws and gather a following in opposition to his Government, he loses patience and consigns them to preventive detention. The inhumanity of his scheme to "rehabilitate" African nationalist intellectuals by condemning them for years to farming a remote area round Gokwe is only matched by his stupidity in providing in it a breeding-ground for Congress plans, quite as fertile as for crops. Whitehead is a well-intentioned if rigid-minded economist, but he is not the political leader whom Southern Rhodesia needs to lead its people out of the darkness of narrow suspicions and suicidal prejudices. At the 1960 talks he is likely to prove as rigid as ever in his views about the whole Federal structure.

Even if the white Rhodesian leaders were prepared to concede terms—the ultimate right to secede and looser links between the territories—would the African Congress leaders in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland accept them? The present evidence is that they would not, but attitudes may change, if the Governments start the talks on a reasonable basis and if the Congress leaders are treated as representative of their peoples. I attended a Fabian Conference on Central Africa in July 1959, and twenty men and women (including Arthur Creech-Jones) argued for a long hot day about how the problems of the Federation could be solved. In the evening James Callaghan looked in, listened for a time and then commented: "The trouble is, you are all falling into the old Fabian fault of trying to draw a blueprint for a revolutionary situation. I believe that we must play it by ear, having first got our principles right." It was wise advice. Attitudes alter, sometimes subtly and sometimes radically. By 1961 or 1962

the situation may have changed greatly. A change of heart among the white leaders may produce a lessening of fear among the African leaders, and an acceptance by them of a differently balanced Federation. The granting of an ultimate right to secede during the early stages of the talks would at a stroke remove the political claustrophobia which now oppresses their minds. The economic benefits of Federation, which are indisputable but not an overwhelming consideration, will appeal to Nyasas as soon as it can be shown that their political freedom is not being sold for some pounds of pottage.

Other grounds for hope are becoming visible. The Conservative Party's Bow Group have consistently, if cautiously, pressed for a more liberal policy in Central Africa than their senior Party colleagues, and their influence is slowly spreading upwards. Mr. Macleod suggested in Nairobi in December 1959 that he did not subscribe to gradualist views about Africa, when he remarked (in rejecting any postponement of the Kenya constitutional conference): "The fences will get higher if we do not take them now". And the setting up of the Mindolo Ecumenical Centre in the Copperbelt was a milestone towards effective church unity in Northern Rhodesia, promising in turn more effective church influence on politics.

But perhaps it is all too late; Federation may have acquired too evil a reputation, African nationalists may believe that any co-operation with white liberals would limit their actions and compromise their policies. Perhaps the fears of Africans cannot be purged by any means short of ending Federation.

This would not be the ultimate disaster that Conservatives fear, unless Federation broke up in turmoil and bloodshed. Nyasaland will not sink into direst poverty, nor will Southern Rhodesia "have to seek the shelter of the Union of South Africa", as Whitehead prophesied early in 1958. These forebodings are flimsy bluff to browbeat the British Government into endorsing the actions of the Southern Rhodesian Government, for fear that worse befall. In 1922, when there

was no anti-English Government in South Africa, a referendum was held among Southern Rhodesian voters about whether they should join the Union. Only 5989 voted for joining the Union, and 8744 voted to stand on their own. Since then, Southern Rhodesia has become wealthier through its tobacco crops and has welcomed thousands of British and English-speaking South African immigrants who have no wish to be ruled by the South African Government. Nor is it conceivable that Britain would allow another two million Africans to disappear into the shadows of *apartheid* (and under the reserved powers she has the constitutional right to stop such a move). There are reasons, also, why South Africa would not welcome Southern Rhodesia as an extra province of the Union: for instance, the well-protected tobacco industry of northern Transvaal would wither in open competition with Rhodesian farmers. The South African Government would be best pleased with a break-up of Federation which left Southern Rhodesia as a white-run buffer state insulating the Union from the independent black states farther north: a Southern Rhodesia constitutionally independent but looking to South Africa economically—and sometimes politically.

In fact, this Verwoerd day-dream will never materialise. Whatever happens to Nyasaland, the two Rhodesias are now inseparably linked economically. They will continue to face each other (rather than turn their backs on one another), whatever changes are made in the structure of political association. The Copperbelt will have to get its power from Southern Rhodesia's Wankie coalfields or from Kariba's hydro-electric supplies, which will always be a joint undertaking between the Rhodesias. The railways, the airways, the future industries centred on Lake Kariba, are all threads that bind the Rhodesias together with varying strength. Although they certainly will neither prevent Northern Rhodesia from getting an African-run Government before Southern Rhodesia, nor prevent a political break-up of

the Federation, yet they do help to make it unnecessary for Southern Rhodesia to "seek the shelter" of South Africa.

Early in 1959 the Dominion Party produced a plan for the partition of Central Africa. It proposed that the Copperbelt and the central "line-of-rail" part of Northern Rhodesia should be combined with Southern Rhodesia in an independent Rhodesian Dominion. Barotseland, North-eastern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be African-run Protectorates which Britain and the Rhodesian Dominion under treaty would jointly undertake to subsidise with grants-in-aid. The scheme, termed with Marlburian grandeur the Central African Alliance, was explained to Dr. Banda by Winston Field himself. The Dominion Party leader reported on his return that Dr. Banda had found the scheme acceptable—as well he might, because it gave Nyasaland virtual independence as well as a subsidy from Rhodesia. But it was far from acceptable to Africans in the Rhodesias. They saw it as a scheme to detach the richest part of Northern Rhodesia in order to support Southern Rhodesia in a system of white supremacy. They doubted whether the Protectorates would get much financial support, and they were sure that the chances for African advancement in the Rhodesian Dominion would be minimised. Although the scheme sent a short-lived breeze through the stuffiness of political thought among white Rhodesians, yet the subsequent history of the Dominion Party confirmed African suspicions of the motives behind this plan. For the Dominion Party later threw aside euphemisms and paraphrases, and agreed that government in Southern Rhodesia should remain in the hands, not of "civilised and responsible people", but of "Europeans" for the interminably "foreseeable future".

If Nyasas carry through to reality their determination to achieve independence—and nothing can stop them achieving it eventually, except the cooling of their own determination—can Nyasaland stand on its own? Sir Richard Turnbull, the

Governor of Tanganyika, once told me: "African nationalists tend to think that there is something magical about independence, that it automatically brings wealth. Ghana has been a misleading example for them. It got its independence because it had wealth. Tanganyika could have independence any time, but it wouldn't get investment that way, any more than Somalia will get investment. It is no good getting political independence like Liberia, and remaining an economic dependency."

Obviously there is some good sense in his remarks, although the Colonial Office is far from logical in its gradualist approach to independence for different territories. Tanganyika had a budget deficit of £1,200,000 in 1958-9 and was expected, because of a fall in the price of cotton, coffee and oil seed, to have a much larger deficit in 1959-60. Yet its constitutional advance is not being delayed, and it will be an independent country long before the Rufiji Valley scheme can make Tanganyika at all wealthy. Again, British Somaliland took a great leap forward, moving in eighteen months from a position of having an entirely nominated legislative assembly to full independence in July 1960. So, when the Colonial Office tells Nyasas that they are poor and have few trained administrators, and that therefore they are far from ready for independence, they can be excused for showing scepticism. They conclude that the real reason is that, while Tanganyika is a United Nations Trust Territory, Nyasaland (which is no poorer in *per capita* income) has been pledged to the Federation by the Conservatives.

Whether she is independent or still part of a reorganised Federation, Nyasaland will get money to start the Shire Valley scheme, and a fertile area will be reclaimed for sugar or cocoa production. Chris Yiannakis, coming to Nyasaland from a family of Aegean fishermen, has shown that there is a great future for a fishing industry based on Lake Nyasa. In an earlier chapter I concluded that the economic benefits of

Federation have not been so far-reaching that their discontinuance will quickly impoverish Nyasaland. Clutton-Brock, in his book *Dawn in Nyasaland*, discusses in detail how Nyasaland would in some ways positively gain from independence, since she would be released from the Federal tariff system and be able to buy necessities in the cheapest markets (such as shirts from Hong Kong). There is, as well, an important factor which Professor Jack, in his Economic Survey of Nyasaland published in 1959, cannot measure: independence would send a great initial surge of enthusiasm through the people which their leaders could channel into a greater production of national wealth.

Negative proof of the potential of enthusiastic effort is available already. In 1955 there was the prospect of a bumper cotton crop, and officials in Zomba were cheered to think that increased spending power, the result of this crop, would advance the country. But, after half the expected bales had been received, the supply dried up. The workers had burnt the remaining crop, rather than pick it, for they had earned sufficient money. A similar story is told of Nyasa troops in Burma who were not interested in winning the reward of one hundred rupees offered for any live Japanese prisoner; they did not want the money. These stories may be quoted as indicating lethargy and lack of ambition. I believe that is the wrong conclusion to draw, and that Nyasas will work extremely hard if they see a worthwhile object. In November 1958, Dunduzu Chisiza, secretary-general of the Nyasaland Congress, tried to convince me that independence would inspire Nyasas to increase agricultural production greatly through farming co-operatives and many other measures of land improvement. I was sceptical at the time; but I am not sceptical any more.

Any realistic chapter about the future of Central Africa must contain dark passages of foreboding. The racial fears and

the wild emotions which have been aroused will take many years to disappear. If reasonableness and liberal broad-mindedness are not allowed to play their conciliatory part, Central Africa will shortly become Britain's Algeria. One purpose in writing this chapter was to suggest that there is plenty of room for broadmindedness, and that politicians of all races should accept that there are many different ways in which the three territories can be associated for their mutual benefit other than in the present stifling Federal form. There is the possibility—faint now, but it could grow firmer—that Nyasas will be reconciled to a state of self-government within a looser Federation; and, even if the territories do end their political association, there is no reason why this should be economically disastrous for any of them. (The main sufferers might be Africans in Southern Rhodesia, where a temporary reaction towards full *apartheid* policies might well take place. But they would look hopefully to the growth of independent black states in the north.) This chapter is, in fact, a plea for flexibility of thought. If politicians assemble for the 1960 talks with minds rigid with prejudice, there will be no "Other Business" on the agenda beyond a hateful racial struggle for power, which white Rhodesians cannot expect to win.

This chapter ends on a bright note of hope. Todd is a better psychologist than Welensky: in the darkest days of the Southern Rhodesian emergency, Todd cheered the hearts of thousands of Africans by describing in glowing phrases the potential future which Central Africa and all its inhabitants can possess. In a few years, he said, it can be as rich as his homeland, New Zealand, and some day as wealthy as the United States itself. Its mineral resources have been hardly touched. The Kafue Flats polder experiment, financed by the Rhodesian Selection Trust Copper Company, may be able to increase Central Africa's food production by thirty million pounds a year (or sixty per cent), with intensive farming by African and European farmers of wheat and rice

crops, dairy and beef cattle. In Southern Rhodesia the Sabi Valley may provide another large area for intensive farming, and the Kyle Dam scheme is opening up great parts of the low veld for sugar and citrus plantations. The fishing industry in the lakes of the northern province of Northern Rhodesia, after only six years of organisation, brought £600,000 to the African traders in 1956; Lake Kariba offers similar prospects for fishermen. In Nyasaland the Shire Valley scheme can be the beginning of a many-sided prosperity. Like Tanganyika, Nyasaland has provided many disappointments for companies exploring for a workable mineral deposit. But the finding, among all the outcrops already known, of a rich deposit could alter Nyasaland's economy in a moment. The possibilities in Central Africa are nearly endless.

Yet little will be achieved, and no material prize will be worth achieving, without a restoration of racial goodwill. If white politicians are slow to show that they realise this basic truth, some "big business" men are not. The speeches of Sir Jock Campbell, of the London and Blantyre Company, and Sir Ronald Prain, of Rhodesian Selection Trust, are an example to the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments. In November 1959 Prain told his shareholders:

"The Africans are constantly pressing for a much greater share of political and economic power, and there is no doubt in my mind that they will eventually achieve this. What is vital for the future of the territories is the means by which they attain their goal. It is in my opinion of the utmost importance that they should do so with the goodwill of the European population. The Europeans deceive themselves if they close their eyes to what is happening in the rest of Africa; and the Africans deceive themselves if they fail to realise that progress is linked with hard work and increased productivity."

In a more vivid style, a rhymester in the *Central African Examiner* expressed a similar thought:

CENTRAL AFRICAN EMERGENCY

“Garfield Todd, Garfield Todd,  
How will it end?  
In black votes or red gutters  
— *You* choose, my friend.”

The British Government has a heavy responsibility in the 1960 talks. It must with tact and firmness persuade Welensky and his colleagues to choose wisely.

## Postscript

A month's visit to Central Africa in March and April 1960, when Mr. Macleod was preparing for the release of Dr. Banda, prompts this postscript. It was heart-warming to experience the relaxation of tension and the renewed hopefulness which Dr. Banda's release brought to Nyasaland. Yet the Provincial Commissioner who described this month to me as "the honeymoon period" between the Colonial Secretary and the African leader was being realistic rather than cynical. It was most unlikely that Mr. Macleod—"that fine Christian gentleman" to Dr. Banda in those days—would be able (if indeed willing) to give the Nyasas the kind of constitution they demanded when the constitutional talks began in July. In fact, he confessed that there was "only just enough common ground" to make it worth holding the talks at all. Elsewhere in the Federation I found attitudes had hardened greatly in a year, and the gulf between the races wider than ever. Most depressing of all, the four governments seemed to have lost momentum and to be bankrupt of ideas about how (in the words of Mr. Macmillan's instructions to the Monckton Commission) "the Federation can best go forward".

The striking fact about Nyasaland was the massive support which the Malawi Congress Party had gained. Printers could hardly keep pace with the demand for Malawi party cards, and the party's membership was about 250,000 when Dr. Banda was released. Of these, Orton Chirwa told me, about four in every nine were women. The determination of

Nyasas was well illustrated by the way in which the women whose husbands had been detained were gently scornful of the others. To have a Prison Graduate for a husband was a mark of honour, and to be able to put the initials "P.G." after one's name was worth more than a normal university degree. The wives of detainees used to sing this song while pounding their maize:

"My husband is a man:  
He's away in Kanjedza.  
The men who are here  
Are women like us."

An equally striking fact was the lack of bitterness among the released detainees. From Dr. Banda downwards, the prevailing attitude was one of pitying the Government for its mistakes. A touching story was told me by a man in Blantyre who was visiting a friend in hospital and found, sitting up in the next bed and scribbling on reams of paper, a so-called "hard-core" detainee recovering from appendicitis. "What are you writing a book about?" my friend asked. "About the love of God," was the reply.

During the few days following the release of Dr. Banda the police paid Nyasas the compliment of handing over responsibility for crowd control to the Malawi leaders. They fulfilled this task perfectly and there was no incident on any of the occasions when Dr. Banda appeared. I heard two whites discussing this achievement. One said, "It shows they're not interested in the fellow any more," while the other remarked, "It's obvious how Malawi controls its own bods—by the big stick." Rhodesian leader-writers were not so muddle-headed as these two men; instead, they complained that the police had set "a dangerous precedent" in handing over control. To me it seemed only dangerous to those who did not want to give Nyasas the chance of controlling their own country.

## POSTSCRIPT

Dr. Banda went on a month's tour of Britain and North America, and returned saying that he had been offered self-government on the unacceptable condition that Nyasaland remained inside the Federation. The Malawi leaders' strategy—to break up Federation—has never altered, although their tactics seem to have changed. They were now putting their main energies into obtaining as radical a territorial constitution as possible, so that the Southern Rhodesian whites would decide to withdraw from the Federation of their own accord, rather than be associated through the federal structure with a black nationalist government in Nyasaland.

Certainly Sir Edgar Whitehead and other Southern Rhodesian whites encouraged Malawi in these hopes. In January he was quoted as saying that he would favour secession for Southern Rhodesia if black nationalist governments came to power in the north and if the British Government did not hand over to his Government the "reserved powers" over the Southern Rhodesian constitution. But, when he arrived in London in April to ask for these reserved powers, he denied that he had ever spoken of secession; he said, however, that he thought it most unlikely that the Federation would succeed if "extreme black nationalist" governments came to power.

His mission, to replace the British Government with a Rhodesian senate as the repository of these "reserved powers" of veto over legislation technically discriminatory against Africans, was "singularly ill-timed", in the view of *The Economist*. Certainly it increased African distrust of the Southern Rhodesia Government; a delegation from the National Democratic Party flew over to tell Lord Home that, even if the British Government had not overtly used these powers in the past, they were anxious for the connection to be maintained. They had no faith, they explained, in Sir Edgar's proposal of a senate as "a local, effective safeguard";

the history of South Africa had shown how feeble any such safeguards were.

The British Government listened to Sir Edgar's arguments without much conviction, but agreed to have further discussions with him before the federal constitutional review began. This allowed him to return to Salisbury without loss of face. At one time it seemed that he was seeking an election issue in which he could outshine the Dominion Party as the champion of white Rhodesians' claims to independence; but he presumably postponed this plan when it became clearer that the Dominion Party in Southern Rhodesia, under the invigorating and extremist leadership of William Harper, was likely to win any general election called in 1960. The rightist swing could also be seen in the formation of the Southern Rhodesia Association, which quickly enrolled thousands of whites with the slogan "What we have we hold." The Association's main aim was to unite the Dominion Party and the United Federal Party in defence of the privileged position of the white population. It held gentlemanly and ineffectual meetings, at which speakers admitted uncertainty as to whether they stood for secession or a stronger central government; nevertheless, it was clear that, once the Association had found a common mind on such matters, it could exert a heavy influence on the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Governments.

The Central Africa Party moved further to the left in March, when its Southern Rhodesian wing voted for a franchise qualification of simple literacy and a full reassessment of industrial wages so that the "rate for the job" principle could be applied to jobs which did not carry a wage inflated by war-time labour shortages. Seven prominent white members of the CAP resigned in protest against such radicalism, while from the other wing a few leading Africans also resigned and joined the National Democratic Party. The underlying reason for their move was a belief that a

party based on the principles of white liberalism and with a high proportion of whites as office-holders would always be inhibited from certain forms of political opposition.

This drift towards the political extremes should have been checked by the eruption in South Africa. It is probable that the Sharpeville shootings did have at least a temporary effect, although the *Argus* papers persisted in describing those arrested as "agitators". The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference must also have had a profound impression on Sir Roy Welensky. His comment at the end, that it "hadn't been as bad as I expected," sounded as if he felt he had personally been treated lightly by those Prime Ministers who castigated Mr. Louw; but their views on how to run any multi-racial community cannot have been lost on him. The same views had been put by the second All-African People's Conference meeting in Tunis in January. But the temper of that conference is likely to have made Welensky obstinate under threats; for the African leaders altered the Accra Conference line of non-violence into a more belligerent form—"all roads to independence are equally valuable, equally respectable" was the way in which President Bourguiba of Tunisia stated it.

Welensky saw the need to impress the British Government and Commonwealth Prime Ministers with evidence of liberal progress. The best evidence he could produce was a plan for African advancement on Rhodesia Railways, agreed after years of discussion. But the final plan was more of a victory for the die-hards than the liberals: in exchange for five "fragmented" job categories into which Africans could begin to move at once at low wages, the principle of the "rate for the job" was conceded to the European Railway Workers Union, with no mention made of a realistic reassessment of rates. There is already a surplus of white labour on the railways, and, with Kariba power cutting down the amount of coal to be hauled by rail to the Copperbelt, it is unlikely that

Africans will be moved into any jobs at "European" rates for years to come. Aware that the Federal Government was not making an impressive case, Sir Roy engaged the ingenious services of Colman, Prentis and Varley, the public relations consultants who performed so well for the Conservative Party in 1959.

The same lack of progress, almost of deadlock, could be seen in Northern Rhodesia. As soon as he was released from prison in January Kenneth Kaunda, president of the United National Independence Party, toured the country preaching non-violence as the means of achieving what UNIP in his absence had set as its target—"independence in October 1960." But the Governor, Sir Evelyn Hone, frankly admitted to me that he could offer Kaunda no reward for such moderation. He thought the Benson constitution should be given a full chance to work, and said no new constitution could be planned "until it becomes clear which way the federal set-up is going to go." In May Mr. Macleod also said that Northern Rhodesia could not have a new constitution in 1960.

It was little wonder, then, that African frustration in Northern Rhodesia first came to a head in a rash of disobedience in schools and technical colleges, when a thousand students had to be expelled, and then erupted in violence along the Copperbelt in May, when the first white person to be killed in racial riots in the Rhodesias, Mrs. Pip Burton, died in hospital after her car had been set alight. The heroism of Bob Burton, in speaking out against racial bitterness and appealing for calm tempers, could not cure the ugly situation which was bound to become more tense still when the Congo gained its independence. Stringent security legislation was introduced into Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which gave the Governors the widest powers for detaining individuals and banning organisations and publications without having to declare an Emergency. Laws of

the same kind had already been enacted in Kenya, and this pattern of security legislation was widely criticised as a poor example for countries which were soon to receive self-government.

Each Government was postponing positive action until at least the Monckton Report was published. To me it seemed that Waiting for Monckton was an excuse, rather than a reason, for delaying territorial advancement in the two Protectorates. Even Mr. Macleod showed no sense of urgency about bringing in an "interim" constitution for Nyasaland (let alone Northern Rhodesia) before the federal review conference began. He felt it was sufficient reassurance to Africans to tell them that at the federal talks all shades of opinion would be represented, and not simply governments. But Africans wanted to be in a strong position in the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland Governments before the federal talks had gone any distance, so that the protestations of Welensky and Whitehead about partnership could be tested against the fact of African dominance of the "partnership" in the northern territories.

Will the Monckton Report be the fiasco which I suggested it would be in the previous chapter? The Commissioners were impressed by the weight of opposition to Federation, although they mistakenly accepted the view that intimidation stopped many pro-Federation Africans from giving evidence. They understood that Nyasaland could no longer be kept in a Federation of the present form; yet they had no opportunity, because of the African boycott, to meet representative African leaders and assess their capacity as rulers. Their recommendations cannot be based on a study of all the evidence, since much of it was withheld from them. They may well recommend a loosening of the federal structure, but ignorance of the calibre of African leaders will certainly stop them from suggesting a full and swift enough programme of African advancement to save Central Africa from further

turmoil. If the Monckton Report is accepted as a balanced judgement and its recommendations alone carry weight, then it may well be a fiasco and do more harm than good. But if Macleod, who unlike the Commissioners has had lengthy talks with the African leaders, is allowed to use some of the Report's recommendations and observations as a basis for more progressive moves, then there is still a faint hope that Central Africa may become an example to the world.

## APPENDIX

### The Rhodesian Press

This book should have suggested some of the insufficiencies of the Rhodesian press, which has shown itself less adequate in the role of independent critic than the South African press. In South Africa, the *Rand Daily Mail*, the monthly *Drum* magazine, and the quarterly *Africa South* have survived many years of opposition to the Nationalist Government, and have commanded respect because of their resolute and consistent editorial policies.\* In the Rhodesias such journals as the *Chronicle* of Bulawayo and the *Central African Examiner* have at times shown the same spirit, but marred it by inconsistency and irresolution. Since this inconsistency of the Rhodesian press has been apparent in the pages of this book, and has probably caused some confusion in the reader's mind, it will be worth explaining briefly the structure—and the inhibitions—of the newspapers and magazines which Rhodesians read and which greatly affect their political thinking.

The Argus Group controls the Federation's four daily newspapers and two Sunday papers. The popular title of Argus Group is something of a misnomer: they are, in fact, owned by the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company and the Argus Company of South Africa controls less than half the shares in R. P. and P. The combined circulations of the *Rhodesia Herald* and the *Evening Standard* of Salisbury, the *Chronicle* of Bulawayo and the *Northern News* of Ndola is considerably less than, say, that of the *Staffordshire Evening*

\* In April 1960 the editor of *Africa South*, Mr. Ronald Segal, had to flee from South Africa to avoid arrest and planned to continue publication of his magazine from Britain.

*Sentinel*: but their influence (for a circulation of less than 100,000) is immense. The *Sunday Mail* of Salisbury and the *Sunday News* of Bulawayo have a combined circulation of about 80,000: the colts in the stable are the two tri-weeklies, the *Central African Post* of Lusaka and the *Umtali Post*.

The group is as old as Rhodesia itself—in fact, it claims to have invented the country's name, for the *Mashonaland Herald and Zambesian Times* which began in 1891 changed its name to the *Rhodesia Herald* in 1892, three years before the country was given the name by a reluctant Cecil Rhodes. The group's expansion into Northern Rhodesia only began in 1950, when the Argus Company bought control of the shares in the *Northern News* which Welensky himself had held since 1945. The Copperbelt boom and the ferment over Federation, exploited by its lively editor David Cole, turned the *Northern News* from the bi-weekly of Welensky's day into a daily with a circulation approaching 15,000. The *Central African Post* of Lusaka was bought by R. P. and P. in 1955 after control had passed from the independent liberal Dr. Alexander Scott to the Cachalola Group of the "big four" companies of Rhodesia (The British South Africa Company, Rhodesia Anglo-American, Rhodesian Selection Trust and The Imperial Tobacco Company). Under Cachalola control, which was exercised in Lusaka by Carey Paver, the *Central African Post* reversed its views towards the African National Congress; when R. P. and P. later bought it, its policies came into line with those of the group in Southern Rhodesia.

It has been argued (as in the *Central African Examiner* in August 1959) that R. P. and P. is not, "in any real sense, a monopoly. All that prevents other newspapers from opening in Rhodesia is lack of capital". This argument does not stand investigation. When the *Evening Standard* was launched in Salisbury in September 1958, the white population (on whose size all circulation calculations were based) was about 80,000. For an independent evening paper to have stood a chance of

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flourishing beside the *Rhodesia Herald*, the population would have had to be about 250,000 (on the experience of American cities). The *Evening Standard* was able to exist on the small population because its capital costs were a fraction of those an independent paper would incur, since it shares its presses and most of its equipment with the *Rhodesia Herald*. This means that R. P. and P., now established in all the large Rhodesian centres, has many years' lead on any other group which might plan to launch a newspaper. It constitutes, in fact, a virtual monopoly.

The way in which it uses its vast influence is not reassuring. Foreign news in the *Rhodesia Herald* is extremely limited: the news, for instance, that Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov had been dismissed rated only a down-page paragraph. The Accra Conference in December 1958 received only the slightest coverage, despite the fact that there was an Argus representative present; the paper gave the conference substantial coverage only after its representative had flown back to Salisbury to plead its importance. Nearer home, it has played a heavy-handed part in aggravating the tense political situation on several occasions since 1957. Its favourite targets are visiting Labour M.P.s: it bayed continuously at James Johnson after one remark of his about a "political struggle"; it hounded James Callaghan while he was attempting to carry out an uncontroversial fact-finding tour; and it distorted John Stonehouse's speech to Congress so badly that an outcry was raised and the Federal Government summarily deported him. With the same unconcern for political repercussions, the *Rhodesia Herald* adopted the South African habit of referring to Africans as "Bantu" throughout its columns on the eve of the Emergencies in February 1959. The editor, Colin Cowan, defended this innovation, which caused intense irritation among educated Africans, on the grounds that use of the word "African" had produced the racist slogan "Africa for the Africans".

Other newspapers in the group have shown more broad-mindedness than the *Rhodesia Herald*. The *Chronicle* of Bulawayo and the *Evening Standard* were forthright in their condemnation of the first Preventive Detention Bill, for instance, while the *Rhodesia Herald* was only admitting anxieties about some aspects of the Bill. The *Chronicle* even backed Garfield Todd during the early weeks of the crisis which began with his Cabinet's resignation and ended with the June 1958 elections. But, with occasional exceptions of this sort, Welensky and Whitehead can count on steady support from the whole group.

If the liberals have despaired of backing from the Argus newspapers, so also have the right-wing politicians. Their answer was to launch their own newspaper. In October 1953, the Afrikaner-dominated Confederate Party helped to start the *Citizen*, a sensational tabloid which achieved a circulation of 15,000 within two years. Encouraged by this success, the leaders of the Dominion Party, in 1956, raised £10,000 to start a daily paper allied to the *Citizen*. The outcome, the *Evening News*, foundered after three months. Since then, the *Citizen* has been recovering slowly from the heavy debts incurred in this fiasco. The Dominion Party's later journalistic venture, a strictly political four-pager called the *Rhodesian*, ended with the party's heavy defeat at the November 1958 Federal election.

While the Argus Group has continued to aim at a predominantly European readership, the spreading of primary education resulted in a large number of Africans eager to read anything new. (One of the editors of African Newspapers described it to me this way: "Before 1936 there was no literature for the Africans at all except the Old and New Testaments".) It is perhaps claiming too much for the *Bantu Mirror* of Bulawayo, which began in 1936, to call it literature. Mr. B. G. Paver, who moved from Johannesburg and the Bantu

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Press to found the *Bantu Mirror* did not employ any reporters on it or the *African Weekly* (1943) for the first ten years. Workers merely clipped "African" news out of the Argus newspapers and translated the clippings into the vernacular. Since the war, four more papers and magazines have been added to the chain, including the most important, the *African Daily News*, which was launched in 1956.

African Newspapers are owned by the Cachalola Group of the "big four" companies, which also own the *Nyasaland Times*. Since the copper and tobacco barons do not pretend to be experts on journalistic matters, they have left the daily management and usually the editorial policy-making to the Paver family. In Chapter 7 I showed briefly Mr. B. G. Paver's frank lack of sympathy for African nationalist aspirations, his outspoken attitude. It has earned African Newspapers, in return, the intense dislike and distrust of Congress members, although (so avid are the Nyasas for political news) the sales of *Bwalo la Nyasaland*, which has taken an anti-Congress line, have soared since Dr. Banda's return.

In 1956, Westminster Provincial Press attempted to buy African Newspapers, offering £50,000 for two-thirds of the 150,000 £1 equity shares. The offer was not accepted by the Cachalola Group, and eight months later it was revised from ten shillings to 17s. 6d. for each of the 100,000 shares. At least one of the four companies was prepared to sell its twenty-five per cent share, but the Cachalola Group made no reply to the offer for a further month. During that time, Sir Charles Cumings, resident director of the British South Africa Company, asked Welensky (who had recently become Federal Prime Minister) if he had any objections to the Westminster Press buying a two-thirds controlling interest in African Newspapers. Welensky replied that he did indeed object. His reasons were based on the Rhodesian view that British newspaper groups with a liberal reputation can only be a menace in Rhodesia, giving African readers "wrong ideas".

The Cachalola Group directors were in a difficult position: if they disregarded Welensky and sold their controlling interest to Westminster Press, the Federal Government could be very awkward about the transfer of Treasury funds. In the end they gave in and rejected the second offer of Westminster Press. They tried to reorganise African Newspapers on their own account by borrowing a new managing director from Westminster Press; but, within a year, the Pavers had reasserted themselves.

The African Newspapers Group was the target for some of Dr. Banda's fiercest words in his Highfield speech in December 1958, but in doing so Banda maligned some of its editors, who are intelligent and high-principled—if somewhat inhibited—men. Having lain low during the height of the Emergency (as every Central African paper except *Dissent* did), the *African Daily News* was outspoken about the conduct of the Beadle Tribunal and showed praiseworthy initiative in exposing the poor conditions in which Congress leaders were having to live in the Gokwe restriction area. But these occasional editorial canterings into independent criticism only serve to show how tight the rein normally is.

Enough mention has been made of the *Nyasaland Times* throughout this book to indicate how it serves the taste of only a small section of Nyasaland opinion. Alan Cooper, the editor, who moved down to Southern Rhodesia after the Emergency, once told me with utter solemnity: "My mission is to spread the gospel of Federation." He missed no opportunity to do so: I remember how he led one issue of his bi-weekly paper in November 1958 with the triumphant banner headline "ANOTHER FEDERAL BENEFIT—All-weather airport at Lilongwe", which betrayed a certain ignorance of what the majority of Nyasas want from life. Despite the consistent way in which it presented the view most contrary to Nyasa popular opinion, it has prospered. It carries a good deal of advertising and is linked with the only chain of bookshops in Nyasaland.

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In a good year its parent concern, the Blantyre Printing and Publishing Company, is able to declare a comparatively large net profit of about £15,000. This, however, does not make it more acceptable to Nyasas.

None of the Congresses has had enough funds to produce a proper journal, although Dr. Azikiwe with his *West African Pilot* had long ago shown what an important instrument a paper can be for political organisation in Africa. Various cyclostyled broadsheets have made brief appearances—Robert Chikerema's *Chapupu* and Titus Mukupo's *Freedom* are examples. But the *African Times* of Lusaka was the first printed journal which aimed at building up African readership by giving really representative (and often anti-government) African views, instead of following the African Newspapers' formula of watering down all criticism. The managing director of the *African Times* was Frank Barton, who had edited the *Central African Post* in its independent days; its editor was a compact, twinkling, fiery Nyasa called Elias Mtepuka; and its backers were the First Permanent Building Society, in which the Independent M.P., Dr. Scott, was a prominent shareholder. The circulation of this weekly paper soared quickly to 15,000, more advertisers were becoming interested and the Northern Rhodesian Government, which had at first thought it would be subversive, was reassured. Then, in 1958, it collapsed suddenly after only a few months' life. Mtepuka died suddenly after a short illness, leaving Barton to do a double job. First Permanent was absorbed by the Founders Building Society of Southern Rhodesia, whose chairman was Mr. A. E. P. Robinson, one of the Federal Government's nominees on the Monckton Commission. Mr. Robinson and his colleagues withdrew support from the *African Times*, and African readers were left to guess whether his decision was due entirely to economic reasons, or affected by political considerations.

The *Central African Examiner* was another adventure (or, as it

turned out, misadventure) in progressive journalism. It aimed at a very different readership—the businessman or politician with two shillings to spend on a fortnightly journal. It began in mid-1957 with the highest references; its mentor was Sir Geoffrey Crowther, former editor of *The Economist*, which gave the *Examiner* generous editorial help. The Federal Chief Justice, the Bishop of Northern Rhodesia and the Principal of the University College made up the most eminent board of trustees imaginable, charged with the task of safeguarding the political independence of the editor from pressure groups and, specifically, of showing that the *Examiner* was independent from the Rhodesian Selection Trust, its financial backers. The editor himself, Francis Baughan, had the unimpeachable background of ten years spent on the staff of *The Times*. Sir Geoffrey defined the aims of the *Examiner* thus:

“The *Examiner* should not be conducted as a predominantly polemical journal nor used as a political weapon. It should not align itself permanently on the side of any particular party or cause but . . . should give support where support is earned, and criticism where it is deserved. At all times the *Examiner* should seek to further the general good of the Federation and all its peoples, regardless of race or creed. The *Examiner* should endeavour to establish itself in the traditions of the great English weekly journals. It should aim at high literary standards and at the creation in Central Africa of a readership united in its respect for the *Examiner's* integrity, sense of responsibility and independence, and the general and thoughtful support it gives to liberal causes.”

Unhappily, it did not live up to these lofty aims, although a few months after its publication, Cyril Dunn in his “Central African Witness” was able to write: “There is nothing in British Africa to compare with the *Central African Examiner*, a review financed by one of the great mining companies and left free to speak its witty and independent mind.” The

journal's integrity was called in question when Baughan resigned a few weeks before the Southern Rhodesian general elections, and the editorial policy swung from whole-hearted backing of Todd to advice that Todd's defeated supporters should join Welensky's party. Possibly this was how the managing director and temporary editor, David Cole, interpreted Crowther's instruction to the journal "not to align itself permanently on the side of any particular party"; but Africans and liberals remembered that Cole, when editor of the *Northern News*, had been a close friend of Welensky's and was still high in the counsels of the Federal Party.

For another year the *Examiner* offered its readers what Eric Palmer, one of Todd's lieutenants, complained was "the precarious dialectic of its leading articles . . . regrettable evidence of a certain dualism in editorial policy. . . ." Quotations throughout this book have shown how the *Examiner* spoke with at least two voices, and how the more liberal voice was swiftly muted at times of crisis. In March 1959, instead of standing forth as the champion of individual freedom, the role it could have fulfilled better than any other publication, it retreated into the most embarrassing sycophancy, attempting a ludicrous historical comparison between the actions of Whitehead and Welensky and those of Abraham Lincoln in taking up arms against the forces of secession.

Soon afterwards the trustees resigned: they had neglected to insist that a permanent editor be appointed, and Cole had remained as temporary editor for a year. They saw that their main function—to protect the editor from pressure from the managing director and his colleagues—was superfluous in circumstances where the editor and managing director were one and the same person. But the pre-occupation of the trustees and of Crowther with other affairs had allowed the *Examiner* to fall into this unhappy state. Six months later, Rhodesian Selection Trust announced that it would withdraw its financial support, a move which everyone had

always agreed would be ultimately desirable for the sake of the journal's independence, but which few expected to be made at a time when the journal (with a circulation of still under three thousand) was losing as much money as ever. The only possible explanation for RST's action in November 1959 was its embarrassment with the connection. Sir Geoffrey bought RST's shares and sold them in May 1960 to Theodore Bull, a young heir of Alfred Beit. Bull appointed a South African liberal, Jack Halpern, to the editorship and the *Examiner* set off once again on an independent course. But the failure of the *Examiner* to fulfil Sir Geoffrey's aim without all this veering is a further sad reflection on journalism and politics in Central Africa.

The Emergencies in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia made plain what should have been realised before; that African and liberal criticism of Government actions had been inadequately reflected in the press, and that editorial disregard had both increased African frustration and failed to prepare the Europeans for the political changes which were inevitable. In the year following the declaration of the Emergencies, three journals began publication to fill this great need. The first was *Dissent*, edited by two university lecturers, Terry Ranger and John Reed, and a Methodist minister, the Rev. Whitfield Foy. Introducing their cyclostyled broadsheet, the three explained: "We feel that its appearance is necessary because it is important at a time of political and moral crisis that all legitimate opinions be heard and all relevant facts be made known." They provided a forum for the government's critics. Very soon the sharp honesty of the writers, cutting through hypocrisy and prejudiced assumptions to the essentials of justice, earned *Dissent* a wide reputation.

It was widened still further when it printed an account by Clemens Micongwe of his weeks of detention in Kanjedza Camp in Nyasaland, in which he claimed that the detainees

had been starved, intimidated and beaten, and subjected to other illegally harsh treatment. The Colonial Secretary at first affected to ignore the views of "an obscure sheet" but later ordered a commission of inquiry. The Nyasaland Government took the curiously foolish step of banning *Dissent* from the territory, because of the Kanjedza article, long after the appointment of a commission had admitted the importance of the article. The Kanjedza commission took evidence six months after the events complained about; unhappily the detainees boycotted the inquiry for a number of reasons, including their fear of victimisation and their disillusionment after the rejection of the Devlin Report. Consequently its report was inconclusive and what conclusions it did make were arguable; but the facts which emerged fully justified the persistence with which the editors of *Dissent* had asserted that conditions at Kanjedza in the early days were deplorable.

The editorial writers of the *Examiner* carried on an unedifying argument with those of *Dissent*, about the Kanjedza affair (e.g. "If Micongwe's allegation is substantially false, it reflects an idiot responsibility on the part of *Dissent*'s editorial board, an unethical confusion of liberty with licence in a manner calculated to inflict maximum harm on the liberal ideals it professes"). They took the opportunity offered by the appearance of *Tsopano* in October 1959 to add a further slap: "What is completely lacking in the first issue of *Tsopano* is the attitude of feminine malice toward authority displayed by the banned *Dissent*".

But the chief difference between the monthly *Tsopano* and *Dissent* was not malice or lack of it. It was that, while *Dissent* editors argued their cases with academic clarity, the chief virtue of *Tsopano* seemed to be that it had immediately become the voice of Nyasaland's people. It is hard to contrast the two without seeming to criticise one. This is not to say that articles in *Tsopano* were not excellent (the editorial criticising the Monckton Commission was the best I have read)

or that *Dissent* was remote from reality. But *Tsopano* (which means "Now" in chiNyanja) gives the atmosphere of Nyasa feeling, while *Dissent* offers the fruits of deep thinking. The letters in *Tsopano*, whether well phrased or (at times) slightly incoherent, convey overpoweringly the Nyasa yearning for secession and freedom. The two Europeans who began *Tsopano*, Jimmy Skinner and Peter Mackay, recognised this yearning in the most practical way: they planned to hand over the entire running of *Tsopano* to Nyasas as quickly as possible.

In Northern Rhodesia a third independent and critical journal was launched in February 1960. Dick Hall, who had made a great success of the Northern Rhodesian Government publications as assistant information officer, left the Government to start his own weekly *African Mail*. Titus Mukupo, formerly Nkumbula's Secretary-General, strengthened the paper's staff. With more professionalism and more advertising support, it seemed likely to be the most successful of the three. *Dissent*, cyclostyled and carrying no advertising, was pegged to a circulation of a thousand; *Tsopano* was aiming to reach ten thousand, which was three thousand less than the initial printing order of *African Mail*. But their importance is far greater than their circulation figures: perhaps twenty Nyasas will read a single copy of *Tsopano*. Together they are the voice of protest, to which Governments must listen. But it is a condemnation of the older papers in Rhodesia that they could not match the pace of political events, which called these new papers into being.

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